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iNon-technical Summary
Decision-makers are confronted with decisions under uncertainty. Financial uncer-
tainty may adversely affect growth. Theoretically, forecasts may potentially reduce
uncertainty and create economic value. Focusing on survey predictions, this cumu-
lative dissertation addresses the economic relevance of interest rate, crude oil and
exchange rate forecasts for policy as well as managerial decision-makers and finan-
cial market participants, respectively. The first research objective of the presented
studies is to compile novel evidence on the accuracy, rationality and usefulness of
financial market forecasts delivered by professional analysts. Despite the compre-
hensible critique regarding their foresight qualities in efficient markets, financial
forecasts are to be understood as integral elements for decision-makers of various
kinds and hence may even be classified as indispensable. This makes the appraisal
of forecasts and the corresponding price-buildings processes even more essential for
decision-makers. Following this line of thought and focusing again on interest rates,
crude oil prices and exchange rates, the second research objective of this thesis is
devoted to the analysis of changing market environments and the resulting effects
on expectation formations.
ii
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Es liegt in der Verantwortung von ökonomischen Entscheidungsträgern, Entschei-
dungen unter Unsicherheit zu treffen. Finanzmarktunsicherheit kann ökonomische
Aktivität negativ beeinflussen. In diesem Sinn können Prognosen theoretisch einen
ökonomischen Mehrwert liefern. Diese kumulative Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit
der ökonomischen Relevanz von Vorhersagen für Zinsen, Rohölpreise und Wechsel-
kurse für Entscheidungsträger aus Politik und Wirtschaft sowie für Finanzmarktteil-
nehmer. Der Fokus dieser Arbeit liegt dabei auf umfragebasierten Survey-Prognosen.
Der erste Forschungsbeitrag dieser Arbeit bezieht sich auf neue empirische Erkennt-
nisse mit Blick auf die Genauigkeit, Rationalität und Verwendbarkeit von von Fi-
nanzmarktexperten zur Verfügung gestellten Prognosen für Finanzmarktzeitreihen.
Trotz der nachvollziehbaren Kritik mit Blick auf die Prognosequalität in effizien-
ten Märkten sind Finanzmarktprognosen essentielle Entscheidungskriterien für die
handelnden Akteure. Insofern sind Finanzmarktprognosen unverzichtbar, was aus
Sicht der Entscheidungsträger eine intensive Begutachtung der Prognosen sowie
der den Finanzmarktzeitreihen zu Grunde liegenden Preisbildungsmechanismen
erforderlich macht. Auf diesem Gedankengang aufbauend leitet sich der zweite
Forschungsbeitrag dieser Arbeit ab, der sich mit den sich verändernden Rahmenbe-
dingungen in ausgewählten Zins-, Rohöl- und Devisenmärkten beschäftigt.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summaries
“Extrapolations into the future, whether empirically founded projections or hunches that are
revealed only by their consequences in action, are being made and will continue to be made.
We live in the present and cannot avoid the future; the decisions we make today will affect
tomorrow. Indeed, many of them must look toward a longer-range future. Such decisions,
whether made against the background of articulated forecasts or out of a subconscious but
often quite strong feeling about the climate of life to be expected, imply projection in the
sense of some view of the future. The choice is not between making and not making an
extrapolation into the future; it is between making the projection in overt and sometimes
quantitative terms, and proceeding by feel and by faith. Even inaction implies some picture
of the future.”
Simon Kuznets (1954)1
Introduction
Both corporate and political decision-makers as well as financial market partici-
pants and private households are confronted with decisions under uncertainty.2 For
decades, economic scholars have been calling attention to uncertainty related im-
pediments for real economic activity.3 Following this line of thought, it has been
argued that rising financial uncertainty may depress inter alia investement activity
and the supply of credit and hence adversely affect growth.4 Consequently, it has
been intensively discussed in the academic literature that economic and financial
market forecasts may potentially reduce uncertainty (Holden et al., 1990), lead to
“good decisions” (see Diebold and Lopez, 1996, p. 241) and hence create economic
value.5 Owing to this, the usefulness of forecasting methods for economic indica-
tors as well as financial market variables and their accuracy has been empirically
assessed and critically discussed for several decades (See Cox, 1930; Makridakis et
al., 1979; Hendry and Clements, 2003; Rossi and Sekhposyan, 2016, to name but a
few).
Unsurprisingly, the forecast evaluation literature has rapidly grown in the last
three decades (see, e.g, Diebold and Lopez, 1996; West, 2006; Franses et al., 2014,
who provide comprehensive overviews of empirical studies and methodologies).
In this context, it is a valid and well-known assertion that the forecast profession
1 See Kuznets (1954), p. 36. Also partly quoted in Roos (1955).
2 See, for example, Lowe (1970) and Belongia (1987).
3 See, especially, Keynes (1936) and Friedman (1977) as well as Creal and Wu (2017) and Moore (2017)
for more recent investigations in this regard.
4 See, for example, Caldara et al. (2016).
5 See, for example, Howard (1954), Wheelwright and Clarke (1976) as well as Elliott and Timmermann
(2008).
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always has had to deal with the critique that predictions are useless6 or inaccurate
at least. In recent times, not only the limitations regarding the accuracy of forecasts
but also forecasters’ behavioral patterns have been discussed intensively.7
Furthermore, the bounded utility of forecasts receives much more attention in
times of financial and economic crisis.8 In this regard, reasonable complaints are
that forecasts seem to be least accurate when they are needed most9 and that there
exist significant limitations of prediction methods in anticipating crisis events or re-
cessions (see, for example, Fintzen and Stekler, 1999; Goodwin and Wright, 2010).
Rising forecast errors during regime shifts as well as in times of high uncertainty
and recession events do often correspond with structural breaks in long-term rela-
tionships (Stock and Watson, 1996; Pesaran and Timmermann, 2004; Clements and
Hendry, 2006), which are important elements of almost all forecasting approaches.10
Moreover, survey forecasts for economic indicators and financial variables – serving
as a rare proxy for market expectations – seem to regularly violate the important
assumption of rationality. Hence, it is realistic and advisable to ask whether there is
any use of forecasts at all.
Having said that, decision-making – which by definition describes a structural
process to make plans for coming periods – is difficult to imagine without assump-
tions about the future (Kuznets, 1954). Phrased somewhat differently: forward-
looking planning and strategies in fact need forecasting (Roos, 1955; Schultz, 1984;
Makridakis, 1986) or, following Firth (1975), “Planning involves making decisions which
will have their effect in the future and so an estimate of this future is required. This assess-
ment of the future is termed forecasting and it is a vital ingredient in any planning process.”
(see Firth, 1975, p. 97). In fact, forecasting may not be seen as an unsolicitous task
for decision-makers. This is especially true for financial institutions. In order to be
compliant with international accounting standards – i.e. International Financial Re-
porting Standard 9 (IFRS 9) – banks are obliged to make use of economic forecasts
and financial market predictions (i.e. interest rates) and employ macroeconomic-
based credit loss models (Novotny-Farkas, 2016; Feschiyan and Andasarova, 2017;
Skoglund, 2017).
Under the assumption of an implicit accordance that despite apparent deficien-
cies it is not possible to imagine decision-making without forecasting, it is even
6 Especially under the assumption of efficient financial markets (Mitchell and Pearce, 2007; Gubay-
dullina et al., 2011; Baghestani et al., 2015). Timmermann and Granger (2004) argued: “The efficient
market hypothesis (EMH) is a backbreaker for forecasters” (see Timmermann and Granger, 2004, p. 15).
7 For example, Meub et al. (2013) experimentally confirmed that anchoring leads to biased forecasts.
Also focusing on the behavioral biases of forecasters, Proeger and Meub (2014) examined the influ-
ence of forecasters’ overconfidence and concluded that this is more of a social rather than only an
individual bias. Focusing on survey predictions for financial markets, Fujiwara et al. (2013) empha-
sized that professional forecasters are influenced by past predictions and hence act behaviorally.
8 For example, Dua (1988) mentioned a decline in accuracy of interest rate forecasts in periods of high
volatility.
9 Crisis-related effects on forecast accuracy have been inter alia discussed by Kunze and Gruppe
(2014), Kunze (2014) as well as Kunze et al. (2015).
10 It does not necessarily have to be the case that crisis events lead to structural changes in long-term
relationships. In his famous Lucas Critique, Lucas Jr (1976) articulated the concern that with their
decisions policy makers themselves “will systematically alter the structure of econometric models” (see
Lucas Jr, 1976, p. 41). This endogeneity problem is especially relevant for central banks, which is
outlined in further detail below.
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more important to have a clear understanding of the methodological issues of fi-
nancial forecasting and the corresponding price-building processes.11 Furthermore,
one important characteristic aftermath of financial crises is the increased attention of
decision-makers as well as researchers and forecasters regarding the interdependen-
cies of financial market turmoil, macroeconomic uncertainty and economic growth
(Bekaert et al., 2013; Creal and Wu, 2017). This has also been true for the global
financial crisis as well as the subsequent euro crisis,12 because the causes and con-
sequences of these crises demonstrated quite impressively that the pro-cyclical fea-
tures and the fragility of financial markets – with rising financial imbalances and
following corrections of asset prices – also hold strong relevance for real economic
activity13 and hence for economic and financial forecasts as well as their recipients.
Motivation and objectives of this thesis
Added together, these preliminary remarks inevitably lead to the conclusion that
given the postulated relationship between economic activity and financial market
uncertainty financial market forecasts are indeed indispensable ingredients of al-
most any decision-making process in business and economics, but they have to be
appraised in the light of a constantly-changing environment. The adjustments of
foreign exchange rate regimes in many Asian economies as a response to the Asian
crisis in 1997/98 may be seen as one well-fitting example in this context (Rajan, 2002;
Hernandez and Montiel, 2003). However, despite being regularly associated with
crisis events, structural changes might also be a consequence of significantly altered
institutional circumstances and hence policy driven. In this context, the introduc-
tion of the euro and the subsequent convergence of government bond yields of the
European Monetary Union (EMU) member countries, the opening up of China’s fi-
nancial markets and the corresponding internationalization of the Chinese currency
as well as the recently observed changes to the balance of power regarding global oil
markets – also referred to as the New Oil Order14 – are relevant “real life” examples,
that will also be touched in this thesis.
Focusing on survey predictions, this thesis’ studies address the economic rele-
vance of interest rate, crude oil price and exchange rate forecasts for policy as well
as managerial decision-makers and financial market participants, respectively. The
first research objective of the presented studies is to compile novel evidence on the
accuracy, rationality and usefulness of financial market forecasts delivered by pro-
fessional analysts. Despite the comprehensible critique regarding to their foresight
11 In this regard, the necessity to recognize the characteristics of exchange rate regimes to predict
exchange rate movements is only one prominent example (see, for example, von Spreckelsen et al.,
2014).
12 See, for example, Bloom (2009), Beckmann and Czudaj (2017a), Creal and Wu (2017), and Hartmann
et al. (2017)
13 See, for example, Gramlich and Oet (2011), Borio (2014) and Magkonis and Tsopanakis (2016) as well
as Cardarelli et al. (2011) who delivered a comprehensive literature overview regarding the impact
of financial cycles on the real economy. The authors inter alia discussed the effects of eroding values
of collateral and the preparedness of the financial system to grant funds for business activities as
well as the consequences of eroding bank capital.
14 In 2015, this expression was used by researchers at the investment bank Goldman Sachs (see Damie
et al., 2015; Khan, 2017) and has to be seen closely associated with the shale oil boom in the US (See
also Morecroft, 2017, who investigated the so-called Saudi America hypothesis.)
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qualities in efficient markets15 financial forecasts are indeed to be understood as inte-
gral elements for decision-makers of various kinds and hence may even be classified
as indispensable. In this context, Granger and Pesaran (2000) and Timmermann and
Granger (2004) annotated the need to link decision-making and forecast accuracy.
Furthermore, the appraisal of the usefulness of these forecasts is always a matter
of the specific task of the decision-makers and the circumstances in which they will
be applied (Barron and Targett, 1988). Moreover – and against the background of
constantly-changing market environments, periods of financial stress and recessions
– survey forecasts may deliver useful insights for decision-makers that extent be-
yond pure measures of accuracy and rationality (see also Makridakis, 1996). In this
regard, the potential relationship between uncertainty and financial forecasters’ dis-
agreement has received a substantial amount of attention lately and looking forward
it could contribute to explain the relationship between financial market movements
and the real economy. Reflecting this line of thought leads to the second research
objective which this thesis will be devoted: the relevance of changing market en-
vironments and the resulting effects on expectation formation and price-building
processes in financial markets.
Before summarizing the following chapters of this thesis, the remainder of this
introductory chapter will discuss the relevance of financial forecasts for various
decision-makers in an uncertain world and emphasize the relevance and applica-
tions for survey predictions for interest rates, crude oil prices and exchange rates.
Decision-makers and financial forecasts
In general, economic and financial forecasts should be interpreted as an integral part
of any decision theoretical framework and hence they have no intrinsic value.16 In
practice, the potential contribution of forecasts largely depends on the specific objec-
tives and tasks of decision-makers. It should not come as a surprise, that predictions
for financial market variables are first and foremost linked to their aid regarding
the implementation of successful trading strategies (see also Kim and Orphanides,
2012).17 Discussing the relevance and potential benefits of forecasts for financial
variables, Mills (2008) brought up a well-fitting example presented by Lo (1997),
which seems to be worth revisiting at this point. The author compared an invest-
ment of one US dollar in January 1926 into US Treasury bills with a maturity of
one month with the investment of the same amount in the S&P stock market index.
Under the assumption of reinvestment, Lo (1997) stated that the bond investment
would have grown to 12 US dollars by December 1994 whereas the stock investment
would have reached 811 US dollars in the same period. Lo (1997) further developed
his example by altering the reinvestment method: now, each month an investor with
perfect foresight (i.e. with the knowledge concerning which asset would have the
higher yield) could choose between the stock and the bond investment (see Lo, 1997;
Mills, 2008). In this case, the final amount would be 1,251,684,443 US dollars.18 Mills
(2008) boiled Lo’s finding down to the essence: “Obviously, few, if any, investors have
15 See also Schwartz (1970), Fama (1970) as well as Belongia (1987).
16 See McNees (1988), Winklhofer et al. (1996) as well as Elliott and Timmermann (2008).
17 It is argued here that financial market forecasts are a specific sub-theme of economic forecasts.
18 Using slightly different investment periods, Mills (2008) ended up with different results.. Moreover,
it is important to note that this example ignores transaction costs (Mills, 2008) and does not account
for survivorship bias. After all, the general implications of this numerical show piece remain unal-
tered.
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perfect foresight, but Lo’s point was that even modest ability to forecast financial asset returns
would have been handsomely rewarded [. . . ]" (Mills, 2008, p. 510).
In fact, not only speculative motives lead to a substantial demand for financial
market forecasts. In this regard, Baghestani et al. (2015) emphasized the relevance
of interest rate forecasts and the inference of market expectations for (monetary)
policy decision-makers, whereas Duffee (2013) additionally highlighted the signifi-
cance of interest rate forecasts as an input factor for economic forecasts. Alquist et
al. (2013) annotated the impact of oil price forecasts on managerial decision-making
and Giddy and Dufey (1975) remarked that foreign exchange rate forecasts have to
be seen as “significant inputs to decisions concerning practically every aspects of interna-
tional business” (see Giddy and Dufey, 1975, p. 1).
More generally, forecasts for interest rates, oil prices and exchange rates offer as-
sistance for decision-makers who have to cope with uncertainty and decisions under
risk. The remainder of this section provides a more detailed overview of potential
recipients of forecasts.
Non-financial institutions – to begin with – are in fact exposed to financial risks.
There exists ample empirical evidence in the literature regarding non-financial firms’
interest rate (Bartram, 2002; Dhanani et al., 2007), exchange rate (Jorion, 1990; Bodnar
and Gentry, 1993; Bartram et al., 2010) as well as commodity price exposure (Tsai,
2015; Shaeri et al., 2016). Concerning exchange rate risks, it is important to note that
even without direct foreign business activities – in terms of their assets, liabilities or
general operations – firms may be exposed to exchange rate risk.19
Consequently, effective risk management may increase firm value (Aretz et al.,
2007). In order to mitigate these risks and increase firm value, hedging might be con-
sidered as the preferred strategy by corporate decision-makers. Froot et al. (1993) ex-
tensively discussed the benefits and rationales for hedging and inter alia annotated
that hedging may be of benefit for corporations when external financing is more
costly than internal funds. In fact, in the long-term corporate decision-makers could
theoretically eliminate almost any exposure via hedging strategies. However, these
hedging strategies are costly and hence corporate decision-makers must rely on fore-
casts to determine the optimal amount and form of hedging (Stockman, 1987). As
a result, forecasting financial market variables is an integral part of corporate hedg-
ing strategies, but not a substitute for effective risk management (see also Gripaios,
1994). Following this line of thought, Fatemi and Glaum (2000) – for example – in-
vestigated the risk management practices of German non-financial firms regarding
foreign exchange rate risk and interest rate risk and, unsurprisingly, concluded that
forecasts are vital input factors in risk management.
Investigating banks from the US, UK, Germany, Canada and Japan, Madura and
Zarruk (1995) delivered empirical evidence for significant interest rate exposure of
these financial institutions. Furthermore, Spiwoks et al. (2008) emphasized the need
for interest rate forecasts for banks to fulfill their tasks of maturity transformation.20
Not only considering banks, Czaja et al. (2009) discussed the relevance of interest
rate risk for German financial institutions. Schwarzbach et al. (2012), for example,
annotated the relevance of ten year German government bond yield forecasts for life
insurers’ asset managers.21
19 See especially Parsley and Popper (2006) who convincingly emphasized the indirect effects of ex-
change rate movements on firms’ profitability.
20 As noted above, financial institution also need forecasts to be compliant with regulatory require-
ments.
21 The authors motivated their investigations with the findings of Chopra and Ziemba (1993), who
underlined the strong relevance of return forecasts for successful asset allocations.
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In addition, governmental and monetary policy decision-makers have already
been interested in the outlook for interest rates, oil price and exchange rate fore-
casts for decades (Elliott and Timmermann, 2008; Duffee, 2013; Butter and Jansen,
2013). Consequently, the relevance of expectations regarding financial market vari-
ables and financial market forecasts has also been intensively discussed from the
perspective of these recipients.
For example, governmental decision-makers conduct fiscal policy not only in ac-
cordance with the current and expected future stance of the economy but also under
simultaneous consideration of the current and expected state of financial markets.
Regarding interest rates, the EMU sovereign debt crisis impressively demonstrated
that market participants’ expectations are strongly relevant concerning the refinanc-
ing needs of governments and the corresponding costs in terms of interest payments.
Government bond yields have been substantially influenced by the changing assess-
ment of investors (see, for example, De Santis, 2014, who emphasized the impact of
flight-to-quality effects on government bond yields of crisis-burdened EMU mem-
bers). Furthermore, one might especially argue that governmental decision-makers
are particularly interested in the foreign exchange market as it affects their coun-
tries’ economic competitiveness.22 More recently, the impact of commodity price
risk or commodity price shocks, respectively, on sovereigns’ credit quality and gov-
ernments’ fiscal stability has been discussed intensively (see, for example, Van Der
Ploeg, 2017; Lopez-Martin et al., 2017). Hence, especially for commodity exporting
countries – that strongly rely on the receipts from processing and exporting their
natural resources – commodity price forecasts and measures to indicate uncertain-
ties regarding commodity prices hold strong relevance.
And finally, monetary policy decision-makers generally conduct actions in ac-
cordance with their mandate. For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) fo-
cuses on price stability, whereas the U.S. Federal Reserve sets its monetary policy in
accordance with its goals of price stability, maximum employment, and moderate
long-term interest rates (McCandless Jr and Weber, 1995; Pollard, 2003; Elliott and
Timmermann, 2008; Basse et al., 2017). These mandates make the application of any
kind of forecast or expectation formation inevitably necessary. Furthermore, due
to the interdependent character regarding their reaction to and influence on finan-
cial markets central banks traditionally received a tremendous amount of attention
when discussing financial market forecasts as well as market expectations (Blinder,
2000). In fact, central bankers are both recipients of forecasts for and generate im-
pulses to financial markets. As one example, scholars have intensively discussed the
possible reactions of central banks to exchange rate movements (Taylor, 2001; Lubik
and Schorfheide, 2007).23 Dealing with monetary policy decision-makers’ reaction
to financial market developments and uncertainties, Pagan and Robertson (2008)
provided a comprehensive overview with regard to the relevant topics for central
banks using forecasts as a decision support tool. Furthermore, market participants’
expectations hold strong relevance for central banks (see, for example, Neuenkirch,
2012, who discussed the relationship between central bank communication and mar-
ket expectations). Conversely, central bank communication may theoretically reduce
uncertainty in the way that it increases forecast accuracy. In fact, it is argued here
22 The relevance of exchange rates has been emphasized – for example – for the individual economies
in the euro area (Breuer and Klose, 2015; Lucarelli et al., 2018). The political importance of FX mar-
kets also becomes clear in the current debate regarding the question of whether China is a “currency
manipulator” (Ramirez, 2013).
23 Reversely, and as discussed below, financial market participants’ expectations are driven by central
bank communication, its forward guidance and its actual measures.
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that lower uncertainty has to be seen as one intended effect of central banks’ forward
guidance (see also Chortareas et al., 2002; Reeves and Sawicki, 2007; Trabelsi, 2016,
who investigated the interrelationships of central bank transparency, forward guid-
ance and forecasting from varying perspectives). This issue can also be understood
as a nexus between central banks’ reaction functions to (expected) future develop-
ments and the potential influence of their monetary policy alignment on financial
markets. The latter especially finds expression via the interest rate channel, the ex-
change rate channel as well as the credit channel (Mishkin, 1995; Boivin et al., 2010).
Moreover, regarding oil prices, Amendola et al. (2017) found empirical evidence in-
dicating a positive relationship between expansionary monetary policy and oil price
volatility. Due to this mutual influence, forecasters regularly have to build an un-
derstanding of the reaction function of central bankers (Sturm and De Haan, 2011)
and monetary policy decision-makers have to anticipate economy wide second and
third-round effects of their words and deeds.
In fact, financial market variables themselves regularly serve as predictors for
economic activity and recessions. Unsurprisingly, a voluminous strand of literature
has emerged around this topic. Following – for example – Harvey (1991), “interest
rates provide a window for future economic growth” (see Harvey, 1991, p. 701). The
shape of the yield curve has been frequently applied to predict economic downturns
(Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Ahrens, 2002; Wheelock and Wohar, 2009; Bluedorn
et al., 2016). Following the discussion above, central bankers’ interest regarding
the outlook for crude oil prices may be initially associated with its influence on the
macroeconomic price level. Having said that, the relationship between global crude
oil prices and economic activity in general also holds special interest for monetary
policy decision-makers (Barsky and Kilian, 2001; Kilian, 2009; Miao et al., 2017). For
example, Bernanke et al. (1997) annotated that “in the view of many economists, oil price
shocks are perhaps the leading alternative to monetary policy as a key factor in postwar U.S.
recessions” (Bernanke et al., 1997, p. 93). Focusing on – but not limited to – the US
economy Mohaddes and Pesaran (2017) recently investigated the effects of falling
oil prices on interest rates, inflation and stock prices as well as dividends (used as a
proxy for real economic activity). Regarding the effects on economic growth, the au-
thors concluded that lower oil prices are in fact beneficial for real economic activity.
However, the uncertainty of oil prices may have a negative effect on investment (El-
der and Serletis, 2010) and thus might hinder economic activity. Following this line
of thought, Jo (2014) discussed the impact of oil price uncertainty on global growth
measured by industrial production and concluded that there exists an inverse rela-
tionship.24
Summarizing these thoughts it is reasonable to state that interest rates, crude
oil prices as well as exchange rates – and especially forecasts thereof – are crucial
variables for decision-makers. In this context, institutional backgrounds, changes
in price-building processes and external impulses hold strong relevance. The three
studies of this thesis presented in Chapters 2, 4 and 6 address recent and specific
developments regarding government bond, crude oil and foreign exchange markets.
24 Interestingly, the authors emphasized the need for survey-based measures for uncertainty regarding
energy prices.
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Survey forecasts for financial markets: evaluations, expecta-
tions and uncertainty
A wide range of forecasting methods exist that are applied to predict the future
movements of economic indicators and financial variables.25 As noted above, this
thesis addresses the applications and evaluations of survey forecasts for financial
market variables.26 Especially for decision-makers who are not able or willing to
produce their own forecasts for all relevant or required financial or economic vari-
ables survey forecasts may be important input variables. In this context, survey
forecasts might also be seen as a potential alternative for self-produced predictions
– or may at least be used as a means of benchmarking.
The evaluation of forecasts and prediction models is crucial for policy decision-
makers (Dovern and Ziegler, 2008). For recipients of survey forecasts it is important
to assess and compare the predictions received using reasonable and easily repro-
ducible quality criteria. Forecast accuracy measures are regularly applied as a stan-
dard of comparison for two or more competing forecasting approaches. Commonly-
deployed metrics regarding accuracy are statistical error measures27 as well as mea-
sures of sign accuracy.28 In addition, measures of relative forecast accuracy have
been regularly applied. Here, the Theil’s U (Theil, 1955; Theil, 1992) as well as the
Diebold Mariano test of equal predictive accuracy (Diebold and Mariano, 1995) are
widely used. Testing empirically for the presence of a status quo bias, Andres and
Spiwoks (1999) introduced the TOTA (topically oriented trend adjustment) coeffi-
cient.29
Over and above these accuracy measures, scholars have intensively investigated
the additional information that can be delivered by survey forecasts and a vast body
of literature is dedicated to the concept of forecast combination.30 For example, Kim
and Orphanides (2012) successfully utilized the additional information of survey
forecasts when modeling the term structure of interest rates. However, given the fo-
cus of this thesis, two interconnected applications of survey forecasts are outstand-
ing and will be discussed in further detail below: first, survey forecasts may be ap-
plied to investigate the expectation formation of market participants and hence may
aid in inspecting price-building-processes; and second, the heterogeneity of survey
25 There does not exist a distinct and universally-valid classification. Good overviews and discus-
sions of different applied forecasting methodologies can be found in Chatfield (1997), Fauvel et al.
(1999), Hendry and Clements (2003), Fildes et al. (2008) as well as De Gooijer and Hyndman (2006).
Moreover, focusing on major central banks, Butter and Jansen (2013) highlighted that the applied
forecasting methods are in fact quite diverse, ranging from pure judgment and expert advisory to
(complex) macro-econometric models.
26 It is important to note that the investigated surveys – Consensus Economics (see Chapter 3 and Chap-
ter 7) as well as Dow Jones (see Chapter 5) – are collected from professional forecasters. Although
the explicit forecasting methodologies applied by these experts are not known, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the forecasters’ approaches show considerable differences and may range from judgmen-
tal forecasts to more complex econometric models (see Pesaran and Weale, 2006, who also provide
a comprehensive overview of further collections of survey predictions).
27 The root mean squared error belongs to the most frequently-applied statistical error measures (see,
for example, Kolb and Stekler, 1996).
28 See, for example, Greer (2003) who applied the sign accuracy test when evaluating interest rate
forecasts.
29 The TOTA coefficient has been frequently applied for interest rates (see, for example, Spiwoks and
Hein, 2007; Spiwoks et al., 2010) and exchange rates (see, for example, Bofinger and Schmidt, 2003).
30 See Bates and Granger (1969), Granger and Ramanathan (1984), Clemen (1989), Hendry and
Clements (2004), Greer (2005), Clements and Harvey (2011), and Blanc and Setzer (2016).
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predictions might deliver relevant and valuable insights into market participants’
uncertainty.
Following Pesaran and Weale (2006), the formation of expectations is an “integral
part of the decision-making process by households, firms, as well as the private and public
institutions” (see Pesaran and Weale, 2006, p. 717.) and “expectations are subjectively
held beliefs by individuals about uncertain future outcomes or the beliefs of other individuals
in the market place” (see Pesaran and Weale, 2006, p. 720.). Following – for example
– Ruelke et al. (2012), the assumption of traders’ rational forecasts is a “cornerstone”
in capital market theory (see Ruelke et al., 2012, p. 2757). When used as a proxy
for market expectations, one major advantage of survey forecasts stems from the
fact that they are exogenous (MacDonald and Torrance, 1988; Jongen et al., 2008).31
Consequently, the rational expectation hypothesis brought forth by Muth (1961) re-
ceived strong attention in the context of investigating financial market survey data
(MacDonald, 2000).32
For the three financial markets in the focus of this thesis, survey forecasts have
been utilized for decades.33 After surveying a substantial part of the evaluation
literature, MacDonald (2000) concluded that biasedness and inefficiency of survey
forecasts are common findings.34 However, he also mentioned the capability of sur-
vey forecasts to investigate the behavior of asset markets also taking risk premia in
financial markets into consideration.
Moreover, in the context of the empirical investigations of survey forecasts in
Chapters 3 and 7 of this thesis, some methodological remarks are reasonable. In or-
der to assess the rationality of the financial forecasts (i.e. interest rates in Chapter 3
and exchange rates in Chapter 7) a focus will be placed on alternative measures that
are located in the field of applied time series analysis, following the reasoning of
Cheung and Chinn (1998). The authors proposed specifically investigating the sta-
tistical properties of the relevant time series. In this sense, as a necessary condition
for rationality, the time series of the actual observations and the corresponding fore-
casts should share the same order of integration and should be cointegrated (Liu and
Maddala, 1992; Cheung and Chinn, 1998).35 Provided that both preconditions are
met further investigations with regard to the forerunning properties of forecasts are
feasible. It is argued in this thesis that good forecasts should fulfill the requirement of
rationality following Cheung and Chinn, 1998 and deliver a forward-looking view.
31 Beckmann and Czudaj (2017a) recently annotated that consensus forecasts are “considered to be the
most adequate approximation of market expectations available” (see Beckmann and Czudaj, 2017a, p. 149).
32 Common tests regarding the rationality of survey forecasts for financial market variables are the test
for unbiasedness and the test for forecast efficiency; also known as test for orthogonality of error
terms (Nordhaus, 1987; Ito, 1990; Ronald and Ian, 1993).
33 Pioneering studies come – for example – from Friedman (1980) focusing on interest rates,
Dominguez (1986) investigating survey predictions for exchange rates and Ronald and Ian (1993)
examining crude oil forecasts.
34 More than a decade ago, MacDonald (2000) investigated the evaluation literature for bond markets,
foreign exchange markets and stock markets. More recent studies also dealing with oil prices con-
firm the findings of MacDonald (2000). For oil price studies, see, for example, Ronald and Ian (1993),
Reitz et al. (2009), as well as Prat and Uctum (2011). Chortareas et al. (2012) focused on interest rate
forecasts. Surveying the literature on exchange rate surveys Jongen et al. (2008) came to similar
conclusions like MacDonald (2000). More recent results regarding exchange rates can be found in
Beckmann and Czudaj (2017a) and Ince and Molodtsova (2017). For example, Ince and Molodtsova
(2017) discussed how survey forecasts for exchange rates allow testing the assumption of rational
expectations of market participants and inter alia could not accept the hypothesis of unbiasedness.
35 Two time series are said to be cointegrated when they share a common stochastic trend (See, for
example, Granger, 1981; Engle and Granger, 1987; Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004).
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The latter may be statistically validated using Granger causality analysis.36 Added
together this framework offers a straightforward and structural assessment of finan-
cial market forecasts. However, in the empirical literature comparatively few studies
utilize this approach and hence the studies in Chapters 3 and 7 provide novel and
relevant contributions to the field of forecast evaluation.37
When analyzing survey data, it becomes obvious that from a cross sectional fore-
caster perspective individuals’ expectations may vary substantially (see also Mankiw
et al., 2003; Sill, 2014). Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that when inves-
tigating expectation formation coping with uncertainty is unavoidable and relevant
(see also Poncela and Senra, 2017). In this context, it is crucial to clearly differentiate
between risk and uncertainty, as Knight (1921) expressed in his seminal contribution.
Following Knight (1921), risk is quantifiable with known probabilities and for uncer-
tainty there are no known probabilities of events (see Knight, 1921; Basili, 2001). The
relevance of this Knightian uncertainty for financial markets has been emphasized in
the literature (Dow and Costa Werlang, 1992; Epstein and Wang, 1994; Basili, 2001;
Rigotti and Shannon, 2005). For example, Basili (2001) annotated that an “uncertainty
attitude of agents may shed new light on some financial market puzzles and provides an new
explanation of them.” (Basili, 2001, p. 2).
Following this line of thought, survey forecasts may provide a missing link not
only to test the rationality of market participants but also to measure uncertainty
(Lahiri and Sheng, 2010). Poncela and Senra (2017), listed three approaches applied
to measure uncertainty using survey forecasts. The authors mentioned disagree-
ment from point forecasts, the equal weighted average of individual uncertainty
and the equal weighted aggregation of the individual density forecasts (Poncela and
Senra, 2017).38 The empirical evidence regarding the usefulness of survey data in de-
livering uncertainty measures is rather mixed, whereas the majority of studies focus
on macroeconomic indicators (see also Atalla et al., 2016). Starting with Zarnowitz
and Lambros (1987), scholars have been discussing – and questioning – the use-
fulness of forecasters’ disagreement as a gage for uncertainty (for comprehensive
overviews of the relevant literature see Boero et al., 2008; Lahiri and Sheng, 2010;
Abel et al., 2016). In fact, Jurado et al. (2015) listed relevant drawbacks when using
survey forecasts in this context.39
However, it is argued in this thesis that given the limited availability of alterna-
tive measures for uncertainty as well as the relevance of financial market variables
for economic activity, survey forecasts should not be ruled out in general. In fact,
survey forecasts for financial market variables may be especially useful to draw in-
ference in the context of the global financial crisis. This has been documented by
Beckmann and Czudaj (2017b), who were able to demonstrate a close link between
36 Generally speaking, a time series Granger causes another time series when past values of the former
deliver additional informational content for the prediction of the latter (Engle and Granger, 1987;
Gelper and Croux, 2007).
37 Some examples in the forecast evaluation literature are Berk (1999) (focusing on inflation forecasts),
Schwarzbach et al. (2012) as well as Kunze et al. (2014) (focusing on interest rate forecasts) and the
recent study of Cheung et al. (2017a) (focusing on exchange rates).
38 In fact, the availability of surveys providing the analysts’ individual probability distribution are
rather scarce. Hence, the majority of studies evaluates disagreement among point forecasts (see
also Abel et al., 2016).
39 The authors highlighted among others the limited number of variables with corresponding forecasts
as well as issues with behavioral biases of forecasters.
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forecasters’ disagreement and uncertainty. Additionally, disagreement among fore-
casters used as dispersion measures may aid explaining the financial market partic-
ipants’ expectation formation process (Dovern, 2015).
In accordance with these lines of thought and focusing on interest rates Kunze
et al. (2014) used the high low spread of monthly forecasts for the three months in-
terbank rate provided by Consensus Economics as a measure for financial market un-
certainty and successfully explained crisis-related movements of this variable with
financial stress indicators and economic sentiment measures. Focusing on survey
forecasts for exchange rates, Cavusoglu and Neveu (2015) recently emphasized the
predictive power of dispersion measures. Regarding oil prices, utilizing data col-
lected by Consensus Economics Singleton (2013) was among the first to draw on dis-
persion measures derived from survey forecasts, albeit not focusing on uncertainty
per se. Also focusing on oil prices, Atalla et al. (2016) investigated the dispersion of
forecasts contributing to the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters and found em-
pirical evidence that rising forecasters’ disagreement mirrors increased uncertainty.
They also concluded that oil price volatility can explain forecasters’ disagreement.
The three studies in this thesis focusing on the evaluation of survey forecasts take
on the concepts discussed in this section, albeit in varying degrees (see Chapters 3,
5 and 7.).
Summary of the studies on interest rates and interest rate fore-
casts
The first two studies of this thesis presented in Chapters 2 and 3 deal with crisis-
related effects on EMU interest rates as well as interest rate forecasts in Germany
and the United Kingdom. The global financial crisis as well as the EMU sovereign
debt crisis strongly influenced both short-term rates and the long end of the yield
curve (see, for example, Basse, 2014; Kunze, 2014; Kunze et al., 2015). Especially in
the case of long-term rates the comeback of risk premia demanded by government
bond investors to hold sovereign debt as well as flight-to-quality effects became evi-
dent in the course of the financial crisis (see, for example, Kunze, 2014; Kunze et al.,
2015). Despite being technically ruled out in a currency union, redenomination risks
have been recently discussed for EMU government bonds (Klose and Weigert, 2014;
Sibbertsen et al., 2014). In this context, rising yield spreads of different EMU govern-
ment bonds have to be interpreted against the background of dramatically-altered
market expectations regarding the fiscal sustainability of EMU member countries
and rising uncertainty. This is also true regarding the outlook for short-term interest
rates. In fact, significantly-altered monetary policy alignments of the central banks
in Washington, Frankfurt and London applied to counter economic downturns have
to be seen as a crisis related impulses on short term rates and interbank rates (see,
for example, Kunze et al., 2014).
Since survey forecasts are frequently used as exogenously given proxies for ex-
pectations, forecast errors as well as measures of forecast dispersion have recently
received a substantial amount of attention. Furthermore, as discussed above, it has
been convincingly argued in the literature that interest rates – as financial indicators
– may be applied to predict real economic activity or recessions, respectively (Fisher,
1907; Harvey, 1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1998). The studies in Chapters 2 and 3 ad-
dress these issues and deliver an empirical investigation of crisis-related changes to
EMU government bond yields from an asset manager’s perspective, investigate the
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accuracy and rationality of interest forecasts and link dispersion measures of sur-
vey forecasts to real economic indicators focusing on the implications for (policy)
decision-makers.
In Chapter 2 – Asset liability management and the euro crisis: Sovereign credit risk as
a challenge for the German life insurance industry – the incisive adjustment regarding
market participants’ attitude towards non-core EMU government debt is investi-
gated. Hence, it is firstly argued that the rise in government bond yield spreads
between Germany and crisis-burdened EMU member countries has to be associated
with a break in a long run relationship of the country-specific long term government
bond yields. The second objective of our investigation is the real life application
of this far-reaching development for asset and risk managers in the financial ser-
vices industry. Thereby we focus on the German life insurance industry, given that
at least in comparison with the large body of research dealing with effects of the
EMU sovereign debt crisis on the banking industry, the literature focusing on insur-
ance companies in this regard is much less extensive (Düll et al., 2017). Taking on
this literature gap, Chapter 2 begins by providing a detailed overview of the invest-
ment patterns of German life insurers and discusses the relevant impacts of the EMU
sovereign debt crisis.
We particularly illustrate that, given the large share of interest-baring assets, the
interest rate level holds strong significance for the life insurance industry. Especially
asset managers in the German life insurance industry seem to have had a complex
task. German government bond yields touched record lows in the aftermath of the
crisis, due to safe haven effects, deflationary fears as well as the ECB’s monetary pol-
icy adjustments. Hence, relying solely on German government bonds would have
had severe implications for life insurers’ interest income. However, higher yield-
ing assets issued by Spain and Italy seemed to be much riskier, due to sovereign
credit risk and redenomination risk. Unsurprisingly, the EMU sovereign debt crisis
strongly influenced the asset values of the German life insurance industry. We in-
vestigate the yield spreads of ten year government bond yields between Germany
and Italy and Germany and Spain (viewing Italy and Spain as EMU non-core coun-
tries) as well as Germany and the Netherlands and Germany and Austria (viewing
the Netherlands and Austria as EMU core countries) using unit root breakpoint tests
(see Perron, 1990; Perron and Vogelsang, 1992; Vogelsang and Perron, 1998; Perron,
2006). One clear advantage of this straightforward test procedure stems from the
fact that it allows checking for breakpoints with unknown timings. The statistical
evidence from the applied unit root breakpoint tests confirms previous findings re-
garding euro crisis-related structural shifts in the cointegrating relationship between
German and Spanish and German and Italian government bond yields, respectively.
Hence, based on our statistical results we have been able to show that sovereign
credit and probably redenomination risks have led to structural changes in the rela-
tionship between government bond yields in peripheral countries and Germany.
It is well documented in the empirical literature that from the perspective of
decision-makers, measures of forecast accuracy and tests for rationality are reason-
able complements in forecast evaluation (Dovern and Weisser, 2011; Chen et al.,
2016; Ince and Molodtsova, 2017). Following this reasoning, Chapter 3 of this the-
sis – Forecasting European interest rates in times of financial crisis – What insights do we
get from international survey forecasts? – presents an evaluation of survey forecasts
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provided by Consensus Economics utilizing both accuracy measures and tests for the
rationality of forecasts. Given the structure of our data set we are able to focus on
alternative tests for the rationality of the survey forecasts (our framework is based
on the approach proposed in Cheung and Chinn, 1998).
Moreover, and in order to derive additional potential utilities from the survey
forecasts, we examine possible implications from dispersion measures and forecast
errors. Testing for structural changes we are able to detect mean shifts in the cor-
responding time series of these uncertainty measures. In fact, the timing of these
breakpoints underpins the viewpoint that dispersion measures and forecast errors
are suitable indicators for uncertainty. Empirical evidence in this regard is rather
scarce in the academic literature. Moreover, based on Granger causality analysis,
we provide new empirical evidence for the existence of a link between uncertainty
regarding future interest rates and real economic activity. This finding should prove
especially useful for fiscal or monetary policy decision-makers and financial mar-
ket participants. However, more work has to be conducted in this growing research
field. Especially in the context of early warning indicators or early warning systems,
this approach might potentially deliver valuable insights, but has to be extended in
terms of investigated countries as well as economic and financial indicators.40
Summary of the studies on crude oil prices and crude oil fore-
casts
The following two studies of this thesis presented in Chapters 4 and 5 are partic-
ularly concerned with the impact of oil prices on market expectations regarding
sovereign credit risk of oil-exporting countries and the appraisal of oil price fore-
casting in the context of managerial decision-making. It has been intensively dis-
cussed in the academic literature that decision-makers of various kinds have to cope
with the uncertainty of global crude oil prices. Empirical evidence indicates that the
financing of some oil-exporting countries’ budgets strongly relies on oil revenues.
Hence, policy decision-makers in oil exporting countries have to plan their bud-
get considering assumptions of future oil prices. As the EMU sovereign debt crisis
impressively demonstrated, the sustainability of public finances has a substantial
impact of market expectation regarding credit risk. In this context, the findings of
Cimadomo et al. (2016) are highly relevant. The authors investigated survey fore-
casts for ten year government bond yields inter alia in Germany, Italy and France and
highlighted that better fiscal outlooks induce lower forecasts regarding sovereign
spreads.
Contributing to this strand of research, the third study in this thesis presented in
Chapter 4 named Oil prices and sovereign credit risk of oil producing countries: an em-
pirical investigation delivers novel empirical evidence on the relationship between
sovereign credit risk and crude oil prices. We investigate daily observations of
credit default swap spreads of eight oil-producing countries41 and the price of crude
40 Recently, Istrefi and Mouabbi (2017) utilized dispersions of Consensus Economics survey forecasts for
short- and long-term interest rates in the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Canada, Spain
and Sweden. The authors argued that interest rate uncertainty may be attributed to uncertainty re-
garding monetary policy and hence has negative impacts on economic activity (Istrefi and Mouabbi,
2017).
41 The countries in our data sample are the UK, US, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Malaysia, Russia,
Qatar and Venezuela.
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oil using methods of advanced time series analysis. Given the non-stationarity
of the time series and the empirical evidence pointing to generalized autoregres-
sive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH), we employ a vector autoregressive
VAR(1)-GARCH(1,1)-in-mean model. With this model, we are able to draw inference
about the impact of crude oil price changes on the market perception of sovereign
credit risk. Using this methodological approach to investigate the relationship be-
tween sovereign CDS spreads and crude oil prices delivers several noteworthy and
relevant results. Most importantly, we have been able to document an inverse re-
lationship between crude oil prices and sovereign CDS spreads for Saudi Arabia,
Brazil, Malaysia, Russia, Qatar and Venezuela. These results indicate that market
participants interpret rising oil prices as a positive influence on the fiscal stability
of oil-producing countries. Interestingly, for Norway, the UK and the US, we did
not find a significant inverse relationship and attribute these results to the diver-
sified character of these economies. Given the relevance of sovereign credit risk,
our recognitions hold strong impact for financial market practitioners and political
decision-makers42 and could also be seen as a starting point for further empirical
research. For example, Shahzad et al. (2017) highlighted the relevance of oil volatil-
ity shocks for directional forecasts for sovereign credit risk (for more recent studies
dealing with the relationship of oil price shocks and sovereign credit risk, see also
Bouri et al., 2018; Lee and Lee, 2018).
Under the assumption that from a decision-making perspective it is not an op-
tion to abandon forecasts per se, oil price surveys may be a welcome input factor
for decision-makers at governments, central banks, companies as well as financial
institutions. In Chapter 5 entitled The usefulness of oil price forecasts – evidence from
survey predictions we deliver evaluation results and appraise them in the context of
managerial decision-making. To the best of our knowledge, the second oil price
study presented in Chapter 5 utilizes for the first time the Dow Jones Oil Price Sur-
vey, which covers the two globally most important crude oil benchmarks. Hence,
this contribution delivers novel empirical evidence regarding the evaluation of oil
price forecasts. One major advantage of the data sample used stems from the fact
that each month twelve forecast horizons are available. This allows drawing infer-
ence regarding the relationship between forecast quality and the forecast horizon.
We find empirical evidence for status quo-dependent forecasts. Using the widely-
acknowledged TOTA-coefficient, we are able to show that topically-oriented trend
adjustment is even more pronounced for longer forecast horizons. However, for
longer horizons forecasters outperform the naïve prediction. Regarding the ratio-
nality of forecasts, longer term forecasts seem to be unbiased. Having said that, the
range of forecast errors – measured by the mean error and the adjusted root mean
squared error – rises with the forecast horizon. This can be seen as evidence of higher
uncertainty. Comparing these evaluation results with empirical findings regarding
the quality of interest rate or exchange rate forecasts it has to be concluded, that oil
price forecasts do not stand out against predictions for “purely financial” markets.
42 Nusair (2016) investigated economic activity in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and con-
cluded that rising oil prices have a stronger impact on real GDP growth than falling oil prices. In-
terestingly, Nusair (2016) emphasized the need to diversify the GCC economies, which to a certain
extent corresponds to our findings for the US, UK and Norway regarding financial markets’ percep-
tion of sovereign credit risk.
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Summary of the studies on exchange rates and exhange rate
forecasts
The last two studies of this thesis presented in Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the for-
eign exchange markets in Asia. In general, exchange rates have a significant im-
pact on foreign trade and cross border investments (see, for example, Kan, 2017)
and are important factors for open economies and international finance (see Dreger
and Stadtmann, 2008; Dick et al., 2015). First of all, we motivate our research focus
on Asia based on this region’s rising share of global GDP growth, cross border in-
vestments and world trade. Second, given the heterogeneous landscape regarding
its exchange rate markets and regimes, the Asian hemisphere holds special interest
for researchers as well as political and managerial decision-makers.43 Moreover, the
most significant economic driving force in that region is the Chinese economy, which
– despite its ongoing protectionist measures – becomes increasingly integrated into
global value chains and – at least gradually – into financial markets. Hence, Asia
in general and China in particular obviously offer themselves as research objectives
regarding institutional changes in foreign exchange markets.
In Chapter 6 – The global emergence of the RMB: A “New Normal” for China’s FX
markets? – we investigate the current state of Renminbi (RMB) internationalization
and the characteristics of China’s bipolar exchange rate system. For decades, re-
searchers investigated China’s growth miracle, its international interdependencies
and its protectionist measures (Ma and McCauley, 2008; Prasad, 2009; Morrison,
2011; Funke et al., 2015). Especially, the exchange rate policy has been criticized
(Frankel and Wei, 2007; Hu et al., 2016). Pegging the RMB to the US dollar has been
considered a substantial growth driver for the Chinese economy, which comes at
the cost of China’s trade partners (see Goldstein and Lardy, 2006). Meanwhile, this
debate’s focus shifted to RMB internationalization (Batten and Szilagyi, 2016; Cui,
2017).44 Furthermore, it has been discussed in the literature whether the RMB al-
ready plays a dominant role in Asia (Subramanian and Kessler, 2013), whether there
will be a transition to a tripolar currency system (see, for example, Fratzscher and
Mehl, 2014) or whether the RMB may eventually succeed the US dollar as the global
anchor currency (see, for example, Ito, 2010).
Having said that, the RMB is not yet freely tradable and still subject to a large
degree of intervention by China’s monetary policy decision-makers. Focusing on
the bipolar structure of China’s FX market – which builds on the parallel existence
of a mainland market and offshore trading locations – we argue in Chapter 6 that
despite ongoing internationalization efforts the imperfect integration of on- and off-
shore markets for the Chinese currency is a substantial impediment for RMB inter-
nationalization.45
43 From a political perspective especially the vast foreign exchange reserves in Asia as well as ongoing
foreign exchange interventions have been intensively discussed in the literature (Aizenman and
Lee, 2008; Pontines and Rajan, 2011; Ouyang and Rajan, 2011).
44 In this context the inclusion of the RMB into the IMF’s basket of special drawing rights (Dixon et al.,
2016) and the growing relevance in terms of becoming an international payment currency (Cheung
and Rime, 2014; Zhang and Zhang, 2017) are important developments.
45 In fact, it has been discussed in the literature that the so-called CNH-CNY-spread has been affected
by arbitrage and carry trades (Liu, 2015; Zhang and Zhang, 2017) as well as global risk aversion.
Funke et al. (2015) and Cheung et al. (2017b) cited so called “risk on, risk off” cycles.
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We investigate market integration between on- and offshore markets using meth-
ods of advanced time series analysis and find empirical evidence for strong persis-
tence of the spread between the on- and offshore quotations for the RMB. Further-
more, we do not find any empirical evidence that the degree of market integration
has improved lately. We infer from these results that the Chinese FX market is far
from being perfectly integrated and hence has not reached its “New Normal” yet.
In the last chapter of this thesis headlined Predicting exchange rates in Asia: New
insights on the accuracy of survey forecasts aggregated survey forecasts provided by
Consensus Economics for the exchange rates of the Chinese yuan, the Hong Kong dol-
lar, the Japanese yen, and the Singapore dollar vis-à-vis the US dollar are evaluated.
Using common forecast accuracy measures it is shown that all forecasts investigated
are irrational in the sense that the predictions are biased. However, these results are
inconsistent with the aforementioned alternative measure of rationality based on
methods of applied time series analysis. Investigating the order of integration of the
time series and using cointegration analysis, empirical evidence supports the conclu-
sion that the majority of forecasts are rational. However, the forerunning properties
of the predictions are less convincing. One major contribution of the study to the
literature of forecast evaluation is its focus on different currency regimes. In this
regard, a comprehensive up-to-date overview of the International Monetary de facto
exchange rate regimes for China, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore is provided. In
fact, the investigated foreign exchange rate regimes range from free floating (JPY)
to currency board systems (HKD). Empirical evidence indicates that the currency
regime matters for the quality of exchange rate forecasts. Regarding impulses for
further research, the study could also be seen as starting point for additional inves-
tigations of regime-dependent investigations of FX forecasts. Especially regarding
event risks (for example, shifts in the FX regimes), further research in the field of
forecast evaluation – also incorporating disaggregated survey data – is necessary.
Focusing on interest rates, oil prices and exchange rates this thesis delivers new
insights on price-building processes, market expectations and predictability for these
three financial markets. Furthermore it presents novel evidence regarding the accu-
racy, rationality and usefulness of survey based interest rate, crude oil price and ex-
change rate forecasts. Given the indispensability of forward-looking planning these
appraisals of available forecasts still are crucial for decision-makers. Furthermore, it
is shown that survey forecasts offer useful additional insights regarding forecasters’
rationality and uncertainty.
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Abstract
Purpose — This paper aims to investigate the long-term relationships of long-term
European Monetary Union (EMU) government bond yields. From an asset man-
agers’ or risk managers’ perspective during the euro crisis, the relevance of sovereign
credit and redenomination risk became a major issue. Furthermore, it has to be dif-
ferentiated between core and non-core EMU member countries.
Design/methodology/approach -– Methods of applied time series analysis are used
to investigate EMU government bond yields and EMU government bond yield spreads
for Spain, Italy, The Netherlands, Austria and Germany. Both standard unit root
testing procedures and breakpoint unit root tests are used to examine cointegrating
relationships and structural changes in these relationships.
Findings -– The empirical results deliver clear evidence for structural shifts in the
long-term relationship between Germany and the two non-core EMU countries (Italy
and Spain). The timing of the breaks coincides with the timing of the euro crisis. On
the contrary, the results for Austria and The Netherlands are different from the find-
ings for the two non-core countries.
Chapter 2. Asset liability management and the euro crisis 32
Research limitations/implications -– One major limitation of the study is the lim-
ited availability of data regarding to the reaction of asset managers or risk managers
to the euro crisis. Especially in the context of the discussion with regard to the rele-
vant risk-free rate for investors, this strand of research is relatively new.
Practical implications -– A deeper understanding of changes in the long-term rela-
tionship between government bond yields and the re-emergence of redenomination
risk is important for asset managers and risk managers in the financial services in-
dustry. This is especially true for German life insurers.
Originality/value -– The study provides various empirical contributions to the lit-
erature on the euro crisis and sovereign credit risk. First, previous results with re-
gard to the structural changes in the long-term relationship between German and
Spanish, German and Italian, German and Austrian as well as Germany and Dutch
government bond yields are confirmed using unit root breakpoint tests. Second,
investigating the autoregressive coefficient and the timing of the breaks delivers evi-
dence that non-core countries have been more exposed to the fear of redenomination
risk. Third, we raise the question which risk free interest rate is relevant for the af-
fected countries.
Keywords
Sovereign credit risk, asset liability management, European monetary union, life
insurance sector, redenomination risk
Highlights
• We discuss the consequences of the EMU sovereign debt crisis for decision-
makers in the financial services industry focusing on German life insurers.
• We apply unit root breakpoint tests to detect crisis related structural changes
in the yields spreads between core and non-core EMU countries.
• The timings of the detected breaks deliver evidence that non-core countries
seem to be more exposed to credit risk and redenomination risk.
• The results of our approach correspond to earlier findings in the literature and
are of special interest for asset managers in the German life insurance industry
investing in EMU non-core bonds.
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1. Introduction 
 
In the course of the global financial crisis and the following euro crisis starting in 2007 
and 2010, respectively, asset and risk managers in the German financial services industry had to 
deal with demanding challenges. The upcoming fears of sovereign defaults, the perceived 
threat of a breakup of the European Monetary Union (EMU) as well as the comeback of 
redenomination risks placed asset values under severe pressure. This has especially affected 
German life insurers because they strongly invest in EMU sovereign bonds and related assets. 
Life insurance policies hold strong significance for structuring the provision for old-age and 
death for the general population in Germany. Hence, they fulfill an important task for the 
German economy as a whole. For example, in 2015 there was a total of 91 million life insurance 
policies in Germany, which has a total population of around 82 million (GDV, 2016). Due to the 
large share of interest-bearing assets, the success of portfolio managers in the life insurance 
industry strongly depends on the interest rate level. Furthermore, the guaranteed interest rates 
included in many insurance contracts have to be generated on capital markets in the long term 
and as risk-free as possible. Unsurprisingly, EMU government bonds are an important asset 
class for German life insurance companies. Following official data from the German Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht - BaFin), 
German life insurers had EUR 94 billion invested in EMU assets excluding Germany in 
Q4/2015. 
The euro crisis had a huge influence on the assets of German life insurers. Given the significant 
role of EMU government bonds for insurance companies in Germany, a deeper understanding of 
the possible driving forces of EMU government bond yields remains to be very important and 
makes some further considerations inevitable. Structural shifts in the long-term relationship of 
EMU government bond yields have consequences for the value of all respective assets. This is also 
the case for German government bond yields, which are at a record low due to safe haven effects, 
deflationary fears caused by the crisis and the current monetary policy in the euro zone. Hence, 
relying solely on German government bonds would have severe implications for life insurers’ 
interest income. However, compared to German government bonds, the higher yielding assets 
issued by Spain and Italy come with additional risks. In this context, not only the pricing of 
sovereign credit risk (SCR) – and hence fundamental factors like rising levels of public debt – but 
also the influence of redenomination risk has to be considered by asset and financial risk managers. 
In the case of a breakup of the euro zone, the liabilities of institutional investors (e.g. insurance 
companies in Germany) would be denominated in the new currency of the peripheral country that 
exits the EMU. Therefore, holding the redenominated government bonds would create losses due 
to currency devaluation. 
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As described above, risk and asset managers in the financial service industry and especially in 
the German life insurance industry have to deal with a challenging environment. Accordingly, we 
empirically examine developments in the EMU government bond market focusing on sovereign 
credit risk and redenomination risk using yield spreads between German and Spanish, Italian, 
Austrian and Dutch government bonds. Building upon existing studies mentioned later to 
reinvestigate the characteristics of EMU government bond yield spreads, we employ a different 
empirical approach testing for unit roots with breakpoints. We investigate the sovereign bond yields 
of the aforementioned countries to differentiate between so-called core and non-core (i.e. periphery) 
EMU countries. Artis and Zhang (2001) implemented this standard segmentation in the literature 
at an early stage, where Italy and Spain belong to the non-core or periphery countries whereas 
Germany, Austria and The Netherlands are seen as core countries (Antonakakis and Vergos, 2013; 
Angelopoulou et al., 2014; Claeys and Vašíček, 2014; Costantini et al. 2014). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we briefly describe the asset 
allocation process of the German insurance industry with a focus on the current low interest rate 
environment, which leads directly to Chapter 3, providing an overview of the related literature and 
the European debt crisis. In Chapter 4, we present the data as well as the methodological framework. 
Chapter 5 presents and briefly discusses the empirical results. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the 
paper and provides some ideas for further research. 
 
2.  Asset allocation process in the German life insurance 
industry 
 
To better understand the consequences of a low interest rate environment as well as the euro 
crisis on the investment patterns of life insurance companies, we first explain the fundamentals of 
their investment strategy. German life insurers differ from most other investors due to a long-term 
investment horizon and the necessity to achieve a return that covers long-term interest rate 
guarantees given to the clients. Their liabilities commonly have a duration of several decades. From 
an insurer’s perspective, this also results in the need to invest the insurance premiums in the long 
term (Basse and Friedrich, 2008). However, a long-term investment period leads to corresponding 
challenges in the investment policy, particularly in connection with the need to comply with these 
guarantees. Potential risks mainly arise from changes in the interest rate and spreads (Bafin, 2010), 
which subsequently lead to (re-)investment risks. The mitigation of these source of risks is a major 
task for the life insurers’ risk managers and their asset liability management (ALM). ALM’s task 
is an integrated consideration and optimization of assets and liabilities, which has gained 
importance especially against the background of the regulatory standards of Solvency II 
(Schwarzbach et al., 2014). 
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ALM can comprise various techniques taking into account the sector-specific structural 
differences in the investment behavior of insurers. For life insurers, especially immunization 
strategies hold particular importance. One result of this is that life insurers primarily invest in 
low-risk, fixed interest rate investments. By using immunization strategies, mostly the risk of 
interest rate changes but also the other risks associated with these investments (liquidity risks 
a.s.o.) are supposed to be accounted for. One technique used by insurers is cashflow matching. 
The main idea of this procedure is a systematic comparison and matching of the cashflows 
expected to be generated from assets and required by liabilities. Put differently, the technique is 
used to ensure that the monetary inflows are able to cover the necessary outflows at any given 
time, which would alleviate or even extinguish the consequences of changes in, for example, the 
interest rate level. Another technique used by life insurers to minimize risk is duration matching. 
Thereby, efforts are made to equal out the interest rate sensitivities derived from the maturities 
of the payouts of the assets and liabilities. Accordingly, assets and liabilities will react equally 
to an interest rate change and thus will not affect the equity position of the life insurer, at least 
in the absence of other risks, e.g. exchange rate risk. 
As previously mentioned, life insurers have to follow a particularly careful investment strategy 
due to long maturities in their liabilities and their products’ important role for old-age provision. 
This behavior is also reflected in their investment allocation among the different types of assets. 
The overall balance sheet value of the German primary insurers amounted to a total of EUR 885 
billion in 2015. Figure 1 shows the average capital stock of these insurance companies on December 
31, 2015. The chart shows that the majority of investments (87.3%) are invested in low-risk possibly 
longer-term bonds. A significantly smaller proportion is invested in stocks (4.3%), longer term 
shareholdings (2.4%), real estate (3.9%) and other forms of investment (2.2%). The bonds can be 
further divided into a total of 25.9% being invested in bonds through funds, 20.5% in loans and 
17.9% in covered bonds. This detailed account of their assets shows the low-risk and likely long-
term investment behavior of life insurance companies in Germany. 
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Fig. 1. Average asset allocation of German life insurers (in %) 
 
 
Own representation (based on GDV, 2016) 
 
With this behavior in mind, one could expect a shift in the investments of German life insurers 
in the course of the recent crises to reduce risk. This reallocation could happen with a focus on 
either assets with a high quality (flight to quality) or the country of origin (flight home). For German 
insurers, the latter would imply an even stricter focus. In times of crisis, this flight home could also 
be interpreted as a way to increase the exposure to one’s home and thereby raise the chances of 
being bailed out if necessary (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012). The shift to higher-quality assets by 
investors would mean pro-cyclical behavior, which is not observed for insurers in studies covering 
non-crises periods (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; De Haan and Kakes, 2010; Ferreira and Matos, 
2008). Nevertheless, as described in further detail in the following section, Bijlsma and Vermeulen 
(2016) found evidence for these tendencies by insurers from The Netherlands during the European 
sovereign debt crisis. 
 
3.  Literature overview and history of the euro crisis 
 
In the past, SCR was mainly a problem for less-developed countries, although recently it has 
also become an issue for EMU member countries (Aizenman, 2013; Moro, 2014). Meanwhile, oil-
producing countries also have to cope with this problem, as stated by Wegener et al., (2016). For 
example, Ang and Longstaff (2013) examined in detail the factors influencing SCR. In the context 
of analyzing the pricing of credit default swaps, they determine that SCR is strongly correlated with 
movements in financial markets. In addition, Afonso et al. (2012) use an event study to conclude 
that government bond yields react significantly to changes in rating grades. Furthermore, rating 
agencies’ assessments are anticipated by market participants. All of this leads to a 
corresponding pricing of government bonds. These relationships have been crucially important 
for the EMU government bond market. 
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Since the start of the Euro in the 1990s, EMU government bond yields have been converging, 
which can be explained by an alignment of risks. The establishment of the EMU led to an 
elimination of exchange rate risks. Obviously, national risks were considered as equivalent. 
Accordingly, from 1999 to 2008 the government bond yields of the EMU member countries acted 
in an almost identical manner. For example, Basse et al. (2014) have shown empirically that a long-
term relationship exists between German and Italian government bond yields. However, structural 
breaks have to be considered in this convergent development. These structural breaks occurred 
during the global financial crisis and the European debt crisis. The causes for the divergence of the 
yields can be explained by using the example of Spain. In the course of the global financial crisis 
in 2008 and the European debt crisis in 2012, the Spanish economy moved into a strong recession. 
This was reflected in heavily-rising unemployment rates and a negative trend in real gross domestic 
product. As a result, the long-term interest rates of Spanish government bonds sharply rose as the 
financial markets identified an increased default risk. The restructuring of Greek debt in March 
2012 – through which creditors waived a large proportion of their nominal claims – played a crucial 
role for this realization. 
Not only the increase in Spanish interest rates is remarkable, but also the simultaneous reduction 
in the long-term interest rates of German government bonds. This indicates that the default risks of 
German bonds were considered to be much lower than the Spanish ones. Therefore, investors 
assessed the risks of the EMU members as being increasingly heterogeneous and accordingly the 
pricing occurred without reference to each other. Furthermore, Sgherri and Zoli (2009) show that 
the assumption of banking risks by European countries implied hazardous linkages between 
financial market uncertainties and the evaluation of governmental debt default risk. Subsequently, 
the correlation between the Credit Default Swaps (CDS) of states and those of domestic banks 
increased. Since European countries issued guarantees for their domestic banks – which were 
subject to divergent default risks – the risk transfer to the sovereign default risks was also unequal 
and thus further increased the differences in the pricing of European government bonds. 
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Additionally, the perception of diverging risks and the respective pricing caused safe haven 
flows, which were problematic for the Southern European countries as they were particularly 
affected by the crisis. As a result of the apparently increased risk of Southern European bonds, other 
more risk-free long-term bonds were more frequently sought. Bernoth and Erdogan (2012) show 
that the majority of German and foreign investors found this ”safe haven” in Germany – Europe’s 
largest economy – which previously did not hold this status. Therefore, as explained above, the 
structural break in the convergence of the interest rates in 2011 to 2012 is not only justified by a 
rising risk of default of Southern European countries, but also by a reduction in German interest 
rates due to a ”flight to quality”, meaning that investors shift their capital away from riskier to safer 
(or as safe as possible) investments. 
Some evidence of this behavior among insurance companies in this environment is also 
observed by Bijlsma and Vermeulen (2016), who examine over 60 Dutch insurance companies. 
Contrary to the results by other authors for earlier time periods, they find a pro-cyclical investment 
behavior among insurance companies during the crises: Southern European assets (especially 
government bonds) were reduced in favor of potentially more secure Northern European assets. 
This behavior was only found in periods of crises and diminished after European Central Bank 
(ECB) president Draghi’s historical ”whatever it takes” speech. This famous speech was part of a 
much wider effort by the ECB to counteract these interest rate developments. Even unconventional 
measures are seen as necessary because most standard procedures – such as lowering the key 
interest rate – have already been extensively utilized. One of these interventions in particular is 
quantitative easing, which has been carried out by the ECB since March 2015. Thereby, the ECB 
(mainly through the countries’ central banks) purchases government bonds worth EUR 60 billion 
each month. In doing so, government bonds from most EMU countries are bought up according to 
a capital key. One goal of this is to prevent deflation. However, at the same time, it assists the 
countries with their refinancing simply because the increased demand lowers the interest rates of 
government bonds. This especially helps the Southern European countries, although it also 
strengthens the German bonds, which already exhibit very low levels of return. The quantitative 
easing by the ECB causes the yields to decline even further. This shows a fundamental weakness 
of the ECB’s policy: it is only applied uniformly to all countries, but not individually to selected 
countries. While many countries with refinancing problems benefit from the ECB’s measures, it 
creates numerous problems for the German economy (i.e. ultra-low interest rates) and here 
especially for the risk and asset managers in German life insurance companies. 
As a further consequence of the EMU currency crisis, the determinants of sovereign bond yields 
of EMU member countries gained strong attention among academic scholars and at the peak of the 
crisis the irreversibility of the Euro was questioned (De Haan et al, 2014; Chang and Leblond, 
2015). One important implication of the euro crisis has been the necessity to distinguish between 
fundamental factors and redenomination risk (Klose and Weigert, 2014) when dealing with 
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sovereign yield spreads. Given the economic relevance of this topic for the financial service 
industry and academic researchers, there already exists a strand of literature discussing the 
implications of redenomination risk (Cœuré, 2013; Sibbertsen et al., 2014; De Backer, 2015; Favero 
and Missale, 2016). Even prior to the outbreak of the EMU crisis and the preceding financial shock 
in 2008/09, the debt levels rapidly increased in numerous euro countries (Lane, 2012). In fact, 
following the economic theory a rising debt position should lead to higher risk premiums and hence 
should result in higher government bond yields (Bernoth et al., 2012). 
However, redenomination risk and fears regarding a breakup of the EMU have obviously long 
been put aside by financial market participants (i.e. both asset and financial risk managers). In the 
early years, the EMU market participants did not differentiate between countries as issuers of debt 
(Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012). However, the default of Lehman Brothers and the EMU sovereign 
debt crisis definitely have to be seen as an inflection point (Maltritz, 2012; Basse, 2014; Iara and 
Wolff, 2014). Furthermore, contagion effects have to be considered (Kilponen et al. 2012; Blatt et 
al., 2015) and a distinction between the different countries within the EMU is necessary (Von 
Hagen et al., 2011; Buechel, 2013; Afonso et al., 2014). 
The findings of Basse et al. (2012) hold strong importance in this context since the authors show 
that government bond yields for Germany and Italy are cointegrated. However, the authors detect 
structural breaks in the long-term relationship between the two bond yields in early 2009. Gruppe 
and Lange (2014) investigate the long-term relationship between government bond yields of 
Germany and Spain and find evidence of a cointegrating relationship up to early 2009. In addition, 
Basse (2014) analyze inter alia government bond yields for Germany, Austria and The Netherlands 
and find empirical evidence for long-term relationships between German and Austrian as well as 
German and Dutch long-term government bond yields. However, especially in the case of the 
Netherlands, no structural break in the cointegrating relationship is found. Following Basse (2014), 
the timing of the break date in Austria in 2006 does not allow the conclusion that it is related to the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
These studies hold strong relevance for the purpose of this paper. We also investigate the 
relationship between German and Spanish, German and Italian, German and Austrian as well as 
German and Dutch government bond yields, although we will use a different approach and focus 
on the corresponding bond yield spreads. Using the government bond yields of Germany as a 
benchmark is quite common in the literature due to the economic relevance of Germany as the 
largest EMU economy and its safe haven status (Canarella et al., 2011; Basse, 2014; MacDonald et 
al., 2015). 
 
  
39
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
https://ediss.uni-goettingen.de/. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
4.  Data and methodology 
 
For the empirical investigation, we use ten-year government bond yields from Germany as a 
reference country, from Italy and Spain as non-core as well as from Austria and the Netherlands as 
core EMU countries. The monthly data set was collected at Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED), provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, covering the period from January 1999 
to February 2015. Hence, it incorporates both the beginning of the EMU as well as the subprime 
and euro crisis. 
Since a long-term relationship between two time series can be empirically verified with the 
existence of a cointegrating relationship, we first check for unit roots in the bond yield time series. 
As Figure 2 shows, all interest rates seem to be non-stationary and hence they should share the 
same order of integration. To empirically test for unit roots, we apply the non-parametric testing 
procedure for unit roots proposed by Phillips and Perron (1988). Subsequently, we investigate the 
sovereign bond yield spreads (i.e. the simple differences between the corresponding two time 
series) for Germany and Spain (GER - ESP), Germany and Italy (GER - IT), Germany and Austria 
(GER - AT) as well as Germany and the Netherlands (GER - NL). For an existing long-run 
relationship, the corresponding spread time series should be integrated of order zero I(0) and hence 
should be stationary. As Figures 3 (GER - ESP / GER - IT) and 4 (GER - AT / GER - NL) show, 
there seem to be structural shifts. Accordingly, using ordinary unit root tests like the Phillips Perron 
(PP)-test used for the yield levels, would lead to biased results. Thus, we will apply a unit root test 
allowing for structural shifts with unknown timing (Perron, 1990; Perron and Vogelsang, 1992; 
Vogelsang and Perron, 1998; Perron, 2006). We apply the test for a unit root (null hypothesis) 
against the alternative hypothesis of a stationary process using the model specification for 
innovational outliers (IO) and additive outliers (AO). In general, the IO model specifications are 
more appropriate for gradual changes over time, whereas the AO model specifications fit better for 
sudden changes (Perron, 1994; Harvie and Pahlavani, 2006). Given the purpose of our 
investigations and as a robustness check, we apply both specifications. 
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Fig. 2. Ten-year government bond yields Austria (AT), the Netherlands (NL), Germany 
(GER), Spain (ESP) and Italy (IT) 
 
 
 
 
Own representation  
based on FRED (2016) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Spreads of ten-year government bond yields Spain vs. Germany (GER - ESP) and 
Italy vs. Germany (GER - IT) 
 
 
 
 
Own representation  
based on FRED (2016) 
41
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
https://ediss.uni-goettingen.de/. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
 
Fig. 4. Spreads of ten-year government bond yields Austria vs. Germany (GER - AT) and the 
Netherlands vs. Germany (GER - NL) 
 
 
 
Own representation  
based on FRED (2016) 
 
5.  Empirical evidence 
 
The results of the PP-unit root tests for the EMU government bond yields for Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Austria and the Netherlands are reported in Tables 1 and 2 below. Following the empirical 
evidence, we can state that all four time series are non-stationary and integrated of order one or 
I(1), respectively. Given the empirical findings mentioned in the literature section, these results are 
unsurprising. 
 
Table 1: PP-unit root tests in levels 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Test stat. 
 
 
1% 
 
Critical value 
5% 
 
 
10% 
Austria 0.432645 -3.464280 -2.876356 -2.574746 
Netherlands 0.361843 -3.464280 -2.876356 -2.574746 
Spain -0.329608 -3.464101 -2.876277 -2.574704 
Italy -0.386912 -3.464101 -2.876277 -2.574704 
Germany 0.217802 -3.464101 -2.876277 -2.574704 
Own  
calculations 
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Table 2: PP-unit root tests in first differences ∆ 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Test stat. 
 
 
1% 
 
Critical value 
5% 
 
 
10% 
Austria -10.66625 -3.464460 -2.876435 -2.574788 
Netherlands -10.43315 -3.464460 -2.876435 -2.574788 
Spain -11.24233 -3.464280 -2.876356 -2.574746 
Italy -10.90881 -3.464280 -2.876356 -2.574746 
Germany -10.24184 -3.464280 -2.876356 -2.574746 
Own  
calculations 
 
Figures 5 to 12 visualize the results of the breakpoint unit root tests for the spread time series. 
The figures show recursively estimated autoregressive processes. In the charts a coefficient value 
above one indicates a structural change in the cointegration relationship (i.e. spread time series as 
a linear combination of the corresponding government bond yields): in other words, an increase of 
the autoregressive coefficient above the benchmark implies that the government bond yield spreads 
for Italy and Spain do not remain stationary over time. In fact, the processes change from I(0) to 
I(1) in the course of the euro crisis. These results are also robust regarding the model specifications 
(i.e. IO or AO). Hence, for both non-core EMU countries, earlier findings of breaks in the long-
term relationship have been empirically proven. These results are confirmed by the results shown 
in Tables 3 to 6 in the Appendix. For the non-core countries, we observe a breakpoint corresponding 
to the occurrence of the euro crisis. Again, these results are robust regarding the applied model 
specifications. For both the additive and innovation outlier, the break dates for Spain (IO: March 
2010; AO: April 2011) and Italy (IO: March 2010; AO: February 2010) correspond to the timing 
of the euro crisis. We interpret the increasing autoregressive coefficient above the threshold value 
as an indication for the comeback of risk factors like redenomination risk (see Figures 5 and 6 for 
Spain and Figures 7 and 8 for Italy, respectively). 
Regarding the EMU core countries, the results are somewhat different. In the case of the 
Netherlands, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of the bond yield spread is rejected. More 
important in the context of our research are the break dates for Austria (IO: August 2008; AO: 
November 2007) and The Netherlands (IO: February 2008; AO: October 2008). Given the time of 
the euro crisis, these break dates may not be seen as a consequence of the euro crisis. Hence, for 
core EMU countries it seems to be the case that redenomination risk was not a major issue. 
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This interpretation gains further support from the estimated autoregressive coefficients shown 
in Figures 9 and 10 for Austria as well as Figures 11 and 12 for The Netherlands. However, in the 
case of Austria we observe a substantial increase in the autoregressive coefficient in the case of the 
innovation outlier specification. The coefficient reaches a value of 1. In fact the timing of this event 
does not seem to correspond to the euro crisis but to the financial turmoil in Austria attributed to 
the HETA case (Randl and Zechner, 2016). For The Netherlands, the occurrence of the break 
coincides with the ING Group facing financial difficulties due to the financial crisis, which led to 
government assistance for the group amounting to EUR 90 billion. 
 
Fig. 5. Autoregressive coefficient; unit root break test GER - ESP; innovation outlier 
 
 
 
Own  
calculations 
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Fig. 6. Autoregressive coefficient; unit root break test GER - ESP; additive outlier 
 
 
 
Own  
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Fig. 7. Autoregressive coefficient; unit root break test GER - IT; innovation outlier 
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Fig. 8. Autoregressive coefficient; unit root break test GER - IT; additive outlier 
 
 
 
Own  
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Fig. 9. Autoregressive coefficient; unit root break test GER - AT; innovation outlier 
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Fig. 10. Autoregressive coefficient; unit root break test GER - AT; additive outlier 
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Fig. 11. Autoregressive coefficient; unit root break test GER - NL; innovation outlier 
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Fig. 12. Autoregressive coefficient; unit root break test GER - NL; additive outlier 
 
 
 
Own  
calculations 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have discussed the relevance of the EMU government bond market as well as 
EMU government bond yields for the financial service industry. One focus was placed on the ALM 
process of German life insurers. Furthermore, we have empirically investigated EMU government 
bond yield spreads. We assessed the pricing differential between German ten-year government 
bonds and two EMU core countries (The Netherlands and Austria) and two EMU non-core 
countries (Spain and Italy), respectively regarding structural changes using monthly data ranging 
from January 1999 to February 2015. We applied model specifications for innovation and additive 
outliers. 
The statistical evidence from the utilized unit root breakpoint tests confirms previous findings 
regarding euro crisis-related structural shifts in the cointegrating relationship between German and 
Spanish and Italian government bond yields, respectively. Hence, based on our statistical results 
we have been able to show that sovereign credit and probably redenomination risks have led to 
structural changes in the relationship between government bond yields in peripheral countries and 
Germany. On the other hand, regarding the EMU core countries (in our case, The Netherlands and 
Austria), we have found no similar evidence of structural changes in the long-term relationship. 
First, the timing of the breakpoints for the yield spreads do not correspond with the euro crisis. 
Second – and even more importantly – in the context of our investigation, we have found no clear 
evidence for a structural change in the persistence of the bond yield spreads. 
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For risk and asset managers in the life insurance industry, these findings are important for 
various reasons. In fact, it has to be stated that especially redenomination risk is a challenge for 
asset managers especially in the German life insurance industry. In addition, further research should 
address the question of whether government bond yields can be seen as the risk-free rate for insurers 
in non-core EMU countries (in the context of our paper with respect to Spain and Italy) and core 
EMU countries (here: Germany, Austria and the Netherlands), respectively. In addition, the results 
also hold strong relevance for the financial services industry as a whole, since not only life insurers 
are heavily exposed to EMU countries. Furthermore, analyzing past structural breaks is helpful and 
necessary to develop a more profound understanding of matters in the context of EMU sovereign 
credit risk. Further research should focus on identifying potential upcoming structural shifts due to 
external or internal factors. Given the current alignment of the ECB’s monetary policy, a more or 
less abrupt interest rate reversal may not be ruled out completely. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3: Unit root break test GER - ESP; innovation outlier 
 
Null Hypothesis: GERESP has a unit root 
Trend Specification: Intercept only 
Break Specification: Intercept only 
Break Type: Innovational outlier 
Break Date: 2010M03 
Break Selection: Minimize Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on Schwarz information criterion, maxlag=14) 
 
  
t-Statistic 
 
Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.726416 0.8203 
 
Test 
critical 
values: 
 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
 
-4.949133 
-4.443649 
-4.193627 
 
Own 
calculations 
 
 
Table 4: Unit root break test GER - ESP; additive outlier 
 
Null Hypothesis: GERESP has a unit root 
Trend Specification: Intercept only 
Break Specification: Intercept only 
Break Type: Additive outlier 
Break Date: 2011M04 
Break Selection: Minimize Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
Lag Length: 12 (Automatic - based on Schwarz information criterion, maxlag=14) 
 
  
t-Statistic 
 
Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.038404 0.6636 
 
Test 
critical 
values: 
 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
 
-4.949133 
-4.443649 
-4.193627 
 
Own 
calculations 
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Table 5: Unit root break test GER - IT; innovation outlier 
 
Null Hypothesis: GERIT has a unit root 
Trend Specification: Intercept only 
Break Specification: Intercept only 
Break Type: Innovational outlier 
Break Date: 2010M03 
Break Selection: Minimize Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on Schwarz information criterion, maxlag=14) 
 
  
t-Statistic 
 
Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.909122 0.7345 
 
Test 
critical 
values: 
 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
 
-4.949133 
-4.443649 
-4.193627 
 
Own  
calculations 
 
 
Table 6: Unit root break test GER - IT; additive outlier 
 
Null Hypothesis: GERIT has a unit root 
Trend Specification: Intercept only 
Break Specification: Intercept only 
Break Type: Additive outlier 
Break Date: 2010M02 
Break Selection: Minimize Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic - based on Schwarz information criterion, maxlag=14) 
 
  
t-Statistic 
 
Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic --2.928872 0.7237 
 
Test 
critical 
values: 
 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
 
-4.949133 
-4.443649 
-4.193627 
 
Own 
calculations 
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Table 7: Unit root break test GER - AT; innovation outlier 
 
Null Hypothesis: GERAT has a unit root 
Trend Specification: Intercept only 
Break Specification: Intercept only 
Break Type: Innovational outlier 
Break Date: 2008M08 
Break Selection: Minimize Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic - based on Schwarz information criterion, maxlag=14) 
 
  
t-Statistic 
 
Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.868535 0.2063 
 
Test 
critical 
values: 
 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
 
-4.949133 
-4.443649 
-4.193627 
 
Own  
calculations 
 
 
Table 8: Unit root break test GER - AT; additive outlier 
 
Null Hypothesis: GERAT has a unit root 
Trend Specification: Intercept only 
Break Specification: Intercept only 
Break Type: Additive outlier 
Break Date: 2007M11 
Break Selection: Minimize Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on Schwarz information criterion, maxlag=14) 
 
  
t-Statistic 
 
Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.923966 0.7266 
 
Test 
critical 
values: 
 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
 
-4.949133 
-4.443649 
-4.193627 
 
Own 
calculations 
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Table 9: Unit root break test GER - NL; innovation outlier 
 
Null Hypothesis: GERNL has a unit root 
Trend Specification: Intercept only 
Break Specification: Intercept only 
Break Type: Innovational outlier 
Break Date: 2008M02 
Break Selection: Minimize Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on Schwarz information criterion, maxlag=14) 
 
  
t-Statistic 
 
Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.539627 0.0388 
 
Test 
critical 
values: 
 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
 
-4.949133 
-4.443649 
-4.193627 
 
Own  
calculations 
 
 
Table 10: Unit root break test GER - NL; additive outlier 
 
Null Hypothesis: GERNL has a unit root 
Trend Specification: Intercept only 
Break Specification: Intercept only 
Break Type: Additive outlier 
Break Date: 2008M10 
Break Selection: Minimize Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on Schwarz information criterion, maxlag=14) 
 
  
t-Statistic 
 
Prob. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.944137 0.1754 
 
Test 
critical 
values: 
 
1% level 
5% level 
10% level 
 
-4.949133 
-4.443649 
-4.193627 
 
Own  
calculations 
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a b s t r a c t
Interest rate forecasts are widely used in the international financial services industry. For
decades, both practitioners and academic researchers question the quality and usefulness
of forecasts. Survey predictions do not only deliver point forecasts but also allow to draw
conclusions with regard to the variety of forecasts provided by professional analysts. We
evaluate the quality of interest rate forecasts for the three months interbank rate in the
UK (LIBOR) and Germany (EURIBOR) as well as the corresponding 10Y government bond
yields using the root mean squared error as well as the Theil’s U measure and also apply
models of time series analysis (i.e. cointegration and causality analysis). Finally, we check
for possible implications from uncertainty measures (i.e. High-Low-Spread of forecasts as
well as forecast errors) and structural breaks. We are able to find some links to the real
economy. Applying our methodological approach both to the UK and Germany we are able
to draw conclusions with regard to the quality of international forecasts in times of
uncertainty.
 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Interest rate forecasts are important for financial market participants’ investment decisions. Since not all decision makers
are willing or able to perform their own forecasts for the relevant term, forecast horizon or region, surveys collecting interest
rate predictions are widely used. In addition to that, there exists empirical evidence for the general usefulness of survey fore-
casts (for a discussion of survey forecasts in general see for example Ang et al. (2007), Pesaran and Weale (2006), Schmeling
and Schrimpf (2011) as well as Ince and Molodtsova (2017)). Predictions for interest rates are provided both for the short and
the long end of the yield curve and for different countries. There already exists a vast literature dealing with the usefulness of
the collected forecasts (i.e. both the individual predictions and the survey mean) for example with regard to rationality (see
Friedman (1980), Simon (1989), Jongen and Verschoor (2008) as well as Chortareas et al. (2012) and more recently Miah
et al. (2016)), unbiasedness (Hafer and Hein (1989) as well as Mitchell and Pearce (2007) and Miah et al. (2016)), efficiency
(see for example Hafer and Hein (1989)) and accuracy (see for example Kolb and Stekler (1996) as well as Greer (2003)).
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Furthermore, summing up the results from the relevant literature would inevitably lead to the disillusioning conclusion that
especially in times of financial crisis forecasts from professional analysts seem to perform fairly badly. This puts the useful-
ness of into question. However, in the context of crisis events dispersion measures have been investigated empirically. Dis-
persion measures may act as an indicator for uncertainty. Hence, a higher level of uncertainty might serve as a bellwether for
dawning crisis events.
The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is threefold. Firstly, a long term assessment of survey forecasts for
the three months interbank rate for two major European economies (i.e. the United Kingdom and Germany) and for the
10 year government bond yield will be performed using standard evaluation methods. Secondly, we will use more sophis-
ticated methods of time series analysis to investigate the quality of survey forecasts (i.e. the survey mean) in an international
context. Finally, and most important in the context of the global financial crisis, we try to get insights from uncertainty mea-
sures (i.e. the dispersion of the collected individual forecasts as well as the forecast errors). We try to find crisis related struc-
tural changes in the time series of dispersion measures and forecast errors. Since we understand possible structural breaks to
be crisis-related the research question behind this approach points in the direction of early warning indicators or at least
some kind of bellwether or discretional warning sign. In order to find evidence we link the uncertainty measures to real eco-
nomic indicators using Granger causality analysis. By applying this methodological approach both to the UK and to Germany
we try find parallels and want to rule out possible country specific implications.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study to address the relevant question of combining uncertainty of interest
rate forecast with real economic data in the context of the global financial crisis focusing on Germany and the United King-
dom. In this sense, we both deliver useful results for the forecast evaluation literature and fill a research gap in the context of
possible crisis related relationships between forecaster uncertainty and real economic activity. One major advantage of our
approach lies in the combination of easy to interpret forecast accuracy measures with time series analysis for a two country
data set. In addition to that, we are able to cross link the financial market variables to the real economy. For political decision
makers uncertainty measures can under certain circumstances be used as crisis indicators.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 provides a short literature overview whereas in chapter 3 the relevant
data set of forecasts will be introduced. In chapter 4 we will briefly present the applied forecast evaluation methods whereas
the empirical results will be discussed in chapter 5. Finally, we will shortly present the idea of uncertainty measures in chap-
ter 6. In the same section we will also present some empirical evidence for crisis related structural breaks for the discussed
uncertainty measures and check for implications from the uncertainty measures for real economic activity. In chapter 7 we
will discuss possible economic implications. Chapter 8 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
Not least due to the relevance of the accuracy of forecasts for decision makers the literature dealing with the evaluation of
economic as well as financial market forecasts from professional analysts dates back for several decades. This is also the case
for the research dealing with the evaluation of interest rate forecasts (see for example Friedman (1980), Belongia (1987),
Spiwoks et al. (2008), as well as Hafer and Hein (1989)). One important field of empirical research has been the evaluation
of survey forecasts. Dependent on the interest rates being predicted by professional analysts there do exist a lot of well-
known and often cited surveys (dealing mainly with the US economy).
Greer (2003) for example tested the directional accuracy of long-term interest rate forecasts issued by The Wall Street
Journal. Baghestani (2006) did assess the accuracy of survey forecasts for 10Y US Treasury bond yields delivered to the Sur-
vey of Professional Forcasters (SPF) collected by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Although this survey provides one
of the longest histories of forecasts its applicability as data source to evaluate crisis related changes has at least to be ques-
tioned because the survey is performed on a quarterly basis. Spiwoks et al. (2008) did also investigate US interest rate fore-
casts using survey data collected by Consensus Economics Inc. One advantage of these surveys lies in the fact that apart from
the US, there exist professional analysts’ predictions for interest rates for various countries.
Kunze et al. (2014) did examine interest forecasts for the three months EURIBOR and also checked for crisis related
changes in the long term relationship of the forecasts and the actual interest rate. Chortareas et al. (2012) evaluated interest
rate survey forecasts from Consensus Economics Inc. for the UK three months interbank rate as well as 10Y government bond
yield with regard to the rational expectations hypothesis also dealing with the aspects of both monetary policy actions and
the central banks communication policy (see Stillwagon (2015) for a recent study testing the expectations hypothesis with
survey forecasts). Despite the different focus of the paper the work of the authors is of high relevance in the context of our
paper and the underlying data. Not only market participants but also political decision makers have to decide under uncer-
tainty. The results of the mentioned studies are of high relevance for our analysis since we want to put the findings of the
authors in an international context.
In times of financial crisis the concept of measuring uncertainty (which we assume to rise during crisis events) becomes
more important when using professional analysts’ predictions for interest rates during the process of decision making. It has
to be taken into account that long run relationships may not hold in times of financial crisis. For example, Sibbertsen et al.
(2014) tested for structural changes in the spreads of interest rates and Wegener et al. (2016) used these results in order to
forecast German and French government bond yields. In periods of high uncertainty forecasters might alter their predictions
not to the same extent. Hence, by solely focusing on the mean of the survey forecast decision makers might be aware of a
high possibility of pronounced movements in future interest rates (at least they might be aware that there exists consensus
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in which direction interest rates might move). But the information whether this mean predictions stem from a broad variety
of individual point forecasts would be ignored. However, the degree of uncertainty might be needed as much more crucial
information than the mean expectations regarding the future interest rates.
Measuring uncertainty is important for decision makers for at least two reasons. Firstly, the simple awareness to be in a
period of high financial market uncertainty might work as a warning signal for decision makers. Secondly, rising uncertainty
with regard to the future movements of interest rates might also work as some kind of early warning indicator for possible
economic downturns and hence the direction of movement for real economic indicators. Dealing with the concepts of uncer-
tainty it has to be stated that there do exist a lot of different methods to measure uncertainty. A widely used measure for
uncertainty is the dispersion of individual forecasts. Following Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) the forecast dispersion for
earnings is at least perceived by financial market participants to be a good proxy for the uncertainty of a firms’ actual future
earnings. For example Bloom (2009) did use the volatility of a stock market index as a measure of uncertainty. The advantage
of this approach lies in the high data frequency, which almost allows a real time monitoring. Gupta et al. (2014) did inves-
tigate US economic policy uncertainty and financial stress with regard to their ability to predict US equity premium. In the
context of survey forecasts for example Rich et al. (1992) discussed the relationship between measures of forecast dispersion
and forecast uncertainty from survey data whereas Bomberger (1996) did emphasize the need to differentiate between indi-
vidual uncertainty and cross sectional uncertainty. More recently the relationship between forecast uncertainty and forecast
disagreement has been inter alia discussed by Lahiri and Sheng (2010).
With regard to the different measures of uncertainty (which we do not only understand as one of the major sources of
forecast errors but also as indication for possible crisis events) one of the most relevant papers stems from Zarnowitz
(1992). Although the author came to the conclusion that the usefulness of dispersion measures (i.e. the difference between
the highest and the lowest provided forecast at one point in time) as an indicator of uncertainty has to put into question,
their remarks are of high relevance for our analysis not only because Zarnowitz (1992) further discusses whether the inter-
personal dispersion of forecasts (measured by the standard deviation of individual forecasts) is an acceptable proxy for the
dispersion of intrapersonal predictive probabilities uncertainty. As a matter of fact, we are not interested in the question
whether interpersonal uncertainty is a good proxy for intrapersonal uncertainty, but we want to check for possible implica-
tions from interpersonal uncertainty, which we can easily derive from survey forecasts.
3. Data
In this paper we investigate interest rate forecasts for twomajor European economies: The United Kingdom (UK) and Ger-
many (GER). For both countries the three months interbank rate (from now on 3M) as well as the yield of 10 Year Govern-
ment bonds (from now on 10Y) provided by Consensus Economics Inc. will be examined. The surveys for UK and GER are
conducted with two forecast horizons: A three months as well as a twelve months ahead forecast. In fact, the actual forecast
horizons are four respectively thirteen months, because the forecasters have to provide their predictions at the beginning of
the month (see for example Spiwoks et al., 2008).
The UK sample under investigation does range from December 1993 to December 2014. The actual time series are the
3 month UK interbank rate (3M) and the 10 year UK government bond yields (10Y). Survey forecasts for both time series
with a 4M respectively 13M forecast horizon are denoted as 3M4M UK and 3M13M UK respectively 10Y4M UK and
10Y13M UK. For each forecast time series the highest, the lowest as well as the naive forecast are also available.
The GER sample under investigation ranges from January 2000 to August 2014. The shorter time horizon has been chosen
to rule out any structural breaks due to the introduction of the Euro. Apart from the time horizon the data set for Germany
follows a similar structure to the UK data set.
A summary of the abbreviations both for UK and for GER are given in Table 1 below.
4. Methodologies of forecast evaluation
We start the empirical analysis of the UK respectively GER interest rate forecasts with simple evaluation measures.
Although the root mean squared error (RMSE) is a crude method in the context of forecast evaluation it is widely used by
Table 1
Abbreviations.
Time series Abbreviation
UK 4 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate 3M4M UK
UK 13 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate 3M13M UK
UK 4 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield 10Y4M UK
UK 13 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield 10Y13M UK
GER 4 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate 3M4M GER
GER 13 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate 3M13M GER
GER 4 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield 10Y4M GER
GER 13 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield 10Y13M GER
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practitioners in the financial service industry due to the straightforward interpretation and the relevance in statistical
methodologies (see for example Hyndman and Koehler (2006)). Since this measure is widely known and in order to preserve
space the formula will not be presented in detail. This also holds for the Theil’s U which we use to further analyze the fore-
cast performance (see Theil, 1992) by comparing the forecast with a simple naive prediction.
We apply both forecast accuracy measures to get a first idea of the quality of the 4 months respectively 13 months ahead
predictions for the three months interbank rate as well the 10Y government bond yields for UK and GER.
Furthermore, we use the widely applied Diebold Mariano (DM) Test (see Diebold and Mariano, 1995) to check whether
the mean forecasts’ accuracy is different from the accuracy of the simple naive forecast. One advantage of the DM Test lies in
the fact that we are able to draw conclusions with regard to statistical significance.
We start the empirical analysis by checking for the order of integration both for the eight forecast time series as well as
for the four actual time series. Instead of using the commonly used ADF-test (see Dickey and Fuller, 1979) we test for pos-
sible unit roots applying the procedure from Phillips and Perron (1988), since this procedure tends to be more robust. For
example Cheung and Chinn (1998) did point out that for FX forecasts to be rational the predictions should be of the same
order of integration like the predicted time series. Kunze et al. (2014) applied this idea to survey forecasts for the three
months EURIBOR whereas Schwarzbach et al. (2012) have evaluated this most basic requirement for the usefulness of survey
forecasts for the 10Y German government bond yields with a forecast horizon of thirteen months and with a different time
frame.
Also following Cheung and Chinn (1998) as well as Schwarzbach et al. (2012) and Kunze et al. (2014) after deriving the
order of integration it will be tested for long run relationships between the eight interest rate time series and the corre-
sponding survey means to check whether there do exist long run relationships between the actual interest rates and the
mean forecasts which is also a basic requirement for rational forecasts. To check for the existence of long run relationships
we employ the often used Johansen procedure (see Johansen, 1991) applying the trace test statistic.
Two time series with the same order of integration are said to be cointegrated if they share a common stochastic trend. In
this case there must be at least unidirectional Granger causality. If the forecasters do their job in a proper way both series –
the prediction and the actual time series – should have the same stochastic properties and thus they should be cointegrated.
Because of this we apply methodologies from the field of cointegration.
We conclude by checking for causal relationships between the actual time series and the corresponding forecasts and
again follow the approach applied by Schwarzbach et al. (2012) for the 10Y German government bond yield and also check
for causal relationships (i.e. Granger causality) by using impulse response functions with orthogonal (see Sims, 1980)
impulses and a length of the impulse responses of 30 month ahead.
5. Evaluation results
Table 2 shows the Theil’s U results for the survey means for the UK data as well as the GER data.
It seems that the survey means are slightly better compared to the naive forecasts as reported in Table 2. However, this
result is only statistically significant for the long run interest rates as reported in Table 3 on a level of 10%. As Table 4 below
shows the time series for the actual interest rates as well as the survey means both for the UK data and for the GER data are
non-stationary on levels but stationary in first differences (d(-)). Hence, both the actual interest rates and the mean forecast
are I(1) and share the same order of integration. Accordingly, all four mean forecasts for each country fulfill the most basic
requirement for rational forecasts.
Checking for long run relationships (i.e. cointegration) between the actual interest rate as well as the mean forecast for
the eight pairs of time series we find evidence for a cointegration relationship for each pair of forecast and actual time series.
Hence, it has been statistically validated that also the second prerequisite has been fulfilled (see Tables 5 and 6 below). The
null hypothesis of no cointegration has to be rejected for all eight cases.
Although we found evidence that the time series share the same order of integration and statistically verified that a long
run relationship exists both for UK and for GER, this does not necessarily mean that the survey mean forecasts are accurate
respectively useful. To be useful the forecasts should deliver some relevant information for the future path of the predicted
interest rates. To check for Granger causality between the eight corresponding pairs of time series we estimate eight vector
error correction models (VECM) and check for Granger causality using impulse response functions (IRF). Some preliminary
considerations should be made: As for example Basse and Reddemann (2010) discussed, the ordering of the variables in the
Table 2
Theil’s U.
UK GER
RMSE Mean RMSE Naive Theil’s U RMSE Mean RMSE Naive Theil’s U
3M4M 0.6325 0.5048 1.2529 0.3466 0.4469 0.7755
3M13M 1.0207 0.8869 1.1507 1.0681 1.2670 0.8430
10Y4M 0.6256 0.6337 0.9872 0.2173 0.3763 0.5775
10Y13M 1.2386 1.4177 0.8737 0.4761 0.6712 0.7093
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model plays an important role in applied econometrics. Since we are interested in the usefulness of the interest forecasts we
put the time series containing the mean forecasts first. The confidence intervals (CI) with a 95% level have been calculated via
bootstrapping (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1994). The results are illustrated from Figs. 1–16 below.
A significant response from the act time series to the impulse (i.e. a positive shock) from the corresponding mean time
series (or vice versa) would be indicated by the response function by a move of both the impulse function as well as the two
confidence bands above or below the zero line. The results from the impulse response analysis imply that only for the four
months forecast of the UK 10Y government bond yield (i.e. mean1 respectively act1) empirical evidence for bi-directional
Granger causality can be found. The lower segment of Fig. 1 shows that the response function (solid line) indicates a signif-
icant negative response, because in addition to the response function both bounds of the confidence band (dotted line) fall
Table 3
P-values Diebold Mariano test.
DM test Survey mean UK Survey mean GER
3M4M 0.8708 0.2374
3M13M 0.3702 0.3111
10Y4M 0.0005 0.0081
10Y13M 0.0940 0.0064
Table 4
P-values of the PP tests for UK and GER.
Actual d (actual) Mean d (mean)
10Y4M UK 0.06 0.01 0.25 0.01
10Y13M UK 0.06 0.01 0.32 0.01
3M4M UK 0.40 0.01 0.38 0.01
313M UK 0.40 0.01 0.42 0.01
10Y4M GER 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.01
10Y13M GER 0.10 0.01 0.15 0.01
3M4M GER 0.71 0.01 0.65 0.01
313M GER 0.71 0.01 0.60 0.01
Table 5
Results of the Johansen procedure for the UK.
Test statistic 10% 5% 1%
10Y4M UK
r 6 1 0.33 6.50 8.18 11.65
r ¼ 0 82.66 12.91 14.90 19.19
10Y13M UK
r 6 1 0.24 6.50 8.18 11.65
r ¼ 0 19.24 12.91 14.90 19.19
3M4M UK
r 6 1 0.73 6.50 8.18 11.65
r ¼ 0 97.00 12.91 14.90 19.19
3M13M UK
r 6 1 0.64 6.50 8.18 11.65
r ¼ 0 29.81 12.91 14.90 19.19
Table 6
Results of the Johansen procedure for Germany.
Test statistic 10% 5% 1%
10Y4M GER
r 6 1 1.09 6.50 8.18 11.65
r ¼ 0 27.82 12.91 14.90 19.19
10Y13M GER
r 6 1 0.91 6.50 8.18 11.65
r ¼ 0 27.57 12.91 14.90 19.19
3M4M GER
r 6 1 2.91 6.50 8.18 11.65
r ¼ 0 98.41 12.91 14.90 19.19
3M13M GER
r 6 1 2.62 6.50 8.18 11.65
r ¼ 0 27.34 12.91 14.90 19.19
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Fig. 3. Impulse response function from mean2 (10Y13M UK) to mean2 (upper curve) and to act2 (curve below).
Fig. 4. Impulse response function from act2 (10Y13M UK) to mean2 (upper curve) and to act2 (curve below).
Fig. 1. Impulse response function from mean1 (10Y4M UK) to mean1 (upper curve) and to act1 (curve below).
Fig. 2. Impulse response function from act1 (10Y4M UK) to mean1 (upper curve) and to act1 (curve below).
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Fig. 5. Impulse response function from mean3 (3M4M UK) to mean3 (upper curve) and to act3 (curve below).
Fig. 6. Impulse response function from act3 (3M4M UK) to mean3 (upper curve) and to act3 (curve below).
Fig. 8. Impulse response function from act4 (3M13M UK) to mean4 (upper curve) and to act4 (curve below).
Fig. 7. Impulse response function from mean4 (3M13M UK) to mean4 (upper curve) and to act4 (curve below).
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Fig. 9. Impulse response function from mean1 (10Y4M GER) to mean1 (upper curve) and to act1 (curve below).
Fig. 11. Impulse response function from mean2 (10Y13M GER) to mean2 (upper curve) and to act2 (curve below).
Fig. 12. Impulse response function from act2 (10Y13M GER) to mean2 (upper curve) and to act2 (curve below).
Fig. 10. Impulse response function from act1 (10Y4M GER) to mean1 (upper curve) and to act1 (curve below).
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Fig. 13. Impulse response function from mean3 (3M4M GER) to mean3 (upper curve) and to act3 (curve below).
Fig. 14. Impulse response function from act3 (3M4M GER) to mean3 (upper curve) and to act3 (curve below).
Fig. 15. Impulse response function from mean4 (3M13M GER) to mean4 (upper curve) and to act4 (curve below).
Fig. 16. Impulse response function from act4 (3M13M GER) to mean4 (upper curve) and to act4 (curve below).
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below the zero line. However, the interpretation of this causal relationship is not unambiguous, because the IRF results indi-
cate that a positive shock from the survey mean causes an instantaneous negative response.
Interestingly (as can easily be seen from the upper segments in the Figs. 3–16), the Granger causality running from the
actual interest rates and the corresponding survey mean time series results in a positive response. This clearly is more cor-
responding to the economic interpretation in the context of this paper. Summing up the results for the two different coun-
tries leads to the conclusion that from a time series analysis perspective all survey mean forecasts despite the UK 10Y4M
forecast are not delivering any relevant information regarding the future movement of the 10Y government bond yield
and the three months interbank rate (i.e. there is only evidence for unidirectional Granger causality running from the actual
interest rate to the survey mean time series). In addition to that, the only exception (i.e. the four months forecast for the 10Y
GILT yield) is not corresponding to economic theory.
6. Examining possible implications from dispersion measures and forecast errors
The evaluation results presented in Chapter 5 above put the forecasting performance of survey forecasts into question.
With regard to the survey mean (both for the case of the UK data and the GER data) we did not find strong evidence for
the usefulness of professional forecasts. Anyhow, bearing in mind the exceptional market reactions due to past financial
respectively economic crisis we want to check for possible insights from forecast errors and dispersion measures in the con-
text of international crisis events. Both the dispersion of forecasts (i.e. the difference between the highest and the lowest
forecast, from now on High-Low-Spread, HLS) and the forecast errors (i.e. the difference between the mean forecast and
the actual interest rate) seem to be remarkably unstable in times of financial turmoil.
This should not be a surprise at all, since both measures can be seen as indicators of uncertainty (see for example Kunze
et al., 2014 who investigated the HLS of professional forecast for the three months EURIBOR in the context of the financial
crisis). Using the forecast errors we are able to observe the uncertainty as deviation from the actual interest rate. However, it
is only an ex post measure of uncertainty which is subject to a substantial time lag (i.e. four respectively 13 months).
Because of that, we analyze both the forecast errors and the HLS for the interest rates under investigation. The abbrevi-
ations of the relevant time series are presented in Table 7 below. If the HLS proved to be a good measure of uncertainty it
would be superior to forecast errors at least with regard to the timing, because we do not have to compare the HLS for a
specific forecast with the actual interest rate in four respectively 13 months. To check for possible implication from the
two described uncertainty measures we will check for structural breaks in the 16 relevant time series.
We want to get to know crisis related implications from the forecast errors as well as the HLS. If uncertainty is to rise in
times of financial crisis these time series might serve as some kind of warning sign for political decision makers or market
participants.
As a matter of fact, the forerunning characteristic of interest rates for the real economy has been widely discussed (see for
example Bernanke (1990), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernard and Gerlach (1998), Estrella et al. (2003) and more recently
Saar and Yagil (2015) who examined the usefulness of government and corporate yield curves to predict economic growth
and stock market reactions in the United Kingdom, Europe and Japan). Stock and Watson (1989) also argued that interest
rates deliver useful information for real economic variables. Using again the concept of Granger causality (see Granger
(1969)), we want to check for Granger causal relationships between economic indicators and the outlined uncertainty mea-
sures (i.e. FECONS and HLS respectively). Since GDP growth is only available on a quarterly basis, this indicator is not appli-
cable in the context of this paper. Being available on a monthly basis and covering a large part of real economic activity in the
United Kingdom as well as in Germany we chose to check for causal relationships between the uncertainty measures and the
index of Industrial production (ip). In addition to that we investigate the relationship between the uncertainty measures and
Table 7
Abbreviations for Forecast errors and High-Low-Spreads.
Description Abbreviation
UK Forecast errors 4 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate FECONS1 UK
UK Forecast errors 13 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate FECONS2 UK
UK Forecast errors 4 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield FECONS3 UK
UK Forecast errors 13 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield FECONS4 UK
UK High-Low-Spread 4 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate HLS1 UK
UK High-Low-Spread 13 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate HLS2 UK
UK High-Low-Spread 4 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield HLS3 UK
UK High-Low-Spread 13 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield HLS4 UK
GER Forecast errors 4 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate FECONS1 GER
GER Forecast errors 13 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate FECONS2 GER
GER Forecast errors 4 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield FECONS3 GER
GER Forecast errors 13 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield FECONS4 GER
GER High-Low-Spread 4 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate HLS1 GER
GER High-Low-Spread 13 months forecast for the 3 months interbank rate HLS2 GER
GER High-Low-Spread 4 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield HLS3 GER
GER High-Low-Spread 13 months forecast for the 10Y government bond yield HLS4 GER
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the unemployment rate (ue). One major advantage of these economic indicators is the straightforward interpretation which
also allows to compare the cause of the economic crisis in both countries.
Once again, we start our empirical analysis by deriving the order of integration for the time series under investigation to
rule out the possibility of spurious results. As a matter of fact, if the time series of the uncertainty measures as well as the
economic indicators would be of the same order of integration we would have to check for cointegrating relationships. In
Table 8 below the results of the corresponding PP-Tests are presented.
For almost all 16 uncertainty measures the PP-Test delivers empirical evidence (1% significance level) that the uncertainty
measures are integrated of order zero. The thirteen months forecast for the three 10Y UK government bond yield (i.e.
FECONS4 UK) appears only to be I(0) on a 10% significance level. More surprisingly in the case of the Germany the thirteen
months forecast for the 3M interbank rate (FECONS2 GER) seems to be stationary. Following the empirical results in Table 8
above the economic indicators ip and ue are I(1) in levels respectively I(0) in first differences. Summarizing the results we
conclude that a further investigation of long run relationships is not indicated in general. For the case of the FECONS2 GER
time series we did apply the Johansen Test to rule out a cointegrating relationship with the economic variables. To rule out
any spurious results we will not investigate this time series when checking for Granger causal relationships. As a matter of
fact following the Johansen Test for cointegration we found empirical evidence for a long run relationship between FECONS2
GER and ue, but zero cointegration relationships between FECONS2 GER and ip.
We go on by testing for structural breaks in the time series of forecast errors as well as the HLS following the approach
outlined by Zeileis et al. (2003). The authors present an applied framework to test for structural breaks with unknown tim-
ing. In addition to that the procedure outlined by Zeileis et al. (2003) also allows to check for the occurrence of several breaks
in the time series under investigation. The time series described above cover a time frame from December 1993 to December
2014 (and hence more than 20 years) for the UK and from January 2000 to August 2014 in the case of Germany. This is
important in the context of this paper. Since we understand the forecast errors as well as the HLS as uncertainty measures,
shifts in these 16 time series might point to crisis related increases in uncertainty. Hence, the timings of the structural breaks
are of interest. Following Zeileis et al. (2003) as well as Zeileis (2006) we want to check whether the mean of the time series
(i.e. FECONS and HLS) changes over time using an OLS-Based CUSUM test (see Ploberger et al., 1989; Zeileis et al., 2003) as
well as a sequence of F-statistics (see Zeileis et al., 2003). After checking for the existence of structural breaks we again follow
Zeileis et al. (2003) and apply a dynamic programming algorithm from Bai and Perron (2003) to derive the corresponding
break dates.
Table 8
Results PP-test economic indicators (levels and first differences).
FECONS1 FECONS2 FECONS3 FECONS4
PP-Test (UK) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07
PP-Test (GER) 0.01 0.37 0.01 0.01
HLS1 HLS2 HLS3 HLS4
PP-Test (UK) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
PP-Test (GER) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ip dip ue due
PP-Test (UK) 0.27 0.01 0.36 0.01
PP-Test (GER) 0.50 0.01 0.92 0.01
Table 9
Summary breakpoints.
BIC Timing of break
FECONS1 UK 0
FECONS2 UK 3 1996(12) 2000(1) 2008(7)
FECONS3 UK 3 1998(9) 2003(7) 2008(10)
FECONS4 UK 4 2000(12) 2004(1) 2008(10) 2011(11)
HLS1 UK 4 1996(12) 2000(9) 2008(10) 2011(11)
HLS2 UK 3 1996(12) 2000(7) 2009(4)
HLS3 UK 3 1996(12) 2007(9) 2010(10)
HLS4 UK 4 1996(12) 2004(8) 2008(10) 2011(11)
FECONS1 GER 3 2005(11) 2008(10) 2010(12)
FECONS2 GER 5 2002(2) 2004(4) 2006(6) 2008(11) 2011(1)
FECONS3 GER 3 2002(5) 2006(12) 2009(8)
FECONS4 GER 4 2002(7) 2005(10) 2009(8) 2012(6)
HLS1 GER 3 2004(1) 2007(12) 2010(2)
HLS2 GER 4 2002(6) 2006(9) 2009(3) 2011(5)
HLS3 GER 3 2002(10) 2006(6) 2009(5)
HLS4 GER 2 2008(5) 2010(7)
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Following the results of the breakpoint analysis the only time series where no statistical evidence for a structural break
has been found is the forecast error of the three months forecast for the UK 10Y government bond yield (i.e. FECONS1 UK).
Because of that, we also exclude this time series from the Granger causality tests below. In order to preserve space the results
of the breakpoint analysis are available on request from the authors. A summary of the results from the breakpoint analysis is
presented in the Table 9 below. The most important result from the breakpoint analysis in the context of this paper is the
timing of the structural breaks.
Since the timing of a substantial part of the breakpoints indicates mean shifts in the uncertainty measures around (finan-
cial) crisis events respectively during periods of crisis (e.g. October 2008) we go on by trying to find causal relationships to
the real economic indicators and once again apply the concept of Granger causality. Due to the fact that we did not find any
long run relationships for the remaining 14 time series we use a simple vector auto regressive model (VAR) to test for Gran-
ger causality between the forecast errors respectively HLS and the first differences of the industrial production time series
(dip) and the first differences of the unemployment rate (due).
The first differences of ip and ue have been chosen because non stationary variables might lead to distorted results. We
estimated 14 VAR-models and checked for Granger causality whereas the FECONS- respectively HLS-time series were the
cause variables (see Pfaff, 2008). For each model the lag length has been derived using the SC criterion proposed by
Schwarz (1978). The causality analysis tested against the null hypothesis of no Granger causality. The results (lag length
and corresponding p-values) are presented in Table 10 below.
The estimations above deliver mixed results. With regard to the significance level we found some empirical evidence for
Granger causal relationships. On the 1% level FECONS2 GER Granger causes changes in the German ip (dip) and HLS2 UK
Granger causes changes in the UK industrial production (dip). On the 5% significance level FECONS3 UK Granger causes
dip whereas HLS2 GER Granger causes dip. These results are encouraging in the sense that changes in the uncertainty mea-
sures may act as some kind of warning sign in financial respectively economic crisis at least with regard to the industrial
production. The evidence with regard to the unemployment rate is less encouraging, however.
7. Policy implications
Dealing with the causes and consequences of financial crisis events is a demanding task for financial market participants
as well as political decision makers. Additionally, the global financial and economic crisis did visualize quite impressively
that crisis events and the consequences thereof are not regionally restricted and hence have to be analyzed in an interna-
tional context. For example, monetary policy decisions of the European Central Bank (ECB) have to be considered by the Bank
of England’s (BoE) monetary policy committee. Not surprisingly and as an answer to the economic downturn in the after-
math of the global financial crisis both the BoE’s and ECB’s decision makers did cut benchmark interest rates several times
to stimulate economic activity. In addition to that, it has to be considered that the long end of the yield curve for various
countries has also been affected by the rising risk aversion of financial market participants. In this context Germany and
the United Kingdom might be considered as safe havens. During the financial crisis both the 10Y German government bond
yield the 10Y GILT yields did fall substantially due to flight-to-quality effects. On the other hand, government yields for coun-
tries like Portugal, Italy and Spain did rise substantially due to rising risk aversion.
All these effects should be taken into account by professional analysts. Hence, for political decision makers forecasts pro-
vided by professional analysts might be a welcome aid during crisis events. However, following our empirical findings this
conclusion might be somewhat overhasty. We found strong evidence for rising forecast errors (at least for the survey mean)
and rising disagreement amongst forecasters during financial crisis events. This puts the usefulness of survey forecasts into
question. As a matter of fact, blindly following professional analysts’ predictions might lead to wrong decisions. By not focus-
ing solely on the accuracy of the forecasts but also on the implications of uncertainty measures we are able to get crisis
related insights from professional analysts’ predictions and are able to link the uncertainty measures to the real economy.
Especially the immediate rise in the HLS for the various investigated forecasts might serve political decision makers as a dis-
cretional warning sign. Hence, the ongoing monitoring of uncertainty measures might be much more useful than focusing
solely on point forecasts.
Table 10
P-values and number of lags Granger causality test. dip refers to the first differences of industrial production and due refers to first differences to the
unemployment rate.
FECONS1 Lags FECONS2 Lags FECONS3 Lags FECONS4 Lags
UK dip 0.43 1 0.05 2 0.08 2
GER dip 0.00 3 0.20 1 0.25 1
UK due 0.91 1 0.18 2 0.07 2
GER due 0.10 2 0.65 1 0.07 1
HLS1 Lags HLS2 Lags HLS3 Lags HLS4 Lags
UK dip 0.83 1 0.01 1 0.96 1 0.07 1
GER dip 0.68 1 0.09 1 0.02 1 0.36 1
UK due 0.07 2 0.36 2 0.14 1 0.47 2
GER due 0.66 1 0.32 2 0.22 1 0.91 1
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8. Conclusion
In this paper the forecasts of professional analysts for the three months interbank rate as well as the 10Y government
bond yield in the United Kingdom and Germany have been evaluated. Applying basic measures of forecast accuracy it has
been shown, that the UK survey forecasts in general do not perform better than a simple naive forecast. These results do
fit to the findings of earlier studies dealing with survey forecasts for German interest rates. Additionally, evaluating the mean
forecasts for the United Kingdom and Germany using models of time series analysis does not lead to the conclusion that the
survey forecasts deliver useful information (with the 10Y4M survey mean for UK as the only exception) with regard to fore-
cast accuracy.
This does not necessary has to lead to the conclusion that survey forecasts are useless in general. Because of that, we have
further investigated forecast dispersion measures. As a matter of fact, in financial crisis uncertainty is a major concern central
bank officials, political decision makers, and financial market participants. Applying our empirical approach we were able to
find crisis related implications and we were able to show, that mean shifts in the uncertainty measures coincide with times
of financial turmoil.
This raises the question whether uncertainty measures might serve as some kind of warning signal or early warning indi-
cator. Using a simple approach we found empirical evidence for causal relationships between the uncertainty measures and
changes in real economic indicators for UK and Germany (industrial production). But more research has to be done. Espe-
cially due to omitting variables and/or long memory in the time series more robustness checks are inevitably necessary. Fur-
thermore uncertainty measures for a broader range of economic and financial variables should be taken into account.
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Highlights
• We utilize a novel comprehensive disaggregated dataset incorporating indi-
vidual forecasts for both Brent and WTI crude oil prices.
• We calculate prominent measures of forecast accuracy and carry out tests for
unbiasedness, sign accuracy and forecast encompassing to assess the rational-
ity and accuracy of professional forecasters.
• We discuss implications for decision-makers as regards the applications of oil
price forecasts.
• Forecasts are more precise for shorter horizons, but less accurate than the naïve
prediction.
• For longer horizons, topically-oriented trend adjustments become more pro-
nounced, but forecasters tend to outperform the naïve predictions.
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This paper evaluates survey forecasts for crude oil prices and discusses the implications for deci-
sion makers. A novel disaggregated data set incorporating individual forecasts for Brent and
WesternTexas Intermediate is used. We carry out tests for unbiasedness, sign accuracy, and fore-
cast encompassing, followed by the computation of coefficients for topically oriented trend
adjustments and the Theil's U measure. We also control for the forecast horizon finding hetero-
geneous results. Forecasts are more precise for shorter horizons, but less accurate than the naïve
prediction. For longer horizons, topically oriented trend adjustments become more pronounced,
but forecasters tend to outperform the naïve predictions.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Crude oil prices have a direct influence on global economic activity. In
addition, the recent low price environment calls into question the sus-
tainability of public finances in a rising number of oil exporting coun-
tries (see, e.g., Wegener, Basse, Kunze, & von Mettenheim, 2016).
For monetary policy‐makers at major central banks, the outlook
regarding the price of crude oil holds vital importance for their inflation
and growth forecasts (see, e.g., Knetsch, 2007; as well as Natal, 2012).
Oil prices as an input factor are also important for strategical decision
making and corporate profitability (see, e.g., Sadorsky, 2008). For
example, Haushalter, Heron, and Lie (2002) have emphasized the
impact of oil price uncertainty on corporate value. Furthermore, crude
oil prices have an impact on stock markets both in emerging and devel-
oped markets (see, e.g., Basher & Sadorsky, 2006; as well as Miller &
Ratti, 2009). Given the risks and uncertainties related to global oil
prices and, hence, transaction costs for corporations, the future expec-
tations regarding crude oil prices and accurate oil price predictions are
essential in terms of understanding the outlook for the global economy
and for individual firms.
As regards, for example, information systems, forecasts belong to
the methodologies of decision support systems (see, e.g., Banker &
Kauffman, 2004) and, hence, good predictions are essential for effi-
cient respectively effective management decisions and planning pro-
cesses (see Waddell & Sohal, 1994). Accordingly, the necessity for
forecasts is a result of the general uncertainty firms have to deal with
(see Lowe, 1970).
Various forecasting models and the usefulness of corresponding
forecasts have been empirically assessed (see, e.g., Alquist, Kilian, &
Vigfusson, 2013). Regarding the applied forecasting methodologies
for crude oil prices, Behmiri and Pires Manso (2013) and Frey, Manera,
Markandya, and Scarpa (2009) provide extensive overviews. Compar-
ing the framework of global oil markets with “purely” financial markets
(e.g., bond, equity, and FX markets), one might conclude that oil prices
should be somewhat more straightforward to forecast due to the avail-
able fundamental market information regarding consumption patterns
and physical supply (i.e., global crude oil production and crude oil
reserves). Within this line of thought, the global balance between sup-
ply and demand and the respective expectations should at least be
suitable to forecast the long‐term price of oil. However, for corporate
managers, long‐term outlooks might not be adequate for decisions
with a short‐ or medium‐term impact. In addition, forecasters have to
account for the endogenous relationship between oil prices and eco-
nomic activity (see He, Shouyang, & Lai, 2010). Furthermore, shock
events on both demand and supply side may lead to a higher forecast
risk despite the available information. Supply side shocks have inter
alia been investigated by Kilian (2008) as well as Kilian (2009). Kilian
(2009) mentioned three types of shocks: oil supply shocks, aggregate
demand shocks, and precautionary demand shocks. Because the OPEC
countries are major suppliers of crude oil, there exists extensive litera-
ture investigating the price impact of the OPEC meetings and the offi-
cial announcements of the cartel members (see, e.g., Bentzen, 2007;
Kaufmann, Dees, Karadeloglou, & Sanchez, 2004; Schmidbauer &
Rösch, 2012). Besides these fundamental effects, speculation also
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plays a role when discussing the usefulness of oil price forecasts
(see Kaufmann & Ullman, 2009; Prat & Uctum, 2011).
Given the various factors influencing crude oil prices, the accuracy
of oil price forecasts is important for decision‐makers. Hence, this
study aims to evaluate survey predictions for the price of Brent and
Western Texas Intermediate (WTI). The remainder of the paper is
structured as follows. In Section 3, we will present the dataset, before
describing the evaluation methods employed in Section 4. Subse-
quently, in Section 5, we present the empirical findings, and finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 | SURVEY PREDICTIONS FOR THE PRICE
OF OIL
As mentioned previously, a wide range of forecasting approaches for
oil prices exists. Decision‐makers and managers have to choose among
them and have to decide how they apply these forecasts as a decision
support tool. Given numerous influences and potential shock effects,
results from survey predictions may be seen as one alternative (see
Alquist et al., 2013) for corporate managers. Survey forecasts for oil
prices respectively financial market variables in general are useful in
several ways for decision‐makers. For example, Pesaran and Weale
(2006) have noted that “combinations of forecasts produced by differ-
ent bodies tend to be more accurate than forecasts produced by any
individual” (see Pesaran &Weale, 2006, p. 748). Furthermore, corpora-
tions not able or willing to produce own predictions have recourse to
regularly produced predictions. Rötheli (1998) has investigated the
rivalry between forecasting and other strategies (i.e., diversification
or waiting) and came inter alia to the conclusion that high forecasting
costs lead to a preference of alternative strategies. Hence, survey fore-
casts when available at comparatively low costs might constitute an
alternative. Decision‐makers from institutions that are producing their
own forecasts have a helpful tool when benchmarking the own predic-
tions. Hence, forecasts may create economic value. However, given
the various factors influencing economic variables, a perfect forecast
is far from certain. Hence, it is essential for decision‐makers to appraise
the forecasts and to develop an understanding of the errors in the past
and the track record of available forecasting methods or forecasters
(see, e.g., Barron & Targett, 1988).
Despite this global importance, to the best of our knowledge, the
academic literature dealing with the evaluation of survey forecasts for
the price of crude oil is rather scarce, at least in comparison with the
assessment of other financial market variables such as interest rates,
corporate earnings, or exchange rates. There exists a large body of lit-
erature dealing with the evaluation of survey predictions for exchange
rate forecasts (see, e.g., Audretsch & Stadtmann, 2005; Dominguez,
1986; Mitchell & Pearce,2007; Pierdzioch & Rülke, 2015; Takagi,
1991; and more recently Ince & Molodtsova, 2017) and interest rate
forecasts (see, e.g., Belongia, 1987; Benke, 2006; Friedman, 1980;
Kolb & Stekler, 1996; Mitchell & Pearce, 2006; Spiwoks, Bedke, &
Hein, 2008; Spiwoks, Bedke, & Hein, 2010; only to name but a few).
Recently, for example, Reitz, Stadtmann, and Taylor (2010), Jongen,
Verschoor, Wolff, and Zwinkels (2012), and Beckmann and Czudaj
(2017) focus on FX forecasters' heterogeneity. Swanson (2006)
investigates inter alia the dispersion of Blue Chip Forecasts for the
3 months' Treasury Bill Rate.
One possible explanation for the relative scarcity of studies deal-
ing with survey forecasts for oil prices is the bounded availability of
surveys collecting oil price forecasts. The following sources for survey
forecasts are mentioned in the relevant empirical literature. On a
monthly basis, survey predictions for the price of oil are collected by
Consensus Economics. MacDonald and Marsh (1993) conclude that
individual forecasts are irrational (i.e., are biased and inefficient),
whereas Reitz, Rülke, and Stadtmann (2009) find evidence for the
underperformance of forecasters compared with a random walk fore-
cast. Prat and Uctum (2011) reject the hypothesis of rational expecta-
tions regarding forecasts for the price of WTI. For the sake of
completeness, one could also refer to Singleton (2013), who inter alia
investigates the dispersion of oil price forecasts collected by Consen-
sus Economics. Pierdzioch, Rülke, and Stadtmann (2010), Pierdzioch,
Rülke, and Stadtmann (2013), and Rülke et al. (2012) evaluate the oil
price forecasts from the ECB's survey of professional forecasters
(SPF). Pierdzioch et al. (2010) find evidence for antiherding of profes-
sional forecasters, whereas Rülke et al. (2012) conclude that fore-
casters do not act rationally, at least in terms of internal consistency
regarding the forecast horizon. More recently, Atalla, Joutz, and Pierru
(2016) examined the dispersion of individual forecasts from the ECB's
SPF. Within this paper, we evaluate the survey forecasts collected by
the news agency Dow Jones International GmbH. The relevance of
forecast evaluation in the context of managerial decision‐making has
been inter alia discussed by Lawrence (1991).
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to assess the
quality of forecasts from the Dow Jones Oil Price Survey. With this
new dataset, as regards academic research, we are able to deliver novel
empirical evidence in terms of forecast evaluation for the price of oil. In
addition to widely acknowledged evaluation measures (e.g., mean
average error or root mean squared error, RMSE), we also perform
tests for sign accuracy, unbiasedness, and forecast encompassing.
3 | THE DATASET
We examine survey data collected by the news agency Dow Jones
International GmbH. The use of survey forecasts for economic and
financial market variables inter alia allows to test for the rationality
of the professional analysts (see, e.g., MacDonald, 1990). In the case
of the Dow Jones Oil price survey, professional financial analysts as
well as researchers from economic think tanks are requested to pro-
vide their forecasts for benchmark energy prices (i.e., the price for
the sweet light crude oil from the North Sea Brent and the lighter U.
S. Benchmark WTI). In general, we denote the actual price of Brent
as pBrent, i, whereas pWTI, i is the actual price of WTI. Furthermore, the
corresponding forecasts are denoted as p^ jBrent;i and p^
k
WTI;i, respectively.
The monthly data ranges from January 2006 to December 2015,
and hence incorporates substantial movements in the price of oil.
Theoretically, 468 point forecasts for Brent and WTI could have been
delivered by every single forecast institution. One important issue of
the dataset is the substantial number of missing values (NAs). This
leads to a strongly unbalanced dataset. The raw dataset contains
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forecasts from 75 individual providers and sums up to 22,759
(10,180 WTI and 12,579 Brent forecasts) individual predictions.1 To
ensure a higher level of statistical validity, forecasters with fewer
than 40 predictions for the price of Brent and WTI, have been
excluded in a first step. This adjustment leads to a dataset with
21,907 individual forecasts. In the time period under investigation,
the Brent price forecasts of j = 52 institutions and the WTI price
forecasts of k = 50 institutions are investigated. Additionally, for
every forecast i for Brent or WTI, a survey median is reported. The
naïve forecast is given by the actual forecast at the date of publica-
tion of the survey (forecast date). It is important to note that due
to the specific process of data collection, the naïve forecast for each
forecast horizon is not a shift of the actual oil price.
In addition, some further prior considerations have to be made due
to the structure of the survey. Every month on the forecast date, the
forecasters are requested to deliver the forecast for the end of quarter
prices for Brent (and WTI) for the following four quarters. For forecast
dates in the last month of the current quarter, the requested forecast
horizon shifts by one quarter (see also Table 1 below).
Following the sample above, on February 17, 2010, the final fore-
cast for the March 31, 2010 end of quarter forecast had to be deliv-
ered. On March 17, 2010, the first forecast for March 31, 2011 had
to be delivered. Due to the monthly frequency of the data for a single
forecast date, there exist up to 12 forecasts, and hence up to 12 fore-
cast horizons. Owing to calendar effects and minor variations in the
forecast date, the forecast horizons slightly change over time.
Table 2 below shows the corresponding forecast horizons. The struc-
ture of the data described above leads to substantial overlapping,
which has to be accounted for. Accordingly, we start our empirical
analysis in Section 5 with evaluation methods that can be applied with-
out consideration of the forecast horizon.
In addition to the forecasts, the data set contains the actual fore-
cast (i.e., the price of oil at the end of quarter date) and the naïve
forecast (i.e., the price of oil at the forecast date). Given the specific
characteristics of the Dow Jones Oil Price Survey, the dataset has
some clear advantages. First, with up to 52 contributors (after adjust-
ments), the group of forecasters is rather large in comparison with
other existing surveys. This fact is especially useful for decision
makers, because the disaggregated data set allows to analyze the
range of the survey forecasts for the oil price (see, e.g., Gripaios,
1994). In general, survey forecasts allow to test hypothesis in the
context of uncertainty of financial market variables. In this context,
Lahiri and Sheng (2010), Atalla et al. (2016), and Glas and Hartmann
(2016) investigated disaggregated data sets to gain insights from the
dispersion of individual forecasts. Atalla et al. (2016) came inter alia
to the conclusion that dispersion of oil price forecasts is positively
correlated with forecast errors. Following Atalla et al. (2016), who
investigated the ECB's SPF oil price predictions, an increased dis-
agreement hence indicates higher uncertainty. Lahiri and Sheng
(2010) empirically assessed inflation and output forecasts contrib-
uted to the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's SPF and came
to the conclusion that disagreement is a fairly good measure of
uncertainty in low volatility periods and for shorter forecast hori-
zons, respectively. A second advantage of the data used in this
paper stems from the fact that two globally recognized crude oil
benchmark forecasts are requested. In fact, a substantially large frac-
tion of the analysts deliver forecasts for both Brent and WTI. Fur-
thermore, the existence of no fewer than 12 forecast horizons
allows drawing conclusions regarding the forecast horizon. Finally,
the dataset covers the global financial crisis, the following rebound
in global economic activity and the price collapse attributed to the
shale oil boom in the United States.
To illustrate the underlying data, in Figures 1 and 2, the actual
Brent price, the median forecast, and the naïve forecast are shown,
whereas Figures 3 and 4 show the corresponding time series for
WTI. Regarding the naïve prediction, it should be considered that
—as noted above—the naïve prediction is given by the price of oil
at the forecast date. Hence, the naïve forecast is not a simple shift
of the actual oil price and, thus, it does not perfectly run after the
actual oil price.
With a forecast horizon of 1 month (Figure 1 for Brent and
Figure 3 for WTI), the forecast error of the median forecast is much
smaller than in the case of the 12‐month horizon (Figure 2 for Brent
and Figure 4 for WTI). Furthermore, it can easily be seen that the naïve
TABLE 1 Structure of the data set
Forecast date Forecast end of quarter Actual price (USD/barrel) Naïve forecast (USD/barrel) Individual forecast (USD/barrel)
February 17, 2010 31.03.2010 81.0 76.0 74.0
30.06.2010 74.0 76.0 75.0
30.09.2010 81.0 76.0 78.3
31.12.2010 94.0 76.0 80.0
March 17, 2010 30.06.2010 74.0 81.0 75.0
30.09.2010 81.0 81.0 76.0
31.12.2010 94.0 81.0 80.0
31.03.2011 117.0 81.0 81.0
TABLE 2 Forecast horizons
Forecast horizon Number of weeks (rounded)
H1 6
H2 10
H3 15
H4 19
H5 23
H6 28
H7 32
H8 36
H9 40
H10 45
H11 50
H12 54
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prediction and the median forecast lie close together for both horizons,
which is an indication for a status quo bias (i.e., topically oriented trend
adjustment) of crude oil forecasters.
4 | METHODOLOGIES OF FORECAST
EVALUATION
Following a standard approach in the context of forecast evaluation
(see, e.g., Beechey & Österholm, 2014; as well as Baghestani, Arzaghi,
& Kaya, 2015), we start our empirical analysis with the test for
unbiasedness, followed by the sign accuracy test and the test for fore-
cast encompassing. In a second step, we apply widely acknowledged
forecast accuracy measures.
4.1 | Test for unbiasedness
In the context of forecast evaluating, the test for unbiasedness
is a common test procedure to check for systematic (i.e., nonran-
dom) errors (see, e.g., Abosedra & Baghestani, 2004; Friedman,
1980; Holden & Peel, 1990; Mincer & Zarnowitz, 1969; and
more recently Bowles et al., 2010; Kenny, Kostka, & Masera,
2015; Pierdzioch et al., 2013; as well as Spiwoks, Scheier, &
Hein, 2014).
We test for unbiased forecasts for the change in the price of
Brent, with ΔpBrent, i being the actual price change and ΔbpjBrent;i
being the forecast for the change in the price of Brent from insti-
tution j. The actual change of the price of one barrel WTI is given
by ΔpWTI, i, and the forecasted price change is denoted with ΔbpjWTI;i.
In Formula 1 below, Brent Model 1 and WTI Model 1 are unbiased
forecasts. Hence, to statistically validate the absence of a system-
atic forecast error in Brent Model 2 and WTI Model 2, α has to
be equal to 0 and β has to be equal to 1. As discussed earlier,
the data set contains forecasts for up to 12 forecast horizons.
However, we begin by applying the test for unbiasedness regard-
less of the forecast horizon.
Unbiased forecast Brent Model 1ð Þ: ΔpBrent;i ¼ Δp^ jBrent;i þ u ji
Biased forecast Brent Model 2ð Þ: ΔpBrent;i ¼ αþ βΔp^ jBrent;i þ u ji
and
Unbiased forecast WTI Model 1ð Þ: ΔpWTI;i ¼ Δp^ kWTI;i þ uki
Biased forecast WTI Model 2ð Þ: ΔpWTI;i ¼ αþ βΔp^ jWTI;i þ uki :
(1)
4.2 | Sign accuracy test
By applying the sign accuracy test, we investigate the directional
accuracy of the forecasts provided (see, e.g., Baghestani, 2008;
Baghestani et al., 2015; Diebold & Lopez, 1996; Greer, 2003; Kolb
& Stekler, 1996; Mitchell & Pearce, 2006; as well as Spiwoks,
Bedke, & Hein, 2009). Following—for example—Spiwoks et al.
(2009), we first use a 2‐by‐2 contingency table. In the fields N11
FIGURE 3 Crude oil priceWesternTexas Intermediate (WTI; actual vs.
forecast)—Forecast horizon 1 month
FIGURE 1 Crude oil price Brent (actual vs. forecast)—Forecast horizon
1 month
FIGURE 2 Crude oil price Brent (actual vs. forecast)—Forecast horizon
12 months
FIGURE 4 Crude oil priceWesternTexas Intermediate (WTI; actual vs.
forecast)—Forecast horizon 12 months
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and N22 of Table 3 below, the correct forecasts for the directional
change of the oil price can be found. Incorrect directional forecasts
for the price of oil can be found in the fields N21 and N12. As with
the test for unbiasedness, we do not differentiate for the forecast
horizon.
Following Diebold and Lopez (1996), we test for significant dif-
ferences between a random directional forecast and the crude oil
forecasts provided in the data set using a χ2 test. Whenever this is
the case, we test for superiority of the forecast over the random
directional change.
4.3 | Test for forecast encompassing
Furthermore, we want to check for additional information content of
the forecasts against a simple benchmark model using the test for
forecast encompassing (see, e.g., Diebold & Lopez, 1996; as well as
Spiwoks et al., 2009; Clements and Harvey, 2010). In a first step,
we apply the setup proposed by McCracken and West (2008) and
estimate a simple linear regression model for the actual price, the
naïve prediction (as the simple benchmark forecast), and the deliv-
ered survey forecasts (see Formula 2 below). Under the null hypoth-
esis (H0), the benchmark model encompasses the survey forecast, and
hence β1 should be 1 and β2 should be 0.
pBrent;i ¼ αþ β1p^NaiveBrent þ β2p^ jBrent þ ui
and
pWTI;i ¼ αþ β1p^NaiveWTI þ β2p^ kWTI þ ui:
(2)
As a robustness check for the results, we will also apply these
test procedures while controlling for the forecast horizon. Due to
the challenges regarding the large number of missing values within
the data, we only use the median forecast when calculating the fore-
cast horizon‐dependent results, as this is the only forecast time series
without gaps.
Following the test procedures outlined above, we assess the
forecasts with common forecast accuracy measures: the mean of
the forecast errors, the (adjusted) RMSE, the TOTA coefficient,
and the Theil's U score. One clear advantage of these measures
stems from the fact that we are able to directly compare different
forecasts in terms of their accuracy. Once again, in a first step, we
do not control for the forecast horizon. In a second step, to derive
implications regarding forecast accuracy depending on the forecast
horizon, we additionally investigate the measures of forecast accu-
racy controlling for the forecast horizon at the level of individual
forecasts.
4.4 | Forecast error measures
We first derive the mean forecast error as the weighted difference
between the actual price for Brent and WTI (see Formula 3 below).
One advantage of this accuracy measure stems from the fact that it
is easy to both calculate and interpret. For example, a positive value
of the mean forecast error measure for forecaster j indicates that j
overestimates the price of oil on average. A comprehensive overview
of forecast evaluation measures—including describing the mean fore-
cast error—is provided by Andres and Spiwoks (1999).
e jBrent;h ¼
1
N
∑
N
i¼1
pBrent;i;h−p^
j
Brent;i;h
 
and
e kWTI;h ¼
1
N
∑
N
i¼1
pWTI;i;h−p^
k
WTI;i;h
 
:
(3)
The forecast errors for the price of Brent for the forecaster j are
denoted as e jBrent, and the forecast errors for the price of WTI for the
forecaster k are denoted as ekWTI. Once again, pBrent, i is the actual price
of Brent, whereas pWTI, i is the actual price of WTI. Although numerous
forecasters deliver forecasts for both Brent and WTI, it does not have
to be the case necessarily that j = k. The corresponding forecasts are
denoted as p^ jBrent;i and p^
k
WTI;i , respectively. The relevant forecast horizon
with h = 1, 2, …, 12 is denoted by h.
Aside from the easy‐to‐interpret mean forecast error, quadratic
error measures are widely used within the evaluation literature. One
advantage stems from the fact that positive and negative forecast
errors do not level out. Furthermore, using a quadratic error measure
leads to a penalization of comparatively large forecast errors. The
RMSE given in Formula 4 below is one very commonly applied error
measure (see, e.g., Andres & Spiwoks, 1999; Espinoza, Fornari, &
Lombardi, 2012; Hyndman & Koehler, 2006; Kisinbay, 2010; Leitch &
Tanner, 1991; and more recently Herwartz & Schlüter, 2017; Ryan &
Whiting, 2017; as well as Wegener, Spreckelsen, Basse, &
Mettenheim, 2016).
RMSE jBrent;h ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N
∑
N
i¼1
pBrent;i;h−p^
j
Brent;i;h
 2s
and
RMSE kWTI;h ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N
∑
N
i¼1
pWTI;i;h−p^
k
WTI;i;h
 2s
:
(4)
As stated above, the RMSE is widely used in the relevant literature
dealing with accuracy of forecasts. However, following—for example—
Clements (2014) and Chen, Costantini, and Deschamps (2016) under
certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to apply an adjusted ver-
sion of the RMSE (aRMSE). Given the large movements in the oil price
and the high likelihood of large forecast errors in the context of the oil
price crisis, individual forecasters who missed out sequences of high
uncertainty might be “rewarded” by the conventional RMSE measure.
Against the background of the unbalanced panel data, there is a high
likelihood for such a misspecification.
The aRMSE given in Formula 5 below attributes a lower weight to
forecast errors when the cross‐sectional forecast error is high. In the
context of our research questions, the aRMSE measure seems to be
TABLE 3 Sign accuracy test 2‐by‐2 contingency table
Actual event:
Oil price rises
Actual event:
Oil price falls Σ
Forecast: Oil
price rises
N11 N12 N1.
Forecast: Oil
price falls
N21 N22 N2.
Σ N.1 N.2 N
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more appropriate. Following Clements (2014) and Chen et al. (2016),
we use the median of the absolute forecast errors rather than the
mean forecast errors.
4.5 | Topically oriented trend adjustment
We will also check for topically oriented trend adjustment using the
TOTA coefficient developed by Andres and Spiwoks (1999). The
TOTA coefficient has been especially used in the context of evaluat-
ing interest rate forecasts (Spiwoks et al., 2008; Spiwoks et al., 2009;
Kunze, 2014 as well as Kunze et al. 2015), economic forecasts (see,
e.g., Spiwoks et al., 2014), and FX forecasts (see, e.g., Bofinger &
Schmidt, 2003; as well as Baghestani, 2010b). Meub, Proeger, Bizer,
and Spiwoks (2015) have also used the TOTA coefficient in an exper-
imental context. The TOTA coefficient is shown in Formula 6 below.
In the context of our investigation, the TOTA coefficient is given by
the fraction of the coefficient of determination of the oil price fore-
cast, the actual oil price (R2Forecast,Actual), the coefficient of determina-
tion of the oil price forecast, and the actual forecast at the date of
forecast (R2Forecast,Actual(ForecastDate). As the authors highlight, a TOTA
coefficient < 1 can be seen as statistical evidence for trend adjust-
ment behavior of the forecasters.
TOTA ¼ R
2
Forecast; Actual
R2Forecast; Actual ForecastDateð Þ
: (6)
4.6 | Theil's U measure
Finally, we investigate the oil price forecast by applying the Theil's
U measure (see Theil, 1955; as well as Andres & Spiwoks, 1999)
as the fraction of the RMSE of the naïve forecast and the Brent
forecasts UrBrent
 
and the naïve forecast and the WTI forecasts
(UBrentr), respectively.
U jBrent ¼
RMSE jBrent
RMSE NaiveBrent
and U kWTI ¼
RMSE kWTI
RMSE NaiveWTI
: (7)
A Theil's U measure (see Formula 7 above) of 1 signals that the
forecast of institution j and k, respectively, is as good as the naïve pre-
diction. A forecast with aTheil's U score below 1 performs better than
the naïve prediction. In case of aTheil's U higher than 1, the naïve pre-
diction outperforms the individual forecasts. Finally, it is important to
note that the adjusted RMSE is not necessary in this context. When
calculating the Theil's U score, only complete pairs of individual
forecasts and the naïve prediction have been considered. Hence, a
weighting of forecast errors is not necessary when calculating the
Theil's U score.
5 | EVALUATION RESULTS
We commence this section by presenting and discussing the evalua-
tion results from the sign accuracy test, the test for unbiasedness,
and the test for forecast encompassing. Subsequently, we will present
and briefly discuss the results of the forecast accuracy measures, both
with and without controlling for the forecast horizon.
The results of the sign accuracy test, the test for unbiasedness,
and the test for forecast encompassing are summarized in Tables 4
(Brent) and 5 (WTI) below. More detailed results can be found in
Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6 in the Appendix.
Regarding the sign accuracy test, we find empirical evidence for
the individual forecasts being better than a random prediction (+) for
aRMSE jBrent;h ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N
∑
N
i¼1
pBrent;i;h−p^
j
Brent;i;h
 2s mediani medianj pBrent;i;h−p^ jBrent;i;h   :
medianj pBrent;i;h−p^
j
Brent;i;h
  
and
aRMSE kWTI;h ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
N
∑
N
i¼1
pWTI;i;h−p^
k
WTI;i;h
 2s mediani mediank pWTI;i;h−bpkWTI;i;h   
mediank pWTI;i;h−bpkWTI;i;h   :
(5)
TABLE 4 Summary sign accuracy, unbiasedness, and forecast
encompassing—Brent
Forecast Sign accuracy Unbiasedness Encompassing
MEDIAN NA − −
F1 + − −
F2 NA − −
F3 + − −
F4 + − +
F5 NA − +
F6 NA − +
F7 NA − +
F8 NA − +
F9 − − +
F10 NA − +
F11 NA − −
F12 + − +
F13 NA − +
F14 NA − −
F15 NA − +
F16 + − +
F17 + − +
F18 NA − −
F19 NA − +
F20 + − +
(Continues)
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22 (Brent) and 27 institutions (WTI). For both Brent and WTI, three
institutions performed worse than a random prediction (−) for the
direction of change. However, 28 (Brent) and 20 (WTI) delivered fore-
casts are not statistically significant different from a random prediction
(NA), and hence also give no additional informational value, at least in
terms of sign accuracy. The accuracy of the median forecast is not
significantly different from a random prediction in the case of Brent.
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Forecast Sign accuracy Unbiasedness Encompassing
F21 + − −
F22 NA − +
F23 − − +
F24 NA − +
F25 + − +
F26 + − +
F27 NA − −
F28 + − +
F29 + − −
F30 + − −
F31 + − +
F32 NA − −
F33 NA − +
F34 NA − +
F35 NA − +
F36 + − −
F37 + − +
F38 + − −
F39 NA − −
F40 + − −
F41 + − +
F42 NA − −
F43 NA − −
F44 − − +
F45 NA − +
F46 + − −
F47 NA − −
F48 + − −
F49 NA − +
F50 NA − −
F51 NA − −
F52 + − −
Note. NA = no significant result; + = significant accurate prediction of sign;
statistically significant unbiased, and statistically significant provision of
additional information; − = no significant accurate prediction of sign,
statistically significant biased, and statistically significant no provision of
additional information.
TABLE 5 Summary sign accuracy, unbiasedness, and forecast
encompassing—WTI
Forecast Sign accuracy Unbiasedness Encompassing
MEDIAN + − −
F1 + − +
F2 + − −
F3 + − −
F4 + − −
F5 + − −
F6 NA − −
F7 NA − +
F8 + − +
F9 NA − +
(Continues)
TABLE 5 (Continued)
Forecast Sign accuracy Unbiasedness Encompassing
F10 − − −
F11 NA − −
F12 + − +
F13 + − +
F14 + − +
F15 NA − −
F16 NA − +
F17 + − +
F18 NA − +
F19 NA + −
F21 + − −
F22 + − +
F24 NA − +
F25 + − −
F26 + − +
F27 + + −
F28 − − −
F29 + − +
F30 + − −
F31 NA − −
F32 NA − −
F33 NA − −
F35 + + +
F37 + − +
F38 + + +
F39 + − −
F40 + − −
F41 NA − −
F43 NA − −
F44 − − −
F45 NA − +
F46 NA − +
F47 + − +
F48 + − −
F49 + − −
F50 NA − +
F53 NA − −
F54 NA + −
F51 NA − −
F52 + − −
Note. NA = no significant result; + = significant accurate prediction of sign,
statistically significant unbiased, and statistically significant provision of
additional information; − = no significant accurate prediction of sign, statis-
tically significant biased, and statistically significant no provision of addi-
tional information.
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This is an important result because the median forecast is often pre-
ferred by economic agents obtaining forecasts from external providers
(e.g., portfolio managers). By contrast, the WTI median forecast passes
the sign accuracy test.
Checking for unbiasedness of the forecasts leads to an even more
disillusioning finding. For all predictions regarding the change of the
price of Brent, the test for unbiasedness reveals that the forecasts
are biased (−). In the case of the WTI predictions, following the regres-
sion approach of the test for unbiasedness for five forecasts, the
conditions that α equals zero and β equals one seem to hold. However,
for four out of these five forecasts, the widely acknowledged Durbin
Watson test (see Durbin &Watson, 1950, 1951) delivers strong indica-
tions for the autocorrelation of the residuals. Hence, for these fore-
casts, on the other hand, the test for forecast encompassing delivers
more encouraging results. We find empirical evidence for additional
information (+) for 29 (Brent) and 21 (WTI) forecasts.
Summing up these heterogeneous intermediate results does not
prompt the conclusion that forecasts delivered by professional
analysts are unworkable. However, economic agents should also not
unconditionally follow external forecasts. Given the results of the
tests of forecast encompassing at least makes the case that one
should not solely stick to the naïve prediction, because professional
forecasters deliver additional information. Having said that, it does
not allow any conclusions regarding forecasters' superiority over the
naïve prediction. Using the forecast accuracy measures, we will be
able to directly compare individual (but anonymized) forecasts with
each other, the median forecast, and the naïve prediction. The results
from the simple forecast accuracy measures are given in Tables 6
(Brent) and 7 (WTI) below.
Our findings regarding the measures of forecast accuracy are het-
erogeneous as well. For the predictions of both Brent and WTI, the
means of the forecast errors have different signs and scales. The
median forecast proves to be a rather accurate predictor regarding
the mean forecast error. However, in the case of WTI, the naïve pre-
diction obviously outperforms the median forecast and all individual
forecasts. For the forecasts for both the price of Brent and WTI, the
aRMSE as well as Theil's U measure reveal that a large fraction of the
individual predictions are less accurate than the naïve prediction.
These findings can also be seen as implications for topically oriented
trend adjustments, which are empirically confirmed by the results of
the TOTA coefficient. As stated above, a TOTA coefficient below 1
has to be seen as empirical evidence of trend adjustments. With the
exception of one institution in the case of Brent and one institution
for the WTI forecasts, we find empirical evidence of topically oriented
trend adjustment for all individual forecasts and the median forecast.
As discussed earlier, thus far no effects regarding the forecast
horizons have been considered. Because forecasts' accuracy should
improve with data availability, forecast errors should be lower for
shorter forecast horizons (see, e.g., Baghestani, 2010aa). We recall that
without controlling for the forecast horizon in the case of Brent, the
median forecast is not significantly different from a random prediction,
is biased, and does not provide additional information. The median
forecast for WTI outperforms a random forecast regarding sign accu-
racy, but is also biased and does not provide additional information.
In Tables 8 and 9 below, the results of the three tests controlling for
TABLE 6 Results from simple accuracy measures (Brent)
Forecast ME aRMSE TOTA U Obs
NAIV 1.35 16.09 NA 1.00 468
MEDIAN 0.27 11.72 0.25 1.00 468
F1 6.64 19.96 0.68 0.83 163
F2 4.35 11.57 0.41 0.90 316
F3 4.42 19.17 0.23 1.05 238
F4 −7.35 18.61 0.37 0.92 275
F5 −13.30 22.71 0.30 1.09 248
F6 6.21 17.46 0.27 1.09 361
F7 −15.14 16.17 0.58 0.83 60
F8 −8.18 17.10 0.00 1.16 156
F9 −2.43 19.28 0.07 1.24 186
F10 −0.57 20.92 0.22 1.09 415
F11 −2.55 20.58 0.40 0.91 270
F12 3.77 17.79 0.65 0.78 197
F13 5.02 14.93 0.49 0.83 307
F14 −2.25 15.65 0.01 1.21 215
F15 −5.07 22.11 0.19 1.11 269
F16 −9.46 13.08 0.00 1.19 132
F17 −3.57 13.66 0.32 0.97 249
F18 7.41 26.56 0.12 1.22 128
F19 −1.40 15.24 0.24 1.00 353
F20 −5.39 15.85 0.01 1.28 205
F21 −6.85 14.22 0.29 0.98 295
F22 −3.35 14.29 0.20 1.04 329
F23 0.88 14.02 0.22 1.06 363
F24 −4.16 17.54 0.02 1.24 262
F25 −4.67 26.58 0.28 1.05 337
F26 0.24 19.40 0.61 0.73 137
F27 0.60 12.96 0.26 0.99 415
F28 −3.78 19.30 0.27 0.96 327
F29 −4.90 17.35 0.16 1.02 371
F30 −2.74 10.54 0.00 1.33 70
F31 2.82 14.37 0.50 0.51 50
F32 −1.24 15.01 0.22 1.06 360
F33 −5.26 19.44 0.00 1.17 87
F34 11.32 18.01 0.40 1.15 52
F35 −5.09 14.27 0.00 1.36 127
F36 2.23 14.94 0.24 1.07 433
F37 0.31 15.54 0.29 1.00 421
F38 −2.83 16.20 0.29 0.97 383
F39 −10.55 15.88 0.00 1.24 143
F40 0.92 15.62 0.28 1.01 419
F41 3.38 14.79 4.12 0.44 68
F42 5.45 12.07 1.10 0.64 43
F43 2.12 16.24 0.25 1.07 356
F44 13.04 14.45 0.64 0.93 70
F45 10.91 17.64 0.21 1.25 259
F46 −0.97 18.29 0.13 1.13 345
F47 3.38 15.71 0.35 0.97 325
F48 −4.75 19.44 0.00 0.55 110
F49 −9.64 13.86 0.12 1.08 240
(Continues)
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TABLE 6 (Continued)
Forecast ME aRMSE TOTA U Obs
F50 21.89 16.01 0.01 1.99 59
F51 −21.76 11.94 0.02 1.41 45
F52 −10.68 16.46 0.03 0.90 44
Note. ME = mean forecast error; aRMSE = Adjusted root mean squared
error.
TABLE 7 Results from simple accuracy measures (WTI)
Forecast ME aRMSE TOTA U Obs
NAIV −0.34 16.98 NA 1.00 468
MEDIAN 0.96 9.88 0.16 0.94 468
F1 6.77 23.63 0.64 0.76 163
F2 3.04 25.55 0.28 0.86 324
F3 6.18 105.12 0.13 1.00 234
F4 −9.21 15.19 0.25 0.84 173
F5 −15.83 10.75 0.06 1.20 160
F6 6.31 17.86 0.18 1.07 365
F7 −12.06 12.36 2.31 0.70 60
F8 −9.00 18.86 0.01 1.18 156
F9 −3.28 14.61 0.04 1.22 178
F10 3.78 15.47 0.14 1.06 355
F11 −1.38 13.56 0.37 0.80 294
F12 4.10 15.24 0.63 0.73 193
F13 9.08 18.56 0.49 0.83 265
F14 −0.89 17.70 0.00 1.14 215
F15 −4.25 15.69 0.08 1.05 276
F16 −9.39 13.61 0.00 1.18 132
F17 −2.64 12.38 0.21 0.91 242
F18 7.63 19.48 0.05 1.22 133
F19 0.23 11.29 0.00 0.54 44
F21 −7.58 11.30 0.03 1.05 235
F22 −2.58 25.83 0.10 0.96 321
F24 −5.25 14.03 0.01 1.20 246
F25 −2.97 12.30 0.30 0.90 349
F26 4.00 11.71 0.79 0.63 137
F27 −0.57 15.09 0.00 1.28 122
F28 −6.99 17.26 0.11 0.94 159
F29 −2.13 12.98 0.04 0.97 370
F30 −4.97 10.58 0.00 1.33 70
F31 5.74 15.41 0.23 0.52 54
F32 −0.96 11.97 0.11 1.00 363
F33 −5.31 8.99 0.00 1.18 88
F35 −3.52 13.03 0.00 1.33 120
F37 5.24 13.99 0.32 0.85 365
F38 −2.07 16.27 0.12 0.92 363
F39 −11.38 12.15 0.00 1.23 143
F40 1.97 12.65 0.17 0.97 423
F41 1.06 12.09 0.00 0.42 68
F43 2.49 13.34 0.19 1.02 356
F44 10.01 12.28 0.57 0.86 68
F45 10.57 11.62 0.11 1.19 260
F46 −0.50 14.35 0.05 1.06 334
F47 2.74 11.43 0.22 0.92 317
(Continues)
TABLE 7 (Continued)
Forecast ME aRMSE TOTA U Obs
F48 2.02 16.11 0.52 0.45 110
F49 −7.36 15.76 0.03 1.02 220
F50 36.43 13.15 0.01 2.27 42
F53 3.38 11.69 0.34 0.46 29
F54 −2.43 11.99 0.07 0.46 36
F51 −23.27 14.89 0.02 1.45 45
F52 −9.47 18.68 0.00 0.68 44
Note. WTI = Western Texas Intermediate; ME = mean forecast error;
aRMSE = Adjusted root mean squared error.
TABLE 8 Summary sign accuracy, unbiasedness, and forecast
encompassing controlling for the forecast horizon—Brent
Forecast horizon Sign accuracy Unbiasedness Encompassing
ALL NA − −
H1 NA − +
H2 − − +
H3 NA + +
H4 NA + +
H5 NA + −
H6 NA + −
H7 NA + −
H8 − − −
H9 NA + −
H10 NA + −
H11 NA + −
H12 NA + −
Note. NA = no significant result; + = significant accurate prediction of sign,
statistically significant unbiased, and statistically significant provision of
additional information; − = no significant accurate prediction of sign, statis-
tically significant biased, and statistically significant no provision of addi-
tional information; ALL = not controlling for the forecast horizon.
TABLE 9 Summary sign accuracy, unbiasedness, and forecast
encompassing controlling for the forecast horizon—WTI
Forecast horizon Sign accuracy Unbiasedness Encompassing
ALL + − −
H1 NA − −
H2 NA − −
H3 NA + +
H4 NA + −
H5 − + −
H6 − + −
H7 NA + −
H8 NA + −
H9 NA + −
H10 − + −
H11 − + −
H12 NA + −
Note. NA = no significant result; + = significant accurate prediction of sign,
statistically significant unbiased, and statistically significant provision of
additional information; − = no significant accurate prediction of sign,
statistically significant biased, and statistically significant no provision of
additional information; ALL = not controlling for the forecast horizon;
WTI = Western Texas Intermediate.
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the forecast horizon are shown. Following these results, for the median
forecast for the price of both Brent and WTI, the random prediction
either outperformed the median forecast in terms of sign accuracy or
no statistical evidence of statistically significant differences in sign
accuracy were found. In the case of the WTI forecast, this result
departs from the earlier findings when not controlling for the forecast
horizon. Regarding the test for unbiasedness, differentiating between
the 12 different forecast horizons shows that for longer‐term predic-
tions the median forecast is generally unbiased for both Brent and
WTI.2 The corresponding results for the test for forecast
encompassing are mixed. In the case of the Brent price forecast, it
can be stated that at least for shorter forecast horizons, the median
prediction provides additional information. In terms of the test for
forecast encompassing, the results only slightly deviate. Most note-
worthy in this context is the finding that in the case of Brent, the
median forecast seems to provide additional information, especially
for shorter horizons.
Controlling for the forecast horizon for the simple forecast accu-
racy measures also delivers noteworthy empirical results. The results
are shown in Figures 5 and 6. We use box plots, which are quite com-
mon in the context of forecast evaluation (see, e.g., Bowles et al., 2007;
Bowles et al., 2010; Fildes, 1992; as well as Davydenko & Fildes, 2013
for applications in the context of survey predictions), because they
deliver a useful depiction of large numbers of individual forecasts in
total and for each forecast horizon. As noted above, uncertainty is a
critical aspect for decision‐makers. The straightforward interpretation
of the box plots delivers academic researchers and decision makers a
useful first impression of the underlying data and forecasts, respec-
tively. Given the large amount of individual forecasts, this is a clear
advantage.
The box plot figures (without outliers) for the mean forecast error
and the aRMSE for Brent and WTI (Figure 5) show that the mean fore-
cast errors only slightly increase with the forecast horizon. Interest-
ingly, the dispersion of forecasts and mean forecast errors increases
with a rising forecast horizon, which indicates rising uncertainty. It is
noteworthy that the mean of the forecast errors seems be centered
on zero for the given forecast horizons. Hence, there does not seem
to be a majority of forecasters over‐ or under‐estimating the WTI or
Brent price on average. Given the large oil price swings during the
period under investigation, this result is somewhat surprising. Further-
more, the aRMSE measures also increase with the forecast horizon.
Despite being foreseeable, the implication of this result is important
when assessing the usefulness of oil price predictions of professional
forecasters.
The results of the forecast horizon‐dependent TOTA coefficient
and Theil's U measure for Brent and WTI are shown in Figure 6
(box plot without outliers). In the case of the TOTA coefficient, we
see rising topically oriented trend adjustment with rising forecast
horizons. In turn, this means that for longer forecast horizons, ana-
lysts seem to be more status quo‐dependent. Notwithstanding, only
a small fraction of forecasters in the case of the price of WTI and
even fewer in the case of Brent fulfill the requirement of no topi-
cally oriented trend adjustment, even when considering short fore-
cast horizons. In terms of the Theil's U measure, the results are
somewhat different. Especially for the short‐term forecasts (i.e.,
Horizon 1), the high Theil's U measure reveals the superiority of
the naïve prediction against the majority of the individual forecasts.
At least with a rising forecast horizon, a growing fraction of individ-
ual forecasters outperforms the simple naïve prediction. However, it
is important to note that in the case of the median Brent forecast,
the results from the horizon‐dependent tests for forecast
encompassing indicate that relevant additional information is deliv-
ered in the short‐term. Overall, the Figures 5 and 6 demonstrate
quite clearly the limitations of survey forecasts. This does not
necessarily mean that survey forecasts for the price of oil deliver
no value added. However, knowing the specific constraints of the
professional forecasts is inevitably necessary when using oil price
forecasts as a methodology for decision‐support.
FIGURE 5 Box plots for errors measures mean forecast error (ME) and adjusted root mean squared forecast error (aRMSE) for Brent and Western
Texas Intermediate (WTI) regarding the forecast horizon 1 to 12 months; ALL = not controlling for the forecast horizon
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6 | SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have empirically investigated survey forecasts for the globally
most relevant crude oil benchmarks. Using a novel comprehensive
disaggregated dataset incorporating individual forecasts for both Brent
and WTI, we have applied a standard framework for forecast
evaluation with and without controlling for the forecast horizon. We
performed tests for unbiasedness, sign accuracy, and forecast
encompassing. As accuracy measures, mean forecast errors, an aRMSE,
the TOTA coefficient, and the Theil's U measure have been used.
We have foundmixed evidence regarding the rationality, additional
information and accuracy of the crude oil price forecasts. In the case of
tests for unbiasedness, sign accuracy, and forecast encompassing, we
even find contracting results, at least regarding the median forecast.
Referring to the forecast accuracy measures, one major finding is the
strong relationship between the oil price at the date of forecast delivery
and the prediction of the professional analysts. A large fraction of the
forecasters tend to follow the naïve prediction. In fact, theTOTA coef-
ficient shows that the topically oriented trend adjustments becomes
more pronounced with a rising forecast horizon for the price of both
Brent and WTI. Interestingly, a growing fraction of analysts perform
better than the naïve prediction for longer‐term forecast horizons,
which in general contributes to the usefulness of the forecasts.
However, given the status quo dependence and bearing in mind
the empirical literature dealing with other financial market forecasts
(e.g., interest rates), it can be stated that crude oil predictions share
common characteristics, and hence do not stand out against these
other financial market variables.
Financial market forecasts in general and especially oil price
forecasts are important decision‐support methodologies. Hence, for
decision‐makers, these results are noteworthy in several respects.
Most importantly, when making use of survey forecasts, they have to
bear in mind the dependency of forecast accuracy regarding the
forecast horizon and the related consequences for the input costs
and their value chain. Furthermore, the TOTA coefficients unveil a
strong status quo bias. These may reduce the usefulness of profes-
sional forecasts in the context of strategic decision‐making as a for-
ward looking view is needed.
Further research should focus on decision‐makers' implementa-
tion strategies of survey forecasts for crude oil prices that incorporate
the accuracy of survey predictions. In this context, especially the
relationship between uncertainty and forecasters' disagreement is an
important research field.
ENDNOTES
1 Because it is not the focus of this paper to analyze the forecast accuracy
of specific individual forecasters, an anonymized data set will be pre-
sented throughout the paper.
2 The results of the Durbin Watson test for autocorrelation (see, Durbin &
Watson, 1950, 1951) deliver no evidence for autocorrelation of the
residuals for the relevant forecasts. The detailed results are not reported
here in order to preserve space.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 Results sign accuracy test Brent
Forecast Test statistic Critical value 99% Critical value 95% Critical value 90% Obs Significance level Result
MEDIAN 7.37 6.63 3.84 2.71 468 *** +
F1 0.02 6.63 3.84 2.71 163 NA
F2 3.65 6.63 3.84 2.71 316 * +
F3 0.99 6.63 3.84 2.71 238 NA
F4 6.77 6.63 3.84 2.71 275 *** +
F5 3.01 6.63 3.84 2.71 248 * +
F6 1.40 6.63 3.84 2.71 361 NA
F7 0.07 6.63 3.84 2.71 60 NA
F8 2.38 6.63 3.84 2.71 156 NA
F9 0.09 6.63 3.84 2.71 186 NA
F10 10.31 6.63 3.84 2.71 415 *** −
F11 0.26 6.63 3.84 2.71 270 NA
F12 0.29 6.63 3.84 2.71 197 NA
F13 15.63 6.63 3.84 2.71 307 *** +
F14 0.49 6.63 3.84 2.71 215 NA
F15 0.53 6.63 3.84 2.71 269 NA
F16 0.85 6.63 3.84 2.71 132 NA
F17 11.98 6.63 3.84 2.71 249 *** +
F18 3.51 6.63 3.84 2.71 128 * +
F19 0.58 6.63 3.84 2.71 353 NA
F20 0.17 6.63 3.84 2.71 205 NA
F21 24.03 6.63 3.84 2.71 295 *** +
F22 3.13 6.63 3.84 2.71 329 * +
F23 0.05 6.63 3.84 2.71 363 NA
F24 5.66 6.63 3.84 2.71 262 ** −
F25 0.01 6.63 3.84 2.71 337 NA
F26 3.69 6.63 3.84 2.71 137 * +
F27 9.56 6.63 3.84 2.71 415 *** +
F28 0.01 6.63 3.84 2.71 327 NA
F29 27.01 6.63 3.84 2.71 371 *** +
F30 6.58 6.63 3.84 2.71 70 ** +
F31 2.90 6.63 3.84 2.71 50 * +
F32 4.25 6.63 3.84 2.71 360 ** +
F33 1.51 6.63 3.84 2.71 87 NA
F34 1.84 6.63 3.84 2.71 52 NA
F35 1.02 6.63 3.84 2.71 127 NA
F36 2.54 6.63 3.84 2.71 433 NA
F37 5.49 6.63 3.84 2.71 421 ** +
F38 3.53 6.63 3.84 2.71 383 * +
F39 4.37 6.63 3.84 2.71 143 ** +
(Continues)
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
Forecast Test statistic Critical value 99% Critical value 95% Critical value 90% Obs Significance level Result
F40 0.09 6.63 3.84 2.71 419 NA
F41 16.12 6.63 3.84 2.71 68 *** +
F42 3.95 6.63 3.84 2.71 43 ** +
F43 0.00 6.63 3.84 2.71 356 NA
F44 ‐ 6.63 3.84 2.71 70 NA
F45 3.40 6.63 3.84 2.71 259 * −
F46 0.12 6.63 3.84 2.71 345 NA
F47 4.77 6.63 3.84 2.71 325 ** +
F48 2.68 6.63 3.84 2.71 110 NA
F49 14.42 6.63 3.84 2.71 240 *** +
F50 0.41 6.63 3.84 2.71 59 NA
F51 1.98 6.63 3.84 2.71 45 NA
F52 0.48 6.63 3.84 2.71 44 NA
Note. + = better than a random forecast; − = worse than random forecast; NA = no statistically significant difference from a random forecast.
Significance levels:
*90%, **95%, ***99%.
TABLE A2 Results sign accuracy test WTI
Forecast Test statistic Critical value 99% Critical value 95% Critical value 90% Obs Significance level Result
MEDIAN 9.15 6.63 3.84 2.71 468 *** +
F1 3.16 6.63 3.84 2.71 163 * +
F2 6.53 6.63 3.84 2.71 324 ** +
F3 4.10 6.63 3.84 2.71 234 ** +
F4 11.91 6.63 3.84 2.71 173 *** +
F5 2.77 6.63 3.84 2.71 160 * +
F6 1.79 6.63 3.84 2.71 365 NA
F7 0.01 6.63 3.84 2.71 60 NA
F8 7.91 6.63 3.84 2.71 156 *** +
F9 1.06 6.63 3.84 2.71 178 NA
F10 2.91 6.63 3.84 2.71 355 * −
F11 2.61 6.63 3.84 2.71 294 NA
F12 8.41 6.63 3.84 2.71 193 *** +
F13 12.74 6.63 3.84 2.71 265 *** +
F14 3.78 6.63 3.84 2.71 215 * +
F15 0.80 6.63 3.84 2.71 276 NA
F16 0.59 6.63 3.84 2.71 132 NA
F17 10.59 6.63 3.84 2.71 242 *** +
F18 1.75 6.63 3.84 2.71 133 NA
F19 0.00 6.63 3.84 2.71 44 NA
F21 23.24 6.63 3.84 2.71 235 *** +
F22 14.78 6.63 3.84 2.71 321 *** +
F24 0.00 6.63 3.84 2.71 246 NA
F25 4.57 6.63 3.84 2.71 349 ** +
F26 5.65 6.63 3.84 2.71 137 ** +
F27 8.74 6.63 3.84 2.71 122 *** +
F28 2.88 6.63 3.84 2.71 159 * −
F29 18.16 6.63 3.84 2.71 370 *** +
F30 10.53 6.63 3.84 2.71 70 *** +
F31 1.22 6.63 3.84 2.71 54 NA
(Continues)
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TABLE A2 (Continued)
Forecast Test statistic Critical value 99% Critical value 95% Critical value 90% Obs Significance level Result
F32 0.74 6.63 3.84 2.71 363 NA
F33 0.00 6.63 3.84 2.71 88 NA
F35 3.17 6.63 3.84 2.71 120 * +
F37 35.70 6.63 3.84 2.71 365 *** +
F38 15.81 6.63 3.84 2.71 363 *** +
F39 9.08 6.63 3.84 2.71 143 *** +
F40 4.02 6.63 3.84 2.71 423 ** +
F41 2.25 6.63 3.84 2.71 68 NA
F43 0.01 6.63 3.84 2.71 356 NA
F44 3.25 6.63 3.84 2.71 68 * −
F45 1.38 6.63 3.84 2.71 260 NA
F46 2.39 6.63 3.84 2.71 334 NA
F47 6.79 6.63 3.84 2.71 317 *** +
F48 25.40 6.63 3.84 2.71 110 *** +
F49 17.61 6.63 3.84 2.71 220 *** +
F50 0.88 6.63 3.84 2.71 42 NA
F53 0.33 6.63 3.84 2.71 29 NA
F54 1.83 6.63 3.84 2.71 36 NA
F51 2.24 6.63 3.84 2.71 45 NA
F52 6.99 6.63 3.84 2.71 44 *** +
Note. + = better than a random forecast; − = worse than random forecast; NA = no statistically significant difference from a random forecast; WTI =Western
Texas Intermediate.
Significance levels:
*90%, **95%, ***99%.
TABLE A3 Results test for unbiasedness Brent
Forecast α Se α β Se β Test statistic F‐test critical value Obs Result Significance level
MEDIAN −0.84 1.12 0.48 0.12 18.09 3.86 468 −
F1 −9.43 1.41 0.17 0.13 67.25 3.90 163 −
F2 −3.54 1.19 0.28 0.15 36.74 3.87 316 −
F3 −0.83 1.59 0.29 0.10 56.29 3.88 238 −
F4 3.33 1.28 0.16 0.11 99.74 3.88 275 −
F5 11.03 1.65 0.61 0.14 92.58 3.88 248 −
F6 −3.46 1.33 0.02 0.13 78.65 3.87 361 −
F7 14.76 1.68 0.34 0.26 87.98 4.01 60 −
F8 7.89 2.29 0.94 0.13 14.13 3.90 156 −
F9 −0.56 2.27 0.31 0.17 17.12 3.89 186 −
F10 −1.94 1.22 −0.02 0.11 92.04 3.86 415 −
F11 −2.65 1.32 −0.02 0.11 85.20 3.88 270 −
F12 −3.34 1.19 0.19 0.11 65.70 3.89 197 −
F13 −3.83 1.15 0.55 0.11 36.04 3.87 307 −
F14 2.00 1.92 0.41 0.12 25.60 3.89 215 −
F15 3.09 1.58 0.22 0.14 42.87 3.88 269 −
F16 7.77 2.76 0.73 0.22 17.03 3.91 132 −
F17 3.42 1.47 0.68 0.11 14.37 3.88 249 −
F18 −1.33 2.53 −0.13 0.20 43.57 3.92 128 −
F19 −0.02 1.36 0.57 0.14 11.30 3.87 353 −
F20 5.11 2.02 −0.06 0.19 39.23 3.89 205 −
F21 6.50 1.36 0.84 0.10 28.38 3.87 295 −
(Continues)
16 KUNZE ET AL.
97
TABLE A3 (Continued)
Forecast α Se α β Se β Test statistic F‐test critical value Obs Result Significance level
F22 2.70 1.41 0.61 0.18 10.49 3.87 329 −
F23 −0.14 1.30 −0.31 0.21 40.07 3.87 363 −
F24 2.34 1.63 −0.14 0.12 91.85 3.88 262 −
F25 −1.39 1.31 0.06 0.09 134.04 3.87 337 −
F26 −1.78 1.57 0.51 0.16 9.82 3.91 137 −
F27 −0.86 1.17 0.47 0.13 17.30 3.86 415 −
F28 4.73 1.22 0.28 0.10 57.29 3.87 327 −
F29 3.10 1.26 0.32 0.12 50.50 3.87 371 −
F30 6.26 4.06 1.59 0.25 6.24 3.98 70 −
F31 −5.70 1.77 0.20 0.23 15.72 4.04 50 −
F32 0.72 1.29 0.20 0.12 46.05 3.87 360 −
F33 −2.75 3.66 −0.28 0.37 15.69 3.95 87 −
F34 −6.22 2.64 −0.41 0.20 72.32 4.03 52 −
F35 2.79 2.99 0.43 0.21 10.24 3.92 127 −
F36 −1.01 1.19 0.17 0.11 61.96 3.86 433 −
F37 −1.19 1.16 0.43 0.09 39.91 3.86 421 −
F38 2.44 1.21 0.72 0.12 11.22 3.87 383 −
F39 16.24 3.01 1.64 0.21 29.50 3.91 143 −
F40 −0.61 1.17 0.41 0.10 33.13 3.86 419 −
F41 −3.27 1.25 0.83 0.17 8.42 3.99 68 −
F42 −6.11 2.37 0.67 0.35 6.66 4.08 43 −
F43 −2.18 1.29 0.16 0.11 63.05 3.87 356 −
F44 −13.06 2.27 0.69 0.35 33.92 3.98 70 −
F45 −4.64 1.53 −0.19 0.10 198.81 3.88 259 −
F46 −2.56 1.44 0.00 0.12 67.72 3.87 345 −
F47 −2.72 1.33 0.66 0.15 11.97 3.87 325 −
F48 1.46 2.11 0.65 0.18 19.33 3.93 110 −
F49 10.21 1.77 1.11 0.15 37.37 3.88 240 −
F50 −0.08 6.82 −1.03 0.44 41.14 4.01 59 −
F51 17.78 5.48 0.47 0.49 29.82 4.07 45 −
F52 12.49 2.72 −0.39 0.43 26.62 4.07 44 −
Note. – = Biased forecasts; + = unbiased forecasts.
Significance levels:
*90%, **95%, ***99%.
TABLE A4 Results test for unbiasedness WTI
Forecast α Se α β Se β Test statistic F‐test critical value Obs Result Significance level
MEDIAN −0.72 1.08 0.81 0.10 4.29 3.86 468 −
F1 −6.67 1.30 0.39 0.14 46.88 3.90 163 −
F2 −2.10 1.18 0.54 0.14 17.58 3.87 324 −
F3 −2.13 1.70 0.53 0.10 41.05 3.88 234 −
F4 8.09 1.35 0.35 0.14 70.18 3.90 173 −
F5 13.63 2.10 0.59 0.15 73.94 3.90 160 −
F6 −2.89 1.37 0.32 0.10 68.08 3.87 365 −
F7 12.36 1.77 0.94 0.14 54.71 4.01 60 −
F8 8.67 2.30 0.93 0.13 16.61 3.90 156 −
F9 0.65 2.37 0.47 0.18 10.75 3.89 178 −
F10 −2.64 1.30 0.36 0.10 53.30 3.87 355 −
(Continues)
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TABLE A4 (Continued)
Forecast α Se α β Se β Test statistic F‐test critical value Obs Result Significance level
F11 0.88 1.10 0.52 0.09 31.04 3.87 294 −
F12 −2.07 1.21 0.41 0.10 48.69 3.89 193 −
F13 −8.00 1.32 0.85 0.10 67.91 3.88 265 −
F14 1.74 1.88 0.62 0.11 12.70 3.89 215 −
F15 3.79 1.49 0.50 0.12 26.64 3.88 276 −
F16 8.42 2.65 0.82 0.20 15.90 3.91 132 −
F17 3.05 1.46 0.86 0.10 5.40 3.88 242 −
F18 0.01 2.65 −0.05 0.19 42.93 3.91 133 −
F19 −1.08 2.09 0.52 0.33 2.07 4.07 44 + **
F21 7.55 1.61 0.86 0.10 24.31 3.88 235 −
F22 2.58 1.32 1.02 0.13 3.88 3.87 321 −
F24 4.60 1.72 0.31 0.11 50.83 3.88 246 −
F25 1.60 1.12 0.46 0.08 52.10 3.87 349 −
F26 −3.75 1.31 0.88 0.12 10.69 3.91 137 −
F27 0.47 2.88 0.79 0.21 1.02 3.92 122 + **
F28 9.60 1.41 −0.58 0.16 120.54 3.90 159 −
F29 2.83 1.23 0.59 0.11 17.11 3.87 370 −
F30 8.89 4.11 1.55 0.23 7.38 3.98 70 −
F31 −3.29 1.91 0.47 0.25 18.73 4.03 54 −
F32 1.34 1.26 0.51 0.11 20.66 3.87 363 −
F33 0.33 3.47 −0.04 0.38 10.74 3.95 88 −
F35 2.79 2.99 0.68 0.21 3.79 3.92 120 + **
F37 −4.24 1.07 0.66 0.08 41.50 3.87 365 −
F38 2.09 1.19 0.97 0.11 3.16 3.87 363 + **
F39 16.61 2.85 1.61 0.20 34.23 3.91 143 −
F40 −0.62 1.17 0.62 0.09 23.01 3.86 423 −
F41 0.92 1.36 0.46 0.18 9.44 3.99 68 −
F43 −1.06 1.29 0.42 0.10 39.78 3.87 356 −
F44 −10.00 2.28 0.79 0.36 19.67 3.99 68 −
F45 −3.40 1.64 0.04 0.10 142.35 3.88 260 −
F46 −0.29 1.37 0.33 0.12 32.37 3.87 334 −
F47 −2.15 1.35 0.82 0.15 6.19 3.87 317 −
F48 −2.07 1.05 0.93 0.13 4.02 3.93 110 −
F49 7.48 1.63 1.12 0.12 21.37 3.88 220 −
F50 −16.00 7.51 −0.81 0.44 58.76 4.08 42 −
F53 −6.93 2.68 1.84 0.44 6.73 4.21 29 −
F54 3.45 2.28 0.73 0.35 2.31 4.13 36 + **
F51 19.46 5.16 0.50 0.43 34.58 4.07 45 −
F52 9.12 2.39 1.05 0.15 20.03 4.07 44 −
Note. – = Biased forecasts; + = unbiased forecasts; WTI = Western Texas Intermediate.
Significance levels:
*90%, **95%, ***99%.
TABLE A5 Results fest for forecast encompassing Brent
Forecast β0 Se β0 p value β0 β1 Se β1 p value β1 Obs Result Significance level
MEDIAN 0.71 0.11 .00 −0.18 0.13 .18 468 −
F1 0.83 0.13 .00 0.15 0.16 .36 163 −
F2 0.85 0.14 .00 −0.19 0.16 .23 316 −
F3 0.64 0.09 .00 −0.13 0.11 .23 238 −
(Continues)
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TABLE A5 (Continued)
Forecast β0 Se β0 p value β0 β1 Se β1 p value β1 Obs Result Significance level
F4 0.66 0.10 .00 −0.07 0.10 .48 275 −
F5 0.12 0.12 .35 0.39 0.12 .00 248 + ***
F6 0.79 0.12 .00 −0.24 0.12 .05 361 + ***
F7 0.60 0.26 .03 0.64 0.37 .09 60 + *
F8 0.22 0.11 .05 −0.33 0.18 .08 156 + *
F9 0.72 0.14 .00 −0.46 0.16 .00 186 + ***
F10 0.85 0.10 .00 −0.31 0.10 .00 415 + ***
F11 1.10 0.11 .00 −0.41 0.13 .00 270 + ***
F12 0.74 0.11 .00 0.10 0.11 .36 197 −
F13 0.51 0.11 .00 0.28 0.13 .03 307 + ***
F14 0.60 0.10 .00 −0.47 0.15 .00 215 + ***
F15 0.50 0.12 .00 −0.05 0.12 .68 269 −
F16 0.73 0.20 .00 −0.86 0.31 .01 132 + ***
F17 0.34 0.10 .00 0.23 0.12 .06 249 + *
F18 0.85 0.17 .00 −0.45 0.17 .01 128 + ***
F19 0.73 0.13 .00 −0.24 0.15 .12 353 −
F20 0.65 0.15 .00 −0.47 0.15 .00 205 + ***
F21 0.13 0.10 .17 0.40 0.11 .00 295 + ***
F22 0.23 0.16 .15 0.23 0.16 .16 329 −
F23 1.26 0.18 .00 −0.77 0.19 .00 363 + ***
F24 0.99 0.10 .00 −0.78 0.11 .00 262 + ***
F25 0.98 0.08 .00 −0.40 0.10 .00 337 + ***
F26 0.30 0.18 .10 0.97 0.28 .00 137 + ***
F27 0.79 0.12 .00 −0.27 0.15 .07 415 + *
F28 0.53 0.09 .00 −0.05 0.09 .60 327 −
F29 0.79 0.10 .00 −0.43 0.11 .00 371 + ***
F30 −0.44 0.23 .07 0.55 0.38 .15 70 −
F31 0.79 0.23 .00 0.16 0.28 .58 50 −
F32 0.82 0.11 .00 −0.33 0.12 .01 360 + ***
F33 −0.03 0.24 .89 0.01 0.22 .96 87 −
F34 1.39 0.19 .00 −0.62 0.21 .01 52 + ***
F35 0.68 0.16 .00 −0.79 0.20 .00 127 + ***
F36 0.73 0.10 .00 −0.20 0.10 .05 433 + *
F37 0.59 0.08 .00 −0.01 0.10 .91 421 −
F38 0.03 0.10 .74 0.45 0.10 .00 383 + ***
F39 −0.13 0.20 .52 0.19 0.29 .51 143 −
F40 0.53 0.10 .00 0.04 0.10 .73 419 −
F41 0.03 0.19 .87 0.36 0.36 .32 68 −
F42 0.49 0.32 .13 1.52 0.40 .00 43 + ***
F43 0.66 0.10 .00 −0.11 0.10 .30 356 −
F44 0.38 0.39 .33 0.57 0.44 .20 70 −
F45 1.10 0.09 .00 −0.57 0.10 .00 259 + ***
F46 1.02 0.10 .00 −0.64 0.12 .00 345 + ***
F47 0.44 0.14 .00 0.21 0.16 .19 325 −
F48 −0.06 0.18 .73 0.01 0.21 .95 110 −
F49 0.19 0.14 .18 0.18 0.19 .33 240 −
F50 0.80 0.25 .00 −0.76 0.23 .00 59 + ***
F51 0.76 0.48 .12 −0.63 0.70 .37 45 −
F52 0.65 0.30 .04 −0.46 0.29 .12 44 −
Note. − = no statistical significant additional information from forecast; + = statistical significant additional information from forecast.
Significance levels:
*90%, **95%, ***99%.
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TABLE A6 Results fest for forecast encompassing WTI
Forecast β0 Se β0 p value β0 β1 Se β1 p value β1 Obs Result Significance level
MEDIAN 0.26 0.09 .00 0.17 0.11 .14 468 −
F1 0.62 0.14 .00 0.35 0.16 .03 163 + ***
F2 0.60 0.13 .00 −0.03 0.16 .84 324 −
F3 0.35 0.09 .00 0.00 0.10 .98 234 −
F4 0.33 0.13 .01 0.16 0.13 .20 173 −
F5 0.19 0.13 .15 0.06 0.15 .68 160 −
F6 0.38 0.09 .00 0.04 0.09 .63 365 −
F7 −0.05 0.15 .77 0.68 0.22 .00 60 + ***
F8 0.24 0.10 .02 −0.39 0.18 .03 156 + ***
F9 0.51 0.15 .00 −0.31 0.17 .07 178 + *
F10 0.42 0.09 .00 −0.01 0.09 .93 355 −
F11 0.49 0.08 .00 0.12 0.10 .25 294 −
F12 0.46 0.10 .00 0.32 0.10 .00 193 + ***
F13 0.16 0.10 .11 0.64 0.12 .00 265 + ***
F14 0.38 0.09 .00 −0.39 0.14 .01 215 + ***
F15 0.24 0.09 .01 0.02 0.10 .87 276 −
F16 0.71 0.19 .00 −0.87 0.31 .01 132 + ***
F17 0.09 0.09 .29 0.33 0.11 .00 242 + ***
F18 0.63 0.15 .00 −0.36 0.15 .02 133 + ***
F19 0.29 0.23 .22 −0.26 0.26 .31 44 −
F21 0.07 0.08 .38 0.08 0.12 .51 235 −
F22 −0.05 0.11 .68 0.34 0.12 .01 321 + ***
F24 0.48 0.09 .00 −0.33 0.10 .00 246 + ***
F25 0.51 0.08 .00 0.07 0.10 .44 349 −
F26 0.08 0.12 .49 1.16 0.18 .00 137 + ***
F27 0.40 0.18 .03 −0.37 0.23 .10 122 −
F28 0.62 0.18 .00 −0.22 0.14 .13 159 −
F29 0.36 0.09 .00 −0.17 0.10 .09 370 + *
F30 −0.38 0.22 .09 0.53 0.37 .16 70 −
F31 0.44 0.24 .07 0.12 0.27 .65 54 −
F32 0.49 0.09 .00 −0.14 0.11 .20 363 −
F33 −0.19 0.24 .44 0.15 0.22 .51 88 −
F35 0.54 0.16 .00 −0.62 0.20 .00 120 + ***
F37 0.29 0.08 .00 0.25 0.09 .01 365 + ***
F38 −0.10 0.09 .26 0.40 0.10 .00 363 + ***
F39 −0.04 0.19 .81 0.09 0.28 .75 143 −
F40 0.27 0.08 .00 0.14 0.09 .10 423 −
F41 0.08 0.20 .70 0.00 0.20 .98 68 −
F43 0.30 0.09 .00 0.13 0.09 .14 356 −
F44 0.33 0.40 .42 0.58 0.47 .22 68 −
F45 0.81 0.09 .00 −0.41 0.10 .00 260 + ***
F46 0.64 0.10 .00 −0.41 0.11 .00 334 + ***
F47 0.13 0.13 .31 0.36 0.14 .01 317 + ***
F48 −0.21 0.12 .09 −0.19 0.22 .38 110 −
F49 0.00 0.10 .97 0.17 0.14 .22 220 −
F50 0.86 0.29 .00 −0.78 0.27 .01 42 + ***
F53 −0.44 0.28 .13 −0.17 0.42 .68 29 −
F54 −0.48 0.33 .15 0.01 0.33 .97 36 −
F51 0.73 0.42 .09 −0.57 0.62 .36 45 −
F52 0.08 0.11 .50 −0.11 0.21 .60 44 −
Note. − = no statistical significant additional information from forecast; + = statistical significant additional information from forecast; WTI = WesternTexas
Intermediate.
Significance levels:
*90%, **95%, ***99%.
20 KUNZE ET AL.
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Highlights
• We examine the bipolar structure of the Chinese exchange rate system and
document empirical evidence for cointegration of the CNH-CNY pricing dif-
ferential.
• We show that the CNH-CNY spread contains strong persistence.
• Even by testing against a break in the persistence we find no indications that
the two time series have become more integrated over time.
• We infer from these results that the RMB has not reached its “New Normal” yet.
• While Beijing’s monetary policy makers may benefit from the special archi-
tecture of a neither fixed nor floating FX regime, we argue that it generates
substantial challenges.
• The Chinese FX market may be prone to speculative attacks and the persistence
of the CNH-CNY spread is an impediment for RMB internationalization.
1. Introduction and institutional background
China’s exchange rate policy has been criticized as an important element of the government’s
protectionist measures to improve the price competitiveness of its export firms (see Frankel
and Wei, 2007). Lately, this debate’s focus shifted to RMB internationalization (see Batten
and Szilagyi, 2016) and the question whether the RMB will succeed the Greenback as the new
global anchor currency (see Ito, 2010). Furthermore, the RMB recently gained importance
as an international payment currency (see Cheung and Rime, 2014; Funke et al., 2015).
However, it is still debatable how far internationalization has gone and whether the RMB
has reached a “New Normal”.
We argue that one major impediment for RMB internationalization is the bipolar struc-
ture of China’s FX market caused by the imperfect integration of on- and offshore markets.
We test market integration using long memory tests – if both markets are perfectly inte-
grated the underlying exchange rates should be (i) cointegrated (see Cheung and Rime,
2014) and (ii) the differential should be integrated of order zero (I(0)). Efficient markets
also excludes a mean reverting but strong dependent spread ingrated of order d (I(d)) with
0 < d < 0.5 because in this case the on- and offshore currencies would be cointegrated but
priced differently and thus, they would not be perfectly integrated.
The impossible trinity - or trilemma of international financial economics - is important
in this context (see Bluedorn and Bowdler, 2010). This rule states that a country cannot
have a fixed exchange rate, free capital movements and an independent monetary policy.
Cooper (1999) argued that it is still unclear what type of currency regime is appropriate for
a specific country. It is well documented in the literature that this choice has implications for
the monetary policy options (see Cooper, 1999). In the case of rigidly fixed exchange rates
all but one central banks participating in this currency regime loose the opportunity to freely
use the tools of monetary policy. In fact, the end of the Bretton Woods system was a direct
consequence of hopes in some countries that a central bank freed from the need to stabilize
the fixed exchange rate would be able to fight more effectively against inflationary pressures
(see Basse, 2006; Gray, 2007). Freely floating exchange rates were quite popular in the 1980s
and 1990s. However, more recently Calvo and Reinhart (2002) diagnosed a “fear of floating”.
Moreover, some observers seem to believe that there are alternatives (e.g., dirty floating or
target zones) that can help to combine the advantages of freely floating and absolutely fixed
exchange rates (see Cooper, 1999; Masson, 2001). With regard to China it could be argued
that the middle kingdom has found its own middle way to create at least some flexibility in
a system of fixed exchange rates and to mask the lack of CNY convertibility. This special
regime is based on the existence of two different exchange rates for one currency.
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As a matter of fact, the birth of the offshore RMB in Hong Kong is highly relevant in
this context (see Cheung and Rime, 2014). The special administrative region hosts a large
FX market and belongs to China, but has its own political system: one country, two systems
(see Meyer and Revilla Diez, 2015). And the same holds for the RMB: it is China’s unique
currency but its quotations are subject to the place where they are traded. On the mainland
the quotation CNY is used, CNH is used for offshore trading. USD/CNY and USD/CNH
are both rates for the exchange of RMB against USD at different trading locations: one
currency, two quotations (see Shu et al., 2015). Although market participants are dealing
with the same currency, a significant difference between the USD/CNH and USD/CNY
exchange rate is observable (see Cheung et al., 2017a,b). With perfect arbitrage processes
the law of one price obviously would predict that the CNH-CNY spread ought to be zero –
at least statistically.
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the data, an initial data analysis
and the methodology of our empirical analysis. In Chapter 3 we present the empirical results.
Chapter 4 concludes the paper.
2. Data, methodology and initial empirical analysis
We examine weekly data for the CNY spot rate as well as the CNH spot rate from January 1st
2011 to February, 10th 2017 taken from Bloomberg. Our sample ranges from the early days
of the RMB offshore market up to the episode of the current RMB weakness and includes the
shifts in Beijing’s FX policy. We investigate USD/CNY and USD/CNH exchange rates and
corresponding pricing differential. Economic theory implies that in a perfectly integrated
market these two exchange rates ought to be identical with a spread of zero (see Barros
et al., 2016). Since the spread is time dependent (see Figure 1) we examine whether the
pricing differences occur systematically (see Craig et al., 2013).
Finding cointegration among the two exchange rates would imply convergence between
these financial market prices. In fact, Becker and Hall (2007) argued that cointegration is a
sign for convergence among non-stationary time series. As stated above, it makes sense to
assume cointegration for the two FX quotations. More specifically, market efficiency should
lead to cointegration among the prices of two almost identical financial assets (e.g. Alexander,
1999; Westerlund and Narayan, 2013). Despite the fact that capital controls might cause a
non-zero spread, a long-term relationship between the USD/CNY and USD/CNH exchange
rate should exist.
The existence of cointegration between the two FX rates is well documented in the liter-
ature (see Cheung and Rime, 2014). Therefore, the CNH-CNY-spread should be stationary
106
Time
Pr
ic
in
g 
Di
ffe
re
n
tia
l
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
−
0.
10
−
0.
05
0.
00
0.
05
Fig. 1. The graph shows the pricing differential between the CNY and CNH quotations
from January 2011 to February 2017. The vertical line indicates a potential break in the
persistence on February 7th, 2014.
or integrated of order 0 (I(d) with d = 0). Thus, we used recently developed techniques of
time series analysis to produce additional evidence of relevance in this context. However,
cointegration covers the case of two time series sharing a common stochastic trend and a
stationary linear combination of both series (I(d) with 0 ≤ d < 0.5).
In this case the spread (yt) might also be strongly persistent (for 0 < d < 0.5) and the as-
sumption of perfectly integrated RMB on- and offshore markets would not be fulfilled. Thus,
we estimate the degree of integration d and assume that the spread follows a fractionally
integrated process of the form
Φ(B)(1−B)dyt = Ψ(B)t (1)
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where all roots of the polynomials Φ(B) and Ψ(B) are assumed to lie outside the unit circle
and t is independent and identically distributed with E(t) = 0, suptE(
2
t ) <∞.
The degree of persistence d ∈ [0, 0.5) determines the degree of integration of the spread
and (1−B)d is defined by its binomial expansion
(1−B)d =
∞∑
j=0
Γ(j − d)
Γ(−d)Γ(j + 1)B
j (2)
with Γ(z) =
∫∞
0
tz−1e−tdt and B as the Backshift operator, i.e. Byt = yt−1.
To estimate the degree of persistence d we employ the local Whittle estimator (see Shi-
motsu and Phillips, 2005; Shimotsu, 2010). However, we want to test the hypothesis of
H0 : d = dˆ. Thus, we employ the Augmented Lagrange Multiplier (ALM) test by Deme-
trescu et al. (2008). The authors suggest a lag augmented version of the Lagrange multiplier
test by Robinson (1991). This procedure is based on the regression
yt = φy
∗
t−1 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 + ...+ apyt−p + εt for t = p+ 1, ..., T (3)
with y∗t−1 =
∑t−1
j=1
yt−j
j
, p as the number of lags in the augmentation, which grows with the
sample size, and εt as an innovation process. The authors retain limiting normality of the
tφ-statistic, which is used to test the null hypothesis H0 : φ = d = 0. However, we use the
estimation result of the local Whittle estimator to use dˆth differences of the spread. By using
this procedure we are able to test H0 : d = dˆ.
Furthermore, we are particularly interested in whether d remains constant over time.
Thus, we use the methodology proposed by Sibbertsen and Kruse (2009) to test the hypoth-
esis
H0 : d = d0, ∀ t vs. H1 :
d = d1 for t = 1, ..., [τT ]d = d2 for t = [τT ] + 1, ..., T . (4)
Here, [τT ] denotes the biggest integer smaller than τT with τ as the relative breakpoint
estimator and T as the number of observations.
The authors restricted 0 ≤ d0 < 32 under H0 and 0 ≤ d1 < 12 and 12 ≤ d2 < 32 under
the alternative. Moreover, d1 and d2 can be exchanged, so a break from stationary to non-
stationary long-memory and vice versa can be investigated. Thus, we test against a break
in the persistence in the spread using the estimated d under the null hypothesis by the local
Whittle estimator.
Thus, our procedure works in three steps:
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1. Estimating the persistence parameter d by the local Whittle estimator. The estimated
counterpart is indicated by dˆ
2. Testing the Hypothesis of H0 : d = 0 and H0 : d = dˆ against the fractional alternatives
3. Testing against a break in the persistence
3. Empirical results
We start our empirical analysis by considering the autocorrelation function in Figure 2. The
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Fig. 2. The graph shows the autocorrelation function of the pricing differential for the full
sample with 200 lags (approx. 4 years).
graph shows the autocorrelation of the spread. By considering the function it seems that it
declines quite slowly which might be a first indication for strong dependence.
We then estimate the degree of persistence d employing the local Whittle estimator (dˆ)
and draw inference about d considering the results of the test by Demetrescu et al. (2008).
For the estimation of d we use two different bandwidths: m = T 0.55 (dˆ0.55) and m = T
0.70
(dˆ0.70). For the ALM test by Demetrescu et al. (2008), we simulate critical values for the test
version with recursive de-meaning for the small sample of 320 observations. We use 100, 000
steps within the Monte Carlo simulation. See Table 1 for the results.
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dˆ0.55 dˆ0.70
Whittle estimation 0.30 0.48
H0 : d = 0 H0 : d = dˆ0.55 H0 : d = dˆ0.70
ALM 1.16* -0.26 -1.09
Table 1: This table reports the results of the estimation of d as
well as the results of the ALM test. We use simulated critical
value with 100, 000 test replications for the version of the test
using the recursive de-meaning. The critical value are 1.05 (1%),
1.43 (5%), 2.10 (10%).
The results support the hypothesis of a strongly dependent spread and we must reject the
null hypothesis of d = 0 on a significance level of 10% while we cannot reject the hypotheses
of d = dˆ0.55 and d = dˆ0.70.
Furthermore, we are interested whether the persistence is stable over time. To test against
a break in the persistence we use the test proposed by Sibbertsen and Kruse (2009). All
results are reported by Table 2.
τlow 0.2 0.4
τup 0.8 0.6
d0 = dˆ0.55 Cannot reject H0 Increasing Persistence
- February 7th, 2014
d0 = dˆ0.7 Cannot reject H0 Increasing Persistence
- February 7th, 2014
Table 2: This table reports the results of the structural
break test by Sibbertsen and Kruse (2009). Here, we
consider two cases concerning the choice of τlow and τup.
We find results in favor of a break for a combination of τlow = 0.4 and τlow = 0.6 –
that means we allow in this particular example for a break from observation 0.4T to 0.6T .
However, if we set τlow = 0.2 and τlow = 0.8 we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Thus, even
if we find indication for a break the persistence increases – this gives even more support for
the finding that China’s FX markets are far away from being perfectly integrated.
To summarize our empirical results: We find evidence for a strong dependent pricing
differential – which does not support that the CNH and CNY quotations are integrated.
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Furthermore, by investigating potential structural breaks we find no support for decreasing
persistence at all – which underlines the result that the “New Normal” of China’s FX markets
is not reached. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show also indications for strong dependence before
and after the break point. Our results confirm earlier findings in the literature in the sense
that financial market practitioners have to consider basis risk when hedging CNY exposure
with CNH contracts (see Craig et al., 2013).
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Fig. 3. The graph shows the autocorrelation function of the pricing differential until the
break point (February 7th, 2014) sample with 163 lags (approx. 3 years).
4. Conclusions
We examine the CNH-CNY pricing differential and document empirical evidence for coin-
tegration. This result can be seen as an indication for ongoing arbitrage processes between
the onshore and the offshore market. However, we also show that the spread contains strong
persistence. Even by testing against a break in the persistence we find no indications that
the two time series have become more integrated over time. Regarding the present state of
the Chinese FX market these results have to be seen as empirical evidence that the RMB
has not reached its “New Normal” yet. Our findings show a substantial weakness of the
”one currency, two quotations approach”. The enduring CNH-CNY pricing differential re-
duces the effectiveness of the offshore RMB as an hedging tool. Hence, Beijing’s monetary
policy makers may benefit from the special architecture of a neither fixed nor floating FX
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Fig. 4. The graph shows the autocorrelation function of the pricing differential after the
break point (February 7th, 2014) sample with 157 lags (approx. 3 years).
regime. However, the bipolar structure of China’s FX markets generates substantial chal-
lenges. Speculators, for example, have been utilizing the Hong Kong market to bet against
the RMB (see Neely, 2017). Prevailing pricing differentials between the two FX rates made
substantial interventions both on the mainland and in the offshore market necessary and
demonstrated the costs of a managed float with two exchange rates.
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Abstract
This paper evaluates aggregated survey forecasts with forecast horizons of 3, 12,
and 24 months for the exchange rates of the Chinese yuan, the Hong Kong dollar,
the Japanese yen, and the Singapore dollar vis-à-vis the US dollar using common
forecast accuracy measures. Additionally, the rationality of the exchange rate pre-
dictions is assessed utilizing tests for unbiasedness and efficiency. All investigated
forecasts are irrational in the sense that the predictions are biased. However, these
results are inconsistent with an alternative measure of rationality based on methods
of applied time series analysis. Investigating the order of integration of the time
series and using cointegration analysis, empirical evidence supports the conclusion
that the majority of forecasts are rational. Regarding forerunning properties of the
predictions, the results are less convincing, with shorter term forecasts for the tightly
managed USD/CNY FX regime being one exception. As one important evaluation
result, it can be concluded, that the currency regime matters for the quality of ex-
change rate forecasts.
Keywords
Exchange rates, survey forecasts, forecast evaluation, forecast acccuracy, forecast ra-
tionality, cointegration, impulse response analysis
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Highlights
• I investigate monthly survey based exchange rate forecasts for the exchange
rates of the Chinese yuan, the Hong Kong dollar, the Japanese yen as well as
the Singapore dollar vis-à-vis the US dollar.
• I find strong empirical evidence for topically oriented trend adjustment (TOTA)
forecasting behavior for all four exchange rates.
• Especially for shorter forecast horizons the naïve no change prediction seems
to outperform the survey forecasts with the three months forecasts for the
USD/CNY exchange rate being the only exception.
• I show that for all four currency regimes the forecasts and actual exchange
rates share the same order of integration and find empirical evidence for long
term relationships.
• Impulse response analysis documents that for all currency regimes under in-
vestigation only the three months forecast for the managed USD/CNY ex-
change rate has forerunning properties.
• I present empirical evidence indicating that the forecasts for the managed Chi-
nese exchange rate systems are closest to be being rational and forerunning.
• Further research should focus on the predictability of regime shifts in managed
exchange rate systems and currency boards as well as the credibility of fixed
exchange rate regimes and its impact on forecast accuracy.
1. Introduction
The foreign exchange (FX) market belongs to the largest financial markets globally
(see, for example, Sosvilla-Rivero and Ramos-Herrera, 2013). Additionally, exchange
rates are crucial price variables in open economies and international finance (see Dreger
and Stadtmann, 2008; Dick, MacDonald, and Menkhoff, 2015) and have a significant
impact on foreign trade and cross border investments (see, for example, Kan, 2017).
Hence, the understanding of the price building processes in the FX market is relevant
for decision makers in general and for forecasters in particular (Ince and Molodtsova,
2017). This is also true for Asian currencies, because with respect to global GDP growth,
cross border investments and world trade Asian economies are becoming increasingly
important, and, in recent years, asset managers outside Asia seeking to diversify their
investment positions are focusing on Asia’s financial markets (see, for example, Dunis
and Shannon, 2005).
During the global financial crisis, various currencies have been under pressure of a
pronounced and unanticipated appreciation of the US dollar (Fratzscher, 2009). These
movements are a potential source of severe economic and financial consequences, be-
cause uncertainty regarding exchange rate movements might hinder economic activity
including cross border trade (see, for example, Thorbecke, 2008; Chit, Rizov, and Wil-
lenbockel, 2010). Hayakawa and Kimura (2009) have shown that especially in East Asia
intra-regional trade is negatively affected by FX volatility. In addition to that, both
foreign and domestic companies have to deal with currency risk (see Aggarwal, Chen,
and Yur-Austin, 2011; Aggarwal, 2013). De Grauwe and Markiewicz (2013) note that
especially in non-U.S. equity markets, and in certain sub-periods, currency risks have
been the major driver of risk premiums in the stock market. Since currency risk is non-
neglectable, FX forecasts may create economic value for financial market participants,
central banks, policy decision makers as well as importers and exporters. Following Duffy
and Giddy (1975), FX forecasts have to be seen as “significant inputs to decisions con-
cerning practically every aspect of international business” (see Duffy and Giddy, 1975, p.
1).
Owing to the growing importance of Asia’s major economies and the region’s most
important financial centers, this paper focuses on the investigation of forecasts for ex-
change rates of the Chinese yuan, the Hong Kong dollar, the Japanese yen, and the
Singapore dollar vis-à-vis the US dollar. Using measures of forecast accuracy, common
tests for rationality (i.e. unbiasedness and efficiency), as well methods of applied time
series analysis (i.e. cointegration analysis and impulse response functions), the quality
of survey forecasts for these exchange rates will be assessed. As a consequence of signif-
icant differences in FX regimes in the currency areas under investigation, it will also be
examined whether there exists empirical evidence for regime dependent variations in the
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quality of survey forecasts.
Given the relevance of the FX regime on the price building processes for exchange
rates, it is expected that survey forecasts do vary regarding accuracy and rationality. For
forecasters classifying the relevant exchange rate regime is a crucial step (see, for example,
Von Spreckelsen, Kunze, Windels, and von Mettenheim, 2014). Against the background
of a strong influence of policy makers on exchange rates in managed FX regimes and the
statutory provisions in currency boards it is standing to reason, that fixed and strongly
managed exchange rates are “easier” to forecast, because policy makers are following an
anticipated or even mandatory agenda. On the other hand, free float FX regimes seem
to lack these policy guidelines which makes it more difficult to forecast the future path
of exchange rates. Hence, while focusing on the investigation of survey based exchange
rate forecasts provided by Consensus Economics for four different currency regimes, this
paper seeks to combine two strands of research dealing with FX forecast evaluation and
FX regimes and, while doing so, to fill a relevant gap in the literature.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 delivers an overview of
the relevant literature. Chapter 3 lists the chosen currency areas as well as the data set
and describes the underlying regimes. Before exhibiting the methodological framework
Chapter 4 delivers initital empirical results. Chapter 5 presents the evaluation results.
Chapter 6 discusses the implications of the results in more detail and concludes the paper.
2. Literature overview
Frenkel and Mussa (1980) note that policy makers have to deal with FX market
fluctuations and that the predictability of FX rates is important in this context. Never-
theless, they also comment that “the facts indicate, however, that exchange-rate changes
are largely unpredictable” (see Frenkel and Mussa, 1980, p. 374). In their seminal pa-
per Meese and Rogoff (1983) discuss the inability of fundamental models to forecast
exchange rates in detail and motivate a large body of research dealing with the quality
of FX predictions (see, for example, Frankel and Rose, 1994; Cheung and Chinn, 1998;
Kilian and Taylor, 2003; Frenkel, Mauch, Rülke, et al., 2017, to name but a few). De-
spite the findings of Meese and Rogoff (1983) as well as Frenkel and Mussa (1980), FX
survey forecasts are still of relevance for economic agents. Especially for financial market
practitioners and decision makers, unable or unwilling to build up forecasting models for
numerous financial variables of their own, survey forecasts (for exchange rates) may serve
as one alternative. Ter Ellen, Verschoor, and Zwinkels (2013) annotate that investors in
the FX market have to gather costly information to be able to form expectations. Not
surprisingly, FX survey forecasts (both in aggregated and disaggregated form) have been
intensively assessed with regard to their rationality (as regards, for example, unbiasedness
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and efficiency) as well as accuracy.
In the context of the evaluation of FX survey forecasts, data sets from numerous
providers have been used.1 Especially, the rationality of FX predictions, which is also in
the focus of this paper, has been analyzed intensively (see, for example, Audretsch and
Stadtmann, 2005; De Grauwe and Markiewicz, 2013; Rülke and Pierdzioch, 2013) with
diverging results. Audretsch and Stadtmann (2005), who focus on disaggregated survey
forecasts from the Wall Street Journal, find no evidence for the assumption of rational
agents forming homogeneous expectations. Dominguez (1986) investigates survey fore-
casts for FX markets in emerging economies and concludes that the rational expectation
hypothesis has to be rejected. Avraham, Ungar, and Zilberfarb (1987) find similar ev-
idence for the Israeli shekel. Frenkel, Mauch, Rülke, et al. (2017) examine forecasters’
rationality regarding exchange rate predictions. Their work is of high relevance for the
focus of this paper because the authors empirically assess differences between currency
forecasts for developed and emerging economies. They present a link between forecast
accuracy as well as rationality and different currency areas and, hence, fill a relevant gap
in the literature on FX survey forecast evaluation.
Focusing on a specific Asian market, Tsuchiya and Suehara (2015) investigate forecasts
provided by Consensus Economics for the USD/CNY exchange rates between July 2005
and December 2012. The authors examine the directional accuracy of the forecasts and
conclude that forecasters are not inferior to a naïve benchmark. Tsuchiya and Suehara
(2015) find evidence for changes in FX forecasters herding behavior due to the financial
crisis and central bank interventions and conclude that the monetary policy respectively
the currency regime is of high relevance when evaluating FX forecasts. Duffy and Giddy
(1975) compare the predictability of flexible and fixed exchange regimes and state that
predictions for flexible exchange rates are futile. The monetary authorities’ influence on
the Japanese FX market (i.e. the exchange rate between the Japanese yen and the US
dollar) and the resulting forecast dispersion has been assessed by Reitz, Stadtmann, and
Taylor (2010). Also using data provided by Consensus Economics the authors conclude
that while with increasing volatility of the USD/JPY FX forecast dispersion increases,
policy interventions in the FX market have dampening effects on forecast dispersion.
MacDonald and Nagayasu (2015) evaluate USD/JPY forecasts provided by the Japan
1In addition to the forecasts provided by Consensus Economics (Leitner and Schmidt, 2006;
Beine, Bénassy-Quéré, and MacDonald, 2007; Jongen, Verschoor, Wolff, and Zwinkels, 2012; Ince and
Molodtsova, 2017) predictions collected via the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) Poll (Audretsch and Stadt-
mann, 2005; Mitchell and Pearce, 2007; Frenkel, Rülke, and Stadtmann, 2009; Rülke, Frenkel, and
Stadtmann, 2010), FX Week (e.g. Ter Ellen et al., 2013), Bloomberg (e.g. Pancotto, Pericoli, and Pistag-
nesi, 2014), Forecasts Unlimited (Bacchetta, Mertens, and Van Wincoop, 2009; Beckmann and Czudaj,
2017a,b; Ince and Molodtsova, 2017), Blue Chip Forecasts (Baghestani, 2010), Reuters (e.g. Bofinger
and Schmidt, 2003) as well as the ZEW Finanzmarkttest (e.g. Bofinger and Schmidt, 2003; Leitner and
Schmidt, 2006; Spiwoks and Hein, 2007; Heiden, Klein, and Zwergel, 2013) have been investigated. The
data sets provided from Consensus Economics which come to use in this paper carry the advantages of
a large historical database and three forecast horizons.
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Center for International Finance (JCIF) survey and conclude that predictions are irra-
tional.
When examining Asia’s foreign exchange markets it has to be acknowledged that,
unlike in the EMU, there does not exist a common currency area in Asia. Even more
than that, currency regimes do vary significantly. Following, for example, Klein and
Shambaugh (2008) it can be stated that the choice of the FX regime does matter and
is a central topic in international finance. For a lot of currency areas, the bipolar seg-
mentation between hard pegs or free floating only appears on the surface (Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 1995; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). For example, Moosa and Li (2017) remark
that in the case of China the identification of the FX regime is important for the de-
bate whether the Chinese currency is undervalued or not. This, in turn, is a relevant
decision variable for forecasters. Having said that, it has to be taken into consideration
that with the course of time monetary respectively FX regimes have changed manifold
(Hernandez and Montiel, 2003; Bordo, Choudhri, Fazio, and MacDonald, 2017). More-
over, most emerging economies do not have a long track record when it comes to floating
FX regimes (Kohlscheen, 2014). As a matter of fact, professional forecasters might also
adjust their behavior when publishing forecasts for different FX regimes. Chinn and
Frankel (1994) note that forecasters might be reluctant to deliver naïve predictions –
especially for unstable currencies. Duffy and Giddy (1975), focusing on flexible exchange
rates, present results indicating that for major exchange rates forecasting is not profitable.
3. Data set and FX regime classification
The monthly mean of survey FX forecasts with regard to four Asian currencies col-
lected by Consensus Economics is used. The data set contains three different forecast
horizons (3, 12, and 24 months) and ranges from January 1999 to March 2017. Forecasts
for the following exchange rates will be evaluated: Chinese yuan against the US dollar
(USD/CNY), Hong Kong dollar against the US dollar (USD/HKD), Japanese yen against
the US dollar (USD/JPY), and Singapore dollar against US dollar (USD/SGD).2
The four exchange rates are suitable for the purpose of this paper for various reasons.
Firstly, the currency areas are of high economic relevance in Asia and / or fulfill an im-
portant role in global financial markets. In terms of nominal GDP, for example, China
respectively Japan are the two largest economies in Asia and number two respectively
three globally. Furthermore, China is the world’s largest trade nation (as measured by
exports plus imports) and the Japanese currency plays an important role as a safe haven
2Throughout the paper all exchange rates are given as units per US dollar. Hence, a rise in the
exchange rate corresponds to a US dollar appreciation and a lower exchange rate corresponds to a
depreciation of the US dollar.
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asset for investors. Hong Kong and Singapore as city states share the common character-
istic to belong to the world’s most sophisticated financial centers (see, for example, Tse
and Yip, 2006; Woo, 2016). Secondly, the four currency areas do vary significantly when
it comes to their FX regimes (see, for example, Tse and Yip, 2006; Cheung, Chinn, and
Fujii, 2007; Chow, 2007; Takagi, 2007). Since this study also aims to examine possible
differences in the forecast accuracy controlling for the FX regime this classification is
important for the purpose of this paper.
However, the officially announced de jure exchange rate regimes do very often deviate
from the observable de facto exchange rate regimes (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Calvo
and Reinhart, 2002; Klein and Shambaugh, 2008; Patnaik, Shah, Sethy, and Balasub-
ramaniam, 2011). Additionally, currency regimes are not necessarily stable over time.
Since 1998, the IMF publishes de facto classifications of the countries’ FX regimes (see
Kokenyne, Veyrune, Habermeier, and Anderson, 2009). To ensure comparability the FX
regime classification in this paper is taken from the official IMF publication Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (i.e. years 2000 to 2016). This de
facto classification is useful because it is regularly updated (Patnaik, Shah, Sethy, and
Balasubramaniam, 2011). Table 1 summarizes the data used. Following this classifica-
tion the “degree of control” ranges from the USD/JPY (least) to the USD/HKD (most).
Furthermore, the USD/CNY FX rate is more strongly controlled than the USD/SGD FX
rate.
Table 1: Overview of monthly FX forecasts under investigation
Country Start End Quotation Current FX regime
PR China 01/1999 03/2017 USD/CNY Other Managed Arrangement
Hong Kong 01/1999 03/2017 USD/HKD Currency Board
Japan 01/1999 03/2017 USD/JPY Free Float
Singapore 01/1999 03/2017 USD/SGD Stabilized Arrangement
Sources: IMF AREAR 2016, Consensus Economics
Given the data set examined in this paper and the potential for regime shifts some
further preliminary thoughts regarding the definition of the four currency areas are war-
ranted.3
In the current political and academic debate China’s exchange rate regime receives
a lot of attention. Here, the focus lies on the People’s Bank of China’s influence on
the exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar or a basket of currencies. (Kan, 2017, delivers
3Following the reasoning of Hernandez and Montiel (2003); Bordo, Choudhri, Fazio, and MacDonald
(2017) it has to be accounted for possible shifts in the FX regimes investigated here.
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a good summary of the discussion). In recent years, the Chinese authorities carried
out far reaching adjustments to the FX regime (Cheung, Hui, and Tsang, 2016, 2017).
Most importantly, in 2005, the central bank announced that the Chinese currency would
switch to a managed float regime “with reference to a basket of currencies” (see Tian
and Chen, 2013, p. 16). Moosa and Li (2017) deliver a clear overview of the 2005
adjustments and the subsequent steps. The IMF’s de facto classification, as well as
important announcements by the Chinese government, can be found in Table 12 in the
Appendix.4
In contrast to the Chinese FX regime the Japanese currency’s floating exchange rate
regime is already in place since 1973 (see, for example, Hamada and Hayashi, 1985;
Hutchison and Walsh, 1992, as well as Table 13 in the Appendix). Hence, the existence
of regime shifts with relevance for the focus of this paper can be ruled out completely. The
same holds true for the currency board system of Hong Kong, which has been established
as early as 1983 and, since, has been in place (see, for example, Ho, 2002; Cook and
Yetman, 2014, as well as Table 14 in the Appendix). In contrast, the Monetary Authority
of Singapore (MAS) operates an exchange rate based monetary policy and, hence, the
FX rate is practically the instrument to steer both output and inflation (see, for example,
Siregar, Har, et al., 2001; Devereux, 2003; Chow, 2007; Chow, Lim, and McNelis, 2014, as
well as Table 15 in the Appendix). As a consequence there does not exist a free floating
USD/SGD exchange rate, but a managed regime which occasionally results in the more
volatile exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar in comparison to the Hong Kong dollar
(Devereux, 2003).5 This regime lasts for the entire time period under investigation.
4. Initial empirical analysis and methodological frame-
work
Before starting to evaluate the forecasts for the FX rates it is necessary to investigate
the trending behavior of the exchange rate time series and the corresponding forecasts.
To test for unit roots, the non-parametric test procedure proposed by Phillips and Perron
(1988) will be used. The results of the PP (Phillips and Perron) unit root tests in levels
and first differences (∆) are given in Table 2 below.
4The regime change in 2005 might also be relevant for the focus of this paper. Because of that,
robustness checks will be executed. It is important to note that for the USD/CNY FX rate controlling
for the notable regime shift in July 2005 would lead to a shorter data period ranging from August 2005
to March 2017.
5Based on standard deviation of log differences as an approximation of returns the volatility is highest
for the USD/JPY, followed by the USD/SGD, USD/CNY, and USD/HKD.
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Table 2: Phillips & Perron (PP) unit root tests
p-value (pv)
Country Time Series Level ∆
USD/CNY 3M forecast 0.99 0.01
12M forecast 0.99 0.01
24M forecast 0.99 0.01
actual 0.99 0.01
USD/HKD 3M forecast 0.03 0.01
12M forecast 0.01 0.01
24M forecast 0.01 0.01
actual 0.04 0.01
USD/JPY 3M forecast 0.63 0.01
12M forecast 0.77 0.01
24M forecast 0.79 0.01
actual 0.62 0.01
USD/SGD 3M forecast 0.61 0.01
12M forecast 0.76 0.01
24M forecast 0.85 0.01
actual 0.54 0.01
Reported are the results (p-values) of the PP unit roots tests for the
forecasts and the actual exchange rate for USD/CNY, USD/HKD,
USD/JPY, and USD/SGD with the forecast horizons of 3, 12, and 24
months in levels and first differences (∆).
Results unit root tests Following Table 2 above, with exception of the actual Hong
Kong dollar exchange rate and the corresponding forecasts statistical evidence for unit
roots are found for all time series under investigation.6 These results will be discussed in
more detail below.
6The results for the USD/CNY FX rate presented in Table 2 range from 01/1999 to 02/2017. The
results for time period 08/2005 to 03/2017 are in general similar and will not be reported in order to
preserve space.
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4.1. Measures of forecast accuracy
Theil’s U measure In a first step, straightforward measures of forecast evaluation will
be used. It will be started by calculating the Theil’s U measure (Theil, 1955). Equation
1 below shows the Theil’s U measure.
U = RMSE
Forecast
RMSENaive
(1)
The major advantages of this metric, which compares two competing forecasts, are
that it is easy to calculate, uncomplicated to interpret as well as dimensionless. Recently,
Ahmed, Liu, and Valente (2016) as well as Byrne, Korobilis, and Ribeiro (2016) utilize
the Theil’s U measure in the context of evaluating FX forecasts. The Theil’s U can easily
be calculated as the fraction of the root mean squared error (RMSE)7 of the forecast and
the naïve prediction.8
Diebold Mariano test Additionally, the Diebold Mariano (DM) test to check for equal
predictive ability of the survey forecast and the naïve prediction will be applied (see also
Diebold and Mariano, 1995). In difference to the Theil’s U measure the DM test allows to
statistically validate possible differences in forecast accuracy between the survey forecasts
and benchmark measures like the naïve prediction (see, for example, Kunze, Wegener,
Bizer, and Spiwoks, 2017).
TOTA coefficient In the context of forecast evaluation, the TOTA coefficient devel-
oped by Andres and Spiwoks (1999) is a reasonable supplement to the Theil’s U measure
and the DM test. The TOTA coefficient, as the fraction of the coefficient of determination
of the FX forecast and the actual FX rate at t+ h (R2Forecast;Actual,t+h) as well as the FX
forecast and the actual FX rate at t (R2Forecast;Actual,t), is shown in the Equation 2 below.
TOTA =
R2Forecast;Actual,t+h
R2Forecast;Actual,t
(2)
A comparably stronger linear relationship between the forecast and the FX rate at
t results in a TOTA coefficient smaller than 1. On the other hand, a TOTA coefficient
larger than 1 can be seen as an indication for the usefulness of the forecasts by defini-
tion (see Andres and Spiwoks, 1999). As stated above, this procedure has already been
7The RMSE itself is an often applied measure of forecast accuracy (see also Leitch and Tanner, 1991;
Hyndman and Koehler, 2006; Herwartz and Schlüter, 2017; Ryan and Whiting, 2017).
8The naïve prediction is used as competing forecast for the survey prediction. Throughout this paper
the naïve prediction is defined as the no change forecast, (i.e. Sˆt+h = St) whereas St is the FX spot
rate at t and Sˆt+h is the forecast of the FX spot rate for t+ h. Alternatively, instead of the no change
forecast the naïve prediction could have also been defined as trend following. However, given the specific
data set (e.g. turning points respectively trend reversals) it is presumed that the no change forecast to
be more appropriate for the purpose of this paper.
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applied to FX forecasts. For example, Baghestani (2010) concludes that forecasts for the
trade weighted USD/EUR FX rate delivered to the Blue Chip quarterly forecasts have
been subject to topically oriented trend adjustment. In their earlier study Bofinger and
Schmidt (2003) deliver similar results for the USD/EUR exchange rate.
Sign accuracy test Pierdzioch and Rülke (2015), for example, emphasize that de-
spite possible biasedness of survey forecasts for exchange rates the predictions might still
be useful in the sense of directional accuracy.9 Hence, the directional accuracy of pro-
vided forecasts will be investigated using the widely acknowledged sign accuracy test (see
Diebold and Lopez, 1996; Kolb and Stekler, 1996; Baghestani, 2008; Spiwoks, Bedke, and
Hein, 2009; Baghestani, Arzaghi, and Kaya, 2015). There also exists a handful of stud-
ies focusing on the directional accuracy of exchange rate forecasts for Asian currencies.
Tsuchiya and Suehara (2015) analyze the directional accuracy of USD/CNY forecasts also
using Consensus Economics data and conclude that only 12M forecasts are useful. The
authors investigate 1M, 3M, and 12M forecasts. Hence, the forecast horizons provided in
the data set of this study might deliver additional insights regarding directional accuracy
of USD/CNY forecasts. Pierdzioch and Rülke (2015) inter alia analyze FX forecasts for
the Singapore dollar with horizons of one respectively three months. This paper follows
the approach used for example by Spiwoks, Bedke, and Hein (2009). Table 3 below shows
a two by two contingency table. The sum of the entries in N11 and N22 gives the num-
ber of correct forecasts for the directional change of the exchange rate. The number of
incorrect forecasts is given by N21 and N12, respectively.
Table 3: Sign accuracy test
Forecast \ Actual event USD appreciates USD depreciates ∑
USD appreciates N11 N12 N1.
USD depreciates N21 N22 N2.∑
N.1 N.2 N
This table shows the two by two contingency table for the sign accuracy
test (see Spiwoks, Bedke, and Hein, 2009).
It will be tested for significant differences regarding directional accuracy between a
random directional prediction and the exchange rate forecast by performing a χ2 test
(see, for example, Diebold and Lopez, 1996; Nolte and Pohlmeier, 2007; Spiwoks, Bedke,
and Hein, 2009; Baghestani, 2010; Tsuchiya and Suehara, 2015).
9The concept of rationality in the sense of unbiasedness and orthogonality will be presented in Section
4.2.
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4.2. Rationality of foreign exchange forecasts
Finally, the rationality of predictions is an important attribute in the context of
forecast evaluation. This is also true for exchange rate predictions. In the case of the
USD/JPY exchange rate, for example, Frenkel, Rülke, and Stadtmann (2009) test for
the rationality of FX survey forecasts by applying two criteria – namely, unbiasedness
and orthogonality (i.e. efficiency). These criteria are common measures in the literature
dealing with forecast evaluation (see also Ito, 1990; MacDonald and Marsh, 1996) and,
hence, will be applied in this paper as well.
Test for unbiasedness Firstly, the test for unbiasedness will be used (see, for example,
Hafer, Hein, and MacDonald, 1992, who apply the test for unbiasedness for futures market
quotes, forward rates and survey forecasts for interest rates). Audretsch and Stadtmann
(2005), Frenkel, Rülke, and Stadtmann (2009), Frenkel, Mauch, Rülke, et al. (2017), as
well as Ince and Molodtsova (2017) investigate whether survey forecasts are unbiased
predictors of future FX rates and come to different conclusions. Following, for example,
Chinn and Frankel (1994), and more recently Ince and Molodtsova (2017) a simple linear
regression model with the actual exchange rate change (st+h − st) as dependent variable
and the expected exchange rate change (sˆt+h − st) as the independent variable will be
estimated, where st is the log of the price of one US dollar in the foreign currency and
the forecast of the exchanges at t for the horizon h is given as sˆt+h (with the forecast
horizons h = 3, 12, or 24 months).10 The error term is given by ut+h. For the test for
unbiasedness the joint H0 : α = 0 and β = 1 has to be empirically verified respectively
discarded (see, once again, Ince and Molodtsova, 2017).11
st+h − st = α + β(sˆt+h − st) + ut+h (3)
Test for efficiency To test for orthogonality (see, for example, Frenkel, Rülke, and
Stadtmann, 2009) the test for efficiency will be used. This test is also widely used in the
context of forecast evaluation (see inter alia Simon, 1989; Leitner and Schmidt, 2006).
Using this procedure, it is possible to verify whether the forecast errors are not related
to information available at the forecast date (see Nordhaus, 1987; Frenkel, Rülke, and
Stadtmann, 2009; Pancotto, Pericoli, and Pistagnesi, 2014; Frenkel, Mauch, Rülke, et al.,
2017). Within the empirically context of this paper this information will be represented
10Due to the non-stationarity of the USD/CNY, USD/JPY, and USD/SGD exchange rates and corre-
sponding forecasts regressions in levels would lead to distorted results (see Granger and Newbold, 1974;
Mitchell and Pearce, 2007). Notwithstanding, due to the stationarity of the USD/HKD FX rate and the
corresponding forecasts, to test for unbiasedness in the case of the USD/HKD forecasts, the test will be
executed in levels.
11In addition to that null hypothesis the residuals of the linear model have to be tested for autocor-
relation. The widely acknowledged Durbin Watson (DW) test is applied here (see Durbin and Watson,
1950, 1951)
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by the last available monthly exchange rate change at the forecast date (st − st-h).
st+h − sˆt+h = α + β(st − st−h) + ut+h (4)
Here, the joint null hypothesis is given by H0 : α = 0 and β = 0. Hence, if α and /
or β are significantly different from zero there does not exist any empirical evidence for
efficiency of forecasts (see, for example, Frenkel, Rülke, and Stadtmann, 2009; Ince and
Molodtsova, 2017).
Cointegration tests In addition to the before mentioned tests for rationality this
paper focuses on alternative measures of rationality. Cheung and Chinn (1998) propose
to investigate the properties of the relevant time series. Following Cheung and Chinn
(1998), as a necessary condition for rationality, the time series of the actual exchange
rates and the corresponding forecast should share the same order of integration. In
addition to that, there should exist long term relationships (i.e. cointegration) between
the two time series (see, for example, Liu and Maddala, 1992; Cheung and Chinn, 1998).
Two time series are said to be cointegrated when they share a common stochastic trend
(see, for example, Granger, 1981; Engle and Granger, 1987; Lütkepohl and Krätzig, 2004).
To test for cointegrating relationships the Johansen procedure will be used (see Johansen,
1991). In a further step it will be tested for Granger causal relationships. If there exists
a cointegrating relationship between the two time series this can be seen as evidence for
the existence of at least unidirectional Granger causality. In general, a time series xt
Granger causes time series yt when past values of xt provide additional content when
forecasting yt. (see, for example, Engle and Granger, 1987; Gelper and Croux, 2007); or
phrased somewhat differently past values of xt help to predict future values of yt. Hence,
for the FX forecasts to be useful predictors of future currency movements in this sense
the survey forecasts (sˆt+h,t) should Granger cause the actual exchange rates (st+h).
Order of integration Given the initial results from section 4, the first necessary con-
dition is fulfilled for the forecasts under investigation, since the PP test for unit roots
indicates that the actual FX rate and the corresponding survey predictions share the
same order of integration for all currency pairs (see Table 2 above). The USD/CNY,
USD/JPY and USD/SGD FX rate and their corresponding forecasts are I(1) (i.e. non-
stationary). These results correspond to earlier findings of Cheung and Chinn (1998),
who have investigated 1M, 6M, and 12M forecasts for the USD/JPY, USD/CAD and
the USD/DEM forecast. The USD/HKD FX rate and the corresponding forecasts are
I(0) (i.e. stationary). Owing to the FX regime of a currency board, this finding is not
surprising at all. 12
12Due to the stationarity testing for cointegration makes no sense in the case of the USD/HKD FX
rate. Hence, the cointegration tests are only excecuted for the USD/CNY, USD/JPY, and USD/SGD
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5. Empirical evidence
Results Theil’s U, DM test, TOTA coefficient The results of the forecast accuracy
measures Theil’s U, DM test as well as the TOTA coefficient are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Measures of Forecast Accuracy
Exchange rate Time series Theil’s U pv DM test TOTA
USD/CNY 3M forecast 0.78 0.11 0.99
12M forecast 0.71 0.32 0.99
24M forecast 0.86 0.69 0.93
USD/HKD 3M forecast 1.22 0.02 0.97
12M forecast 1.03 0.81 0.86
24M forecast 0.92 0.63 1.03
USD/JPY 3M forecast 1.13 0.01 0.85
12M forecast 1.12 0.08 0.51
24M forecast 0.86 0.20 0.10
USD/SGD 3M forecast 1.09 0.04 0.95
12M forecast 1.05 0.58 0.81
24M forecast 1.04 0.78 0.58
Reported are the results for the Theil’s U measure, the Diebold Mariano
(DM) test and the TOTA coefficient for the forecasts for USD/CNY,
USD/HKD, USD/JPY, and USD/SGD with forecast horizons of 3, 12,
and 24 months.
Based on the results of the Theil’s U measure (see Table 4) the mean forecast for the
USD/CNY FX rate13 seems to be more accurate than the naïve prediction for all three
forecast horizons. For the USD/HKD 24M, as well as the USD/JPY 24M forecast, the
Theil’s U measure indicates that the survey predictions are more accurate than the naïve
forecast. For the remaining seven forecast time series a Theil’s U measure larger than
one implies that the naïve prediction is more accurate. Considering the results from the
DM test procedure for equal forecast accuracy delivers rather sobering results: From the
five forecast time series with a Theil’s U < 1 the H0 of equal forecast accuracy cannot be
rejected on the 10% level. Even more than that, the H0 of equal forecast accuracy has
to be rejected for four forecast time series which have a Theil’s U > 1 (i.e. USD/HKD
FX rates.
13The results for the USD/CNY FX rate presented in this Chapter for the period January 1999 to
March 2017 are similar to the results for the time period August 2005 to March 2017 and, hence, will
not be reported in order to preserve space. The results are available by request from the corresponding
author.
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3M, USD/JPY 3M, USD/JPY 12M and USD/SGD 3M). Hence, especially in the case
of shorter forecast horizons, the naïve predictions seems to be the superior forecast.
Interestingly, the superiority of the naïve predicition seems to be regime independent.
As regards topically oriented trend adjustments, the only TOTA coefficient > 1 belongs
to the USD/HKD 24M forecast. Especially in the case of the USD/JPY forecasts, the
topically oriented forecasting behavior becomes obvious (i.e. TOTA = 0.10).
Results sign accuracy test The results of the sign accuracy test are presented in
Table 5 below. On the 5%-level the USD/CNY as well as the USD/HKD forecasts are
significantly better than a random forecast for all three forecast horizons. Hence, the
results contradict the earlier findings of Tsuchiya and Suehara (2015). For the USD/JPY
and USD/SGD predictions the results are more heterogeneous. For the 3M forecast for
the USD/JPY as well as the USD/SGD no statistically significant difference from the
random prediction regarding the sign accuracy has been found. The USD/JPY 12M
forecast is worse than a random prediction for the direction of change, whereas the 12M
forecast for USD/SGD outperforms the random prediction. The 24M forecasts both for
the USD/JPY and for USD/SGD are better than a random prediction. As regards the
regime dependent quality of FX forecasts it is noteworthy that the USD/CNY exchange
rate as well as the USD/HKD exchange rate forecasts are consistently more sign accurate
than the random prediction.
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Table 5: Results sign accuracy test
Exchange rate Time series Test statistic Test result
USD/CNY 3M forecast 18.15 +
12M forecast 14.10 +
24M forecast 4.00 +
USD/HKD 3M forecast 16.72 +
12M forecast 42.32 +
24M forecast 47.43 +
USD/JPY 3M forecast 1.42 N/A
12M forecast 10.34 −
24M forecast 3.46 +
USD/SGD 3M forecast 0.86 N/A
12M forecast 5.04 +
24M forecast 12.41 +
Reported are the test results for the sign accuracy test for
USD/CNY, USD/HKD, USD/JPY and USD/SGD with the
forecast horizons of 3, 12, and 24 months. The critical value
on the 5%-level is 3.84. ’+’ indicates that the survey forecast
is better than a random prediction. ’−’ indicates that the
random prediction is better than the survey forecast. ’N/A’
indicates that no significant difference in sign accuracy ex-
ists.
Results test for unbiasedness The results of the test for unbiasedness are presented
in Table 6 below. For the forecasts under investigation the joint H0 : α = 0 and β = 1
could not be empirically verified, because the requirement of nonexistence of autocor-
related residuals is not fulfilled. Hence, the predictions are biased for all forecasts re-
spectively regimes under investigation. These results generally confirm earlier findings in
the literature (see, for example, Frenkel, Rülke, and Stadtmann, 2009; Frenkel, Mauch,
Rülke, et al., 2017; Ince and Molodtsova, 2017). Having said that, the empirical evidence
does not allow any robust conclusion with regard to FX regime dependent differences of
forecast rationality.
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Table 6: Results unbiasedness test
Exchange rate Time series α SE α β SE β Test statistic DW-test
USD/CNY 3M forecast 0.08 0.03 0.99 0.00 19.60 0.68
12M forecast 0.73 0.07 0.90 0.01 120.78 0.13
24M forecast 1.68 0.10 0.77 0.01 331.95 0.04
USD/HKD 3M forecast 0.38 0.14 0.81 0.07 46.20 0.37
12M forecast 1.03 0.16 0.50 0.08 98.21 0.57
24M forecast 1.05 0.12 0.49 0.06 173.24 0.48
USD/JPY 3M forecast 0.00 0.00 -0.14 0.14 68.32 0.68
12M forecast 0.00 0.01 -0.13 0.14 66.54 0.19
24M forecast 0.02 0.01 0.94 0.14 2.57 0.06
USD/SGD 3M forecast 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.13 48.56 0.68
12M forecast 0.01 0.00 0.40 0.18 27.52 0.16
24M forecast 0.03 0.01 1.05 0.29 35.32 0.07
Reported are the test results for the test for unbiasedness: The test statistic of the
F-test as well as the DW-test, the coefficients α and β and the corresponding standard
errors (SE) for USD/CNY, USD/HKD, USD/JPY and USD/SGD with the forecast
horizons of 3, 12, and 24 months. The critical value on the 5%-level is 3.88.
Results test for efficiency The results of the efficiency tests are presented in Table
7 below. On the 5%-level empirical evidence for efficient forecasts has been found for the
following forecasts: USD/CNY 3M, 12M and 24M, USD/HKD 12M, 24M, USD/SGD
12M, 24M. In contradiction to the results from the unbiasedness tests these findings are
more convincing, because forecasts seem to be efficient for managed exchange rates.
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Table 7: Results efficiency test
Exchange rate Time series Test statistic
USD/CNY 3M forecast 0.40
12M forecast 0.03
24M forecast 2.07
USD/HKD 3M forecast 12.2
12M forecast 3.43
24M forecast 0.85
USD/JPY 3M forecast 29.04
12M forecast 14.39
24M forecast 7.10
USD/SGD 3M forecast 9.92
12M forecast 2.26
24M forecast 2.70
Reported are the results of the efficiency
tests’ test statistic for USD/CNY, USD/HKD,
USD/JPY and USD/SGD with the forecast
horizons of 3, 12, and 24 months. The critical
value on the 5%-level is 3.88.
Results cointegration tests Finally, as mentioned above, the procedure to test for
the rationality of FX forecasts proposed by Cheung and Chinn (1998) will be applied. The
results of the cointegration tests for the pairs of forecasts, and actual FX rate which are
I(1) (i.e. the USD/JPY, the USD/SGD as well as the USD/CNY FX rate), are presented
in the Tables 8 to 10 below. Interestingly, only the 24M forecast for the USD/JPY FX
rate does not fulfill the condition of cointegration (see Table 10). For the remaining eight
pairs of forecasts and actual FX rates empirical evidence for a cointegrating relationship
has been found, i.e. the null hypothesis of no cointegration had to be rejected at least on
the 5%-level.
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Table 8: Results cointegration tests USD/CNY
Test statistic 10% 5% 1%
3M forecast
r ≤ 1 0.91 6.50 8.18 11.65
r = 0 45.84 12.91 14.90 19.19
12M forecast
r ≤ 1 0.76 6.50 8.18 11.65
r = 0 25.62 12.91 14.90 19.19
24M forecast
r ≤ 1 0.77 6.50 8.18 11.65
r = 0 16.85 12.91 14.90 19.19
Reported are the test statistics and critical values for the cointe-
gration tests for the USD/CNY forecast and the actual USD/CNY
exchange rate for the 3M, 12M, and 24M forecast horizon. The
H0 of no cointegrating relationship is given by r = 0. The H0 of
at least one cointegrating relationship is given by r ≤ 1.
Table 9: Results cointegration tests USD/JPY
Test statistic 10% 5% 1%
3M forecast
r ≤ 1 3.53 6.50 8.18 11.65
r = 0 119.77 12.91 14.90 19.19
12M forecast
r ≤ 1 4.97 6.50 8.18 11.65
r = 0 22.50 12.91 14.90 19.19
24M forecast
r ≤ 1 3.44 6.50 8.18 11.65
r = 0 5.80 12.91 14.90 19.19
Reported are the test statistics and critical values for the cointe-
gration tests for the USD/JPY forecast and the actual USD/JPY
exchange rate for the 3M, 12M, and 24M forecast horizon. The
H0 of no cointegrating relationship is given by r = 0. The H0 of
at least one cointegrating relationship is given by r ≤ 1.
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Table 10: Results cointegration tests USD/SGD
Test statistic 10% 5% 1%
3M forecast
r ≤ 1 0.96 6.50 8.18 11.65
r = 0 108.07 12.91 14.90 19.19
12M forecast
r ≤ 1 0.99 6.50 8.18 11.65
r = 0 23.53 12.91 14.90 19.19
24M forecast
r ≤ 1 2.00 6.50 8.18 11.65
r = 0 15.81 12.91 14.90 19.19
Reported are the test statistics and critical values for the cointe-
gration tests for the USD/SGD forecast and the actual USD/SGD
exchange rate for the 3M, 12M, and 24M forecast horizon. The
H0 of no cointegrating relationship is given by r = 0. The H0 of
at least one cointegrating relationship is given by r ≤ 1.
Model estimation In a final evaluation, it will be tested for Granger causality using
impulse response functions for the relevant bivariate vector autoregressive models (VAR)
respectively bivariate vector error correction models (VECM). The results predetermine
which model type is appropriate for the pairs of forecasts and actual FX rate. For the
USD/CNY (3M, 12M, and 24M), the USD/JPY (3M, and 12M), as well as the USD/SGD
(3M, 12M, and 24M) will be used. For the stationary USD/HKD time series (3M, 12M,
and 24M) VAR models in levels will be used. And finally, for the USD/JPY 24M FX
rates a VAR model in 1st differences has to be applied due to the lack of a cointegrating
relationship between the two non-stationary time series. Table 11 below summarizes the
applied models. Lag lengths for the VAR models is determined using the Schwarz Crite-
rion (SC) (see Schwarz et al., 1978). The vector error correction models have a lag of two.
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Table 11: Estimated models for actual FX rates and corresponding
forecasts
Exchange rate Forecast horizon Model Lag
USD/CNY 3M VECM 2
12M VECM 2
24M VECM 2
USD/HKD 3M VAR in levels 3
12M VAR in levels 3
24M VAR in levels 3
USD/JPY 3M VECM 2
12M VECM 2
24M VAR in 1st differences 1
USD/SGD 3M VECM 2
12M VECM 2
24M VECM 2
This table summarizes the estimated models (i.e. vector error correction
model (VECM) as well as vector auto regressive (VAR) models) for the
corresponding relationships between the forecasts and actual FX rates.
Lag lengths are reported in the last column.
Useful financial market forecasts should deliver relevant information for actual fu-
ture movements (see, for example, Schwarzbach, Kunze, Rudschuck, and Windels, 2012;
Kunze, Wegener, Bizer, and Spiwoks, 2017). This should also be the case for exchange
rates. As noted above the concept of Granger causality will be used to investigate the
hypothesis whether forecasts under investigation are useful in a Granger sense.
The empirical confirmation of a cointegrating relationship can be seen as evidence for
the existence of at least unidirectional Granger causality. However, it is not clear whether
the Granger causality is running from the forecast to the actual FX rate, from the actual
FX rate to the forecast or if it is bidirectional. Furthermore, in the case of the VAR
models no preliminary conclusions regarding Granger causal relationships are possible.
Impulse response analysis In an empirically setting impulse response functions are a
useful tool to analyze these possible relationships between time series regarding Granger
causality (see, for example, Basse and Reddemann, 2011). One advantage of impulse
response functions stems from the fact that they are easy to interpret. The results of
the impulse response analysis can be found in the Figures 1 to 4 below. The confidence
intervals (with a confidence level of 99%) have been derived by bootstrapping (see Efron
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and Tibshirani, 1994) and 1,000 runs have been used. For the orthogonal impulses (see
Sims, 1980) the length of the impulses is 30. Empirical evidence for a Granger causal
relationship would be indicated by a significant response of the forecast time series to
a shock to the actual times series or vice versa. A significant response is defined by a
move of the response time series including the upper and lower confidence band above,
or below the zero line (see Kunze, Wegener, Bizer, and Spiwoks, 2017).
Following the IRF results for the USD/CNY 3M VECM shown in the panels (a) and
(b) in Figure 1 it can be stated that there exists empirical evidence for bidirectional
Granger causality between the time series of the FX forecast and the actual FX rate.
Hence, short term forecasts for the USD/CNY FX rate are not only rational in the
sense of the approach proposed by Cheung and Chinn (1998) (i.e. sharing the same
order of integration), but it is also shown that the USD/CNY FX forecast with a three
months horizon (3M) has forerunning properties regarding the USD/CNY exchange rate.
However, for the longer term forecast horizons this finding is not sustainable (see panels
c, d, e, and f in Figure 1). Instead, the 12M and 24M forecasts for the FX rates are only
granger caused by the actual USD/CNY rate. This result may also be seen as supporting
evidence for the results from the measures of forecast accuracy (i.e. especially the TOTA
coefficient).
In the case of the VARmodels for the forecast and actual time series for the USD/HKD
exchange rates only one Granger causal relationship has been found (i.e. the response
from the 3M USD/HKD forecast to an impulse from the the 3M USD/HKD actual rate
as shown in panel b of Figure 2). For all three forecast horizons the USD/HKD FX
rate predictions have no statistical significant forerunning properties for the actual FX
rate. This may come as a surprise, because given the special properties of the currency
board arrangement conventional wisdom would indicate that predicting the FX rate is
easier. Having said that, it is important to note, that due to the stationarity of the time
series under investigation for neither forecast horizon there exists a long term relationship
between the actual rate and the forecast.
The interpretation of the results for the IRF for the USD/JPY as well as for the
USD/SGD forecasts is rather straightforward. Based on the vector error correction mod-
els no evidence for forerunning properties of relevant forecast time series has been found
(see Figure 3 panel a and c as well as Figure 4 panel a, c, and e). The same holds true for
the VAR model in first differences for the USD/JPY exchange rate with a 24M forecast
horizon (see Figure 3 panel e).
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(a) 3M: Impulse by USD/CNY forecast (b) 3M: Impulse by USD/CNY actual
(c) 12M: Impulse by USD/CNY forecast (d) 12M: Impulse by USD/CNY actual
(e) 24M: Impulse by USD/CNY forecast (f) 24M: Impulse by USD/CNY actual
Fig. 1. The graphs show the impulse response functions for the USD/CNY forecast and
the actual USD/CNY exchange rate for the 3M, 12M, and 24M forecast horizon.
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(a) 3M: Impulse by USD/HKD forecast (b) 3M: Impulse by USD/HKD actual
(c) 12M: Impulse by USD/HKD forecast (d) 12M: Impulse by USD/HKD actual
(e) 24M: Impulse by USD/HKD forecast (f) 24M: Impulse by USD/HKD actual
Fig. 2. The graphs show the impulse response functions for the USD/HKD forecast and
the actual USD/HKD exchange rate for the 3M, 12M, and 24M forecast horizon.
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(a) 3M: Impulse by USD/JPY forecast (b) 3M: Impulse by USD/JPY actual
(c) 12M: Impulse by USD/JPY forecast (d) 12M: Impulse by USD/JPY actual
(e) 24M: Impulse by USD/JPY forecast (f) 24M: Impulse by USD/JPY actual
Fig. 3. The graphs show the impulse response functions for the USD/JPY forecast and
the actual USD/JPY exchange rate for the 3M, 12M, and 24M forecast horizon.
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(a) 3M: Impulse by USD/SGD forecast (b) 3M: Impulse by USD/SGD actual
(c) 12M: Impulse by USD/SGD forecast (d) 12M: Impulse by USD/SGD actual
(e) 24M: Impulse by USD/SGD forecast (f) 24M: Impulse by USD/SGD actual
Fig. 4. The graphs show the impulse response functions for the USD/SGD forecast and
the actual USD/SGD exchange rate for the 3M, 12M, and 24M forecast horizon.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper monthly survey based exchange rate forecasts for the exchange rates
of the Chinese yuan, the Hong Kong dollar, the Japanese yen as well as the Singapore
dollar vis-à-vis the US dollar have been investigated regarding accuracy and rationality.
Thereby, some interesting and relevant general results are worth mentioning. Rather
strong empirical evidence for topically orientated (TOTA) forecasting behavior for all
four exchange rates has been found. Furthermore, especially for shorter forecast horizons
(i.e. 3M) the naïve no change prediction seems to outperform the survey forecasts with
the three months forecasts for the USD/CNY exchange rate being the only exception.
As regards sign accuracy for the forecasts for the USD/CNY and USD/HKD, empirical
evidence supports the conclusion that the survey forecasts are more precise than a random
prediction for all three forecast horizons under investigation. These results have been
supported by the test for efficiency. Having said that, empirical evidence shows that all
forecasts are irrational in the sense of the test for unbiasedness, due to the existence of
autocorrelated residuals.
Applying an alternative framework to test for rationality proposed by Cheung and
Chinn (1998), it has been shown that, for all four currency regimes the forecasts and
actual exchange rates share the same order of integration. Furthermore, for the foreign
exchange regimes with I(1) time series (i.e. USD/CNY, USD/JPY, and USD/SGD) em-
pirical evidence supports the hypothesis of the existence of cointegrating relationships
and, hence, a long term relation has been statistically validated. The only exception has
been the USD/JPY forecast with a forecast horizon of 24 months. However, impulse
response analysis for all currency regimes under investigation indicated that only the
three months forecast for the managed USD/CNY exchange rate has forerunning prop-
erties. More generally, forerunning properties of the remaining survey forecasts under
investigation are rather limited.
Furthermore, as regards regime dependent differences with respect to accuracy and
rationality it has not been shown that exchange rates for fixed or closely managed ex-
change rates are in general easier to forecast. Despite the fact that no definite conclusion
regarding FX regime dependent forecast accuracy respectively rationality of the survey
predictions is suitable, the presented empirical evidence indicates that the forecasts for
the managed Chinese exchange rate systems are closest to be being rational and fore-
running, especially for the three months forecast horizons. Furthermore, also taking into
account the results for the forecast evaluation of the USD/HKD exchange rate it can be
stated that forecast accuracy – especially when it comes to sign accuracy – seems to be
higher for stronger controlled exchange rate regimes. These findings are relevant both for
the recipients of foreign exchange forecasts (e.g. corporate managers or politicians) and
for the monetary respectively FX policy makers themselves.
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After all, these findings may not be extraordinary surprising, as in managed foreign
exchange regimes monetary policy authorities have to follow a self or government obliged
framework. However, it has to be taken into account, that strongly regulated FX markets
may be much more exposed to event risks and tail events, respectively, like for example
currency crisis and, most importantly in the context of the results of this study, shifts in
the FX regimes (see, for example, Husain, Mody, and Rogoff, 2005; Fiess and Shankar,
2009; Abildgren, 2014). Having said that, further research is necessary and should, par-
ticularly, focus on the predictability of regime shifts in managed exchange rate systems
and currency boards, the credibility of fixed exchange rate regimes as well as the influence
thereof on forecast accuracy and rationality, respectively.
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Appendix
Table 12: China FX arrangement based on IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
Arrangement AREAER reports Important announcements / changes
Conventional pegged arrangement 2000 - 2005 ◦ July 21st, 2005: People’s Bank of China (PBOC) revalued USD/CNY to 8.11; CNY FX
rate will be determined by an undisclosed basket of currencies
Crawling peg 2006 - 2007 ◦ effective August 1st. 2006 IMF classifies FX arrangement as crawling peg
Stabilized arrangement 2008 - 2009 ◦ from April 30st, 2008 IMF FX arrangement was classified as crawl-like arrangement due
to changes in IMF classification
Crawl-like arrangement 2010 - 2015 ◦ effective June 1st, 2008 IMF classifies FX arrangement as stabilized arrangement
Other managed arrangement 2016 ◦ effective June 21st, 2010 the de facto exchange rate was reclassified to a crawl-like arrange-
ment
◦ April 16th, 2012: USD/CNY trading band was officially widened from +/-0.5% to 1.0%
◦ March 17th, 2014: USD/CNY trading band was officially widened from +/-1.0% to 2.0%
◦ effective December 24th, 2014 the de facto exchange rate was reclassified to other managed
arrangement
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2000-2016
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Table 13: Japan FX arrangement based on IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
Arrangement AREAER reports Important announcements / changes
Independently floating 2000 - 2007 ◦ from April 30st, 2008 IMF FX arrangement was classified as free floating due to changes
in IMF classification
Free floating 2008 - 2016 ◦ September 15th, 2010: Ministry of Finance intervened in FX market
- March 18th, August 4th, October 31st, 2011 Ministry of Finance intervened in FX market
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2000-2016
Table 14: Hong Kong FX arrangement based on IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
Arrangement AREAER reports Important announcements / changes
Currency board 2000 - 2016 ◦ May 18th, 2005: Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) established a trading band of
USD/HKD 7.75 to USD/HKD 7.85
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2000-2016
Table 15: Singapore FX arrangement based on IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
Arrangement AREAER reports Important announcements / changes
Managed floating with no pre-announced
path for the exchange rate
2000 - 2005 ◦ effective January 1, 2006, the de facto exchange rate arrangement has been reclassified
retroactively to other managed arrangement
Other managed arrangement 2006 - 2009 ◦ effective April 14th, 2010 arrangement was (retroactively) reclassified to crawl-like ar-
rangement
Crawl-like arrangement 2010 - 2013 ◦ effective September 12th, 2011 arrangement was reclassified to other managed arrangement
Stabilized arrangement 2014 - 2016 ◦ effective November 9th, 2011 arrangement was reclassified to crawl-like arrangement
◦ effective January 1st, 2013 arrangement was reclassified to stabilized arrangement
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2000-2016
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